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My personal aims with this book are twofold. Firstly, I want to stress 
the importance of the anthropogenous greenhouse effect and to expose 
its grave consequences for mankind, many of which are not seen at all 
by the general public and the rest mostly being underrated, often even 
by scientists working in this field. With this exposition I will try to 
contribute my share to counterbalancing the, for the most part, 
appallingly short-sighted and egocentric political debate about this 
problem and the questions connected with it, e.g. the carbon-tax. And I 
want to support all those fighting for much more rigorous measures 
against the greenhouse effect, for renewable energy and, last not least, 
for the well-being of the people in poor countries now and in the future. 
But, surely, whether such measures are right depends on the question if 
the arguments in this book, or their better substitutes, back the claims to 
be made here. 
Secondly, I want to show that ethics, in particular welfare ethics like 
utilitarianism, and even more particular welfare ethics incorporating 
justice like the criterion utilex introduced by me, are able to confront 
such difficult and far-reaching social, technical and ecological problems 
like the greenhouse effect, which then translate into problems of social 
justice. And I want to show that such ethics are able to give, justified in 
detail, moral recommendations as to what to do with these problems. 
This means that there is a different, supra-partisan voice, besides the 
single personal and national voices and the political bargaining and 
fighting. Up to now no similar, quantitative welfarist assessment of the 
greenhouse effect and its alternatives has been made, nor are there 
quantitative welfarist inquiries of other big questions of social justice as 
one would expect utilitarians and other welfare ethicists to perform. 
This is a shame because it makes people think that ethics, in particular 
welfare ethics, is either irrelevant for such questions or at best the 
background for individual behavior in personal relations but no adviser 
for the big social issues. Thus, the following study, which tries to assess 
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the greenhouse effect and its alternatives quantitatively, does pioneer 
work and has to solve many still open methodological and empirical 
questions. Therefore, I hope for the reader's forbearance toward many 
still provisional solutions. And I hope to encourage other ethicists to 
continue this work and to apply this approach in other fields. 
The argument in this book is organized as follows: 
(1) First, the specific questions of this study are explained. Specifically, 
four options with respect to the greenhouse effect, namely business as 
usual and three more or less radical abatement options, will be 
evaluated from the point of view of several ethics, the Kantian 
Categorical Imperative or some sustainability criteria of environmental 
ethics but first of all from the point of view of two welfare ethics: 
utilitarianism and utilex. 
(2) Then, the methodology of this welfare inquiry is explained: i. In 
particular the impacts of the greenhouse effect and of the abatement 
options on human and social life will be estimated according to the data 
found in the appertaining literature. ii. These impacts then will be 
evaluated from the personal, individual points of view. For this personal 
evaluation some sort of rational hedonism is taken as the relevant 
criterion, i.e. the view that individual desirability is proportional to the 
subjective well-being of the respective subject. iii. The individual 
evaluations will then be integrated to various moral evaluations of the 
options in question. 
(3) Chapter 3 contains the inquiry about the social consequences of 
business as usual and their personal desirability for the individuals. It is 
subdivided on the basis of the various types of damages - apart from 
section 3.3 where details of the hedonistic evaluation are explained. 
(4) The next chapter contains the analogue to chapter 3 with respect to 
the abatement options. 
(5) The material gathered so far is then used for the moral evaluations 
of the four options according to utilitarianism, utilex (both without and 
with temporal discounting), a sustainability criterion of environmental 
ethics, Kant's Categorical Imperative, and neminem laedere ( the 
criterion 'do not harm anybody!'). According to all these criteria, the 
severest abatement option is found to be the morally best respectively 
obligatory alternative. The cost-welfare relations of the abatement 
options are analyzed, too. Again the severest abatement option is found 
to be the most efficient. 
(6) The simple criterion that the morally best option is always morally 
obligatory is rejected. Then for welfarist ethics the general question 
arises as to which actions are morally obligatory. A general answer to 
this question is sketched: a historizing conception of moral obligations. 
In addition, the problem of what and how moral valuation criteria can 
be justified is dealt with. 
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(7) Finally, these general conceptions are applied to the greenhouse 
effect. It is claimed that we have a moral duty to implement the most 
stringent, politically feasible norms for greenhouse gas abatement. 
As is necessary with a quantitative approach the inquiry contains 
some mathematical formulas and calculations - but nothing requiring 
more than school mathematics. And all such technical parts (as well as 
criticisms of competing theories) are banished into paragraphs in small 
print which may be skipped without problems for understanding the 
main parts of the book. 
In writing this book I have profited from the help of other people. In 
particular I wish to thank Dieter Birnbacher, Christoph Fehige, Stefan 
Guhe, Steven Lukes, Sandro Nannini and Reinhard Suck for very 
helpful suggestions and discussion and Julia Weiss, Dennis John 




 Siena, July 2000 
 Christoph Lumer 



























1. Aims of this Study 
The anthropogenous greenhouse effect is in danger of becoming the 
biggest environmental problem of this century with enormous negative 
consequences for mankind: It threatens to kill hundreds of millions 
people in this century. Unfortunately, the economic costs for preventing 
these consequences range from very high to gigantic - at least according 
to traditional economic assessments. The costs of eliminating the CFCs 
are in the (US-)billions (= 109) of US-dollars per year for some years; 
the costs of reducing sulphuric acid may be in the tens of billions 
(Schelling 1992, 3); the costs of preventing the anthropogenous 
greenhouse effect instead, in the long run, will be higher than (US-
)trillion (= 1012) US-dollars per year - always according to these 
traditional assessments (cf. below). But even such sums can absolutely 
be paid. This combination of enormous damages and high prevention 
costs, moreover, is morally explosive because the present generation 
enjoys the advantages of the causes of the anthropogenous greenhouse 
effect and eventually would have to pay a considerable part of the cost 
of its prevention, whereas the disadvantages for the most part are 
externalized on future generations. 
Despite the tremendous seriousness of the anthropogenous 
greenhouse effect up to now it has not been the object of much attention 
in environmental ethics. In particular there is no global assessment of 
the various alternatives in this field from a utilitarian point of view or 
that of some other welfarist ethic. This in one part is due to the difficult 
empirical questions, but to another - perhaps even more important - part 
it is due to the fact that, shamefully, in welfare ethics there is no 
tradition for assessing even the options (with various advantages and 
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disadvantages) concerning any other big and difficult problem of social 
distributive justice - like developmental aid, rationing of medical 
resources, pensions and intergenerational justice, equity of income etc.1 
Even important parts of the methodology necessary for such studies are 
lacking, in particular good, ethically acceptable methods of measuring 
personal desirabilities. 
Some first economic assessments of the global social and economic 
consequences and costs of the greenhouse effect, which come closer to 
what an ethicist needs for evaluating these phenomena, have been 
published recently (e.g. Fankhauser 1995; Tol 1995; Pearce et al. 1996). 
In spite of being the best material presently available even these studies, 
from an empirical point of view, often only rely on informed guesses; 
e.g. sometimes figures from the US are transferred to the world as a 
whole. But still more importantly from a moral point of view is that all 
these studies are cost-benefit analyses, i.e. analyses which try to 
measure all advantages and disadvantages of the options in monetary 
terms. Such cost-benefit analyses rely on methods and criteria that are 
unacceptable for the ethicist. 
The main problems of cost-benefit analyses from a welfarist point of view 
are: 1. Non-monetary welfare-losses are monetized in a very doubtful manner. 
The value of a life in the First World for example is assessed at 1.5 million US-
dollars, whereas in the Third World it is 150,000 US-dollars.
2
 Also the 
differences of purchasing power of money in different parts of the world are 
usually neglected, so that for example the loss of one unit of arable land is 
valued quite differently. Taken together this leads to a much greater weighting 
of damage in the First World compared to the rest of the world, ethically a 
parochialism.
3
 2. Inversely, the meaning of real monetary losses for the well-
being of different persons is ignored completely. This contradicts all welfare-
oriented approaches in ethics, which asses e.g. that 1000 dollars for a rich and a 
poor person will have very different utilities. 3. Cost-benefit analyses tend to be 
money-fetishistic. They are not very sensitive towards what is really important 
for well-being and concentrate far too much on monetary losses and on harm 
that is easily measured in monetary terms. So many categories of damages are 
ignored, e.g. suffering from hunger-pangs, grief over the loss of loved ones, 
strain and suffering from emigration. 4. Money has a lot of attributes which 
welfare does not have - and vice versa. Money can yield interest, it can be 
easily distributed, it can be changed into goods and services at rather fixed 
prices, it can be lent etc. Monetizing welfare losses (and gains) means adding 
these attributes to events in the sphere of welfare and thus may lead to gross 
distortions of the resulting calculations. Cost-benefit analyses e.g. discount 
future damages (with an average of 3%/year); this is right for many economic 
losses but not for real welfare losses. On the contrary, for most ethics 
discounting welfare losses is an unpermitted preference for the living in place 
of future generations.
4
 5. The money-metric measure of cost-benefit analyses 
often measures incommensurable values with different method. Namely a big 
part of the monetary values expresses real or estimated market prices; another 
big part, though, expresses willingness to pay and similar things, which is a way 
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to express personal preferences. But these are different dimensions and scales 
so that the resulting monetary values of the two methodologies must not be 
added, it would be equal to adding together apples and pears. Surely, 
introducing willingness to pay is intended to be a means for accounting for 
"the" value of things which have no market price and perhaps no market value. 
The underlying corrective idea, namely that money is not the only valuable 
thing, is quite right but the consequences derived from it are half-hearted. 
Things other than money are important because they are preferred or fulfill our 
desires or contribute to our well-being. But the same holds for money as well. 
So if one wants to account for non-monetary values too, and this is definitely 
necessary, the proper and all-embracing scale for doing so would be welfarist in 
some way. Current cost-benefit analyses instead are an incompatible mixture of 
monetary and preferentialist assessments. 
But could these problems of current cost-benefit analysis not be overcome 
by using improved methods? The third mentioned problem, i.e. the tendency to 
ignore or underrate non-monetary losses, obviously is not an unsolvable 
problem for cost-benefit analysis per se. And some straightforward attempts to 
eliminate the first problem (monetizing non-monetary losses) exist too. The 
Global Commons Institute e.g., explicitly for ethical reasons, recalculated the 
social costs of greenhouse damages obtained by the IPCC-authors (Pearce et al. 
1996; Fankhauser 1995) with, among others, the following modifications: 
Statistical deaths were equally valued all over the world at 1.5 million US-
dollars; and prices were corrected for purchasing power parity (Meyer / Cooper 
1995). This obviously lead to much higher damage estimates.5 But these 
corrections for the first problem aggravate the fifth problem. As already 
mentioned the corrections are explicitly made for ethical (and political) reasons 
(ibid.). Such reasons however have little to do with the monetary value of the 
objects in question; e.g. they say nothing about what it would cost to pay the 
benefits of a life insurance or to buy some particular land before it is lost due to 
the greenhouse effect. The motives for the correction in question, surely, are 
honorable. But the particular procedure obscures more and more what after all 
is measured with this kind of "cost-benefit analysis". From an economical point 
of view, the resulting figures have ceased to reflect market prices (problem 5). 
And from an ethical point of view, not only problems 2 and 4 (neglect of 
different impacts of monetary losses on well-being and different attributes of 
money and welfare) remain unsolved but even the proposed solution to problem 
1, to take all statistical human deaths into account universally equally and with 
the specific sum of 1.5 million dollars, is ad hoc and not justified by an ethical 
criterion. The muddling through between economics and ethics continues as in 
the studies criticized by the Global Commons Institute. 
With respect to the strict differentiation of monetary value and welfare some 
people think that the units of measurement are not significant; this would mean 
that the above listed problems could be nonexistent or at least somehow 
resolvable. A first interpretation of this idea is that the different units, e.g. 
dollars versus utils, may be converted one into the other. The problem with this 
type of rejoinder to the above listed criticisms is that monetary value and 
welfare are not simply different units of measurement (like miles and meters) 
but different dimensions or values; different things are measured, apples versus 
pears. Monetary value in market economies results from supply and demand; 
welfare however is an aggregation of individual desirabilities. One of the 
necessary conditions for an attempt to convert monetary value into welfare 
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should be to dispose of information about who owns the money (because of the 
diminishing marginal utility of money). But this information is not contained in 
the monetary value. And for the reverse attempt one should dispose of 
information about supply and demand of certain goods, which is not contained 
in the welfarist value. In addition, it is hard to imagine what a conversion of 
welfare into monetary value should mean if not the monetary value of the goods 
and services producing such welfare. But these, obviously, are quite different 
things: the welfare itself (which may be obtained in different ways) and the 
monetary costs of (the various ways to produce) this welfare. - A second 
interpretation of the idea that the units of measurement are not significant is to 
understand cost-benefit analysis as some sort of multi-attribute "welfare" 
economics or ethics, where the value of market goods is identified with their 
market value (perhaps corrected for purchasing power parity) and where the 
value of things from other dimensions is measured differently but, for reasons 
of simplicity, expressed in monetary units, too. According to this interpretation, 
cost-benefit analysis would change its aims radically, it would no longer be an 
economic instrument for measuring market value but an ethical instrument for 
measuring moral value. This sort of semi-welfarism would not rest on 
conceptual confusion about values but its way to measure "welfare" now should 
be compared to the moral criteria and aims of welfare ethics because the aims 
of this sort of instrument now would be ethical. Even with this interpretation the 
second mentioned problem (that the individual importance of monetary losses is 
neglected) remains in any case. Whether the value attributed in the dimensions 
of non-market goods sufficiently reflected ethical requirements would depend 
on further specifications of the respective variants of this type of semi-
welfarism and on the justifications given for them. (Simply assuming e.g. a 
universally equal value of 1.5 million US-dollars for each statistical death, 
firstly would be an unjustified procedure which, secondly, among other 
problems, neglects how well or badly off persons are in different countries 
already without the greenhouse effect.) And the better this part of the value 
criterion complied to ethical requirements the more difficult to answer would be 
the question why the first half of the criterion is not welfarist, too. 
Taking this background into account, this study has three aims: 
1. Firstly, the relevant consequences of the unrestricted anthropogenous 
greenhouse effect, i.e. business as usual (= BAU), and of three 
alternatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to different degrees (= 
abatement options) will be estimated (ch. 2-4). In the political and 
scientific worlds these consequences mostly are considerably 
underrated; and even scientists researching on the social consequences 
of the greenhouse effect often overlook very important categories of 
damages. Therefore, this part has some value on its own. 
2. Secondly, the social consequences of BAU and the abatement 
options will be evaluated from the perspective of several moral criteria: 
utilitarianism, another welfarist criterion called "utilex" and other non-
welfarist and much easier applicable moral criteria like sustainability, 
Kant's Categorical Imperative or 'neminem laedere' ('do not harm 
anybody!') (parts of chs. 3-4 and sect. 5.1). Welfare ethics are ethics 
which define the moral desirability of an option (often solely) in terms 
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of the personal desirabilities of that option for the affected beings. The 
easiest way to do this is utilitarianism, which simply adds the individual 
desirabilities; other welfare ethics use more complex forms of 
aggregating the individual desirabilities. The disadvantage of welfare 
ethics is that they eventually (as in the present case) need huge sets of 
information. But their advantage is that they take into account all sorts 
of personal advantages and disadvantages and ponder them. Therefore, 
the bulk of the effort is dedicated to the welfarist assessments. - In 
addition to the pure moral evaluations, moral efficiency, i.e. the cost-
welfare relations, of the abatement options are calculated (sect. 5.2). - 
Since, as already mentioned, as of today there are no welfarist 
assessments of the greenhouse effect (or of any other major social 
issues) this part of the study does pioneer work on a new ground of 
applied ethics. - Anticipating results of this part, we can already say 
that, according to all ethical criteria considered here, the severest (of the 
examined) abatement option, i.e. sustainable reduction, is morally 
optimum. 
3. Finally, considering this result, the question if and how these 
evaluations translate into moral obligations is discussed: Are we 
morally obliged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to a morally 
efficient or to a sustainable level? To answer this question (ch. 7) a 




Notes to Chapter 1 
 
                                                 
1 Some people find these contentions hard to believe. I would like, 
therefore, to inspect quickly the work of some contemporary theorists whose 
names may come into mind first when thinking about this question. (The 
following considerations are absolutely not intended to belittle the works 
mentioned but are only used to prove my point.) Broome (1992) has even 
written a monograph about the greenhouse effect. In its first chapter 
information about the natural and social consequences of the anthropogenous 
greenhouse effect is gathered, whereas in the rest of the book general theoretical 
problems of welfare ethics are discussed, especially discounting and 
aggregation. The book never comes to a conclusion as to which alternative is 
morally best. To reach such a conclusion many premises which would be 
required are missing: the consequences of alternatives to business as usual and, 
above all, figures for the personal desirabilities of the persons concerned. 
Singer pleads for giving 10% of one's personal income to the hungry (Singer 
1993, 246) but does not calculate the utilitarian moral desirability of this option 
(as compared to doing nothing). The most critical piece of such an assessment 
6 The Greenhouse  
  
                                                                                                  
is missing, namely the determination of the respective personal desirabilities. At 
first sight this seems to be superfluous though, because with the proposed 
action the desirability gains of the hungry clearly would outweigh the losses of 
the people of the First World. But at second sight it is clear that there are many, 
many more options (giving more; different quotas for different people; 
distributing the money in different ways) so that a quantitative assessment 
could be necessary for determining the best of them. Singer does not consider 
such options seriously because he takes them to be politically utopian. Ng 
(1986; 2001) pleads for an increase in population ― but based on a purely 
theoretical (and I think fallacious) argument and on the ethical principle of 
maximizing total utility. The really important empirical questions and the 
problems of hedonistic measurement are not even touched. Drèze and Sen 
energetically try to avoid those welfaristic preferential judgements that could be 
established only by weighing the advantages and disadvantages of several 
alternatives. They maintain e.g. that in cases of (impending) famines 
employment programs are better than direct distribution of food but they try to 
prove this by showing that employment programs are better in any respect (or 
more precisely that all prima facie disadvantages of employment programs 
actually are not disadvantages at all) (Drèze / Sen 1989, 113-117) so that a 
quantitative comparison is not necessary. This may even be true in the specific 
case, in other cases, however, such a dominance of the best alternative does not 
hold. Comparing the welfare of India and China the same authors found that 
China does better with respect to mortality, rate of literacy etc. but not with 
respect to its authoritarian political system so that a simple ranking of these two 
social systems is not possible; instead of doing this the authors, in a certain 
sense, propose to combine the advantages of both countries (Drèze / Sen 1998, 
ch. 4). This may be a wise solution in the case in question but not one feasible 
in every situation. Sen, finally, in pleading for (valuations of) multidimensional 
vectors of functionings as being the relevant measure of well-being (e.g. Sen 
1985, 9-16; 25; 28; 51; 56) abandons the necessary instruments for assessing 
welfare altogether, namely a one-dimensional, cardinal and intersubjectively 
comparable measure of well-being. ― These are only a very few examples. But 
they may indicate that some leading welfare theorists are far away from the type 
of quantitative welfare assessment conducted in the present study. 
2 The view of Hohmeyer and Gärtner (1992) which assess the value of 
each life at 1 million US-dollars is an exception. (Unfortunately, many 
statements by Hohmeyer and Gärtner are based on obsolete estimations, this is 
why their study is rarely mentioned here.) On the other hand this uniform 
assessment is criticized by other economists: this approach is "based entirely on 
a "moral imperative", the theoretical economic basis of this approach is weak" 
(Pearce et al. 1996, 196). But this criticism falls back on the authors for the 
following reasons. In my opinion, the only purely economic approach is the 
human capital approach, which treats an individual as an economic agent 
capable of producing an output that is valued in monetary terms; a life lost is 
then the loss of that output, less any consumption that the individual would 
have made. Pearce et al. criticize this approach because "it tends to produce 
extremely low values for those with low earnings, clearly discriminating against 
the already poor" and because it does not take into account the willingness to 
pay, so that this approach "is not properly founded in economic theory" (ibid.). 
But the first argument is clearly a moral argument. Pearce et al. themselves 
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prefer the willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-accept-method, which, admittedly 
(ibid.), also discriminates against the poor ― but not to such an outrageous 
extent as the human capital approach. And this, I think, is the true reason why 
Pearce et al. prefer the willingness-to-pay approach: it seems to be a 
compromise between economic and moral consideration. The alleged 
"foundation in economic theory" is only a pretext. What counts in an economic 
context are market prices or estimated market prices; and Pearce et al. in most 
cases rely on market prices. Willingness to pay is only a bad substitute for this 
in cases where market prices cannot even be estimated. But the human capital 
approach provides market prices for what people produce and for what they 
consume. So, economically there is no need to switch to willingness to pay. ― 
The one real problem is that money is not the only thing which counts; and 
money is not the right unit for counting these things because it does not count 
intrinsic desirabilities. The other real problem is the interpersonal aggregation 
of values; simply adding monetary gains and losses is not a well considered 
solution either. All these are profound ethical questions. And the arguments 
reported above nicely show how cost-benefit analysis implicitly gives ― bad 
― answers to these questions by making ad hoc assumptions and muddling 
through. 
3 Exactly this criticism was raised against the cost-benefit analysis of 
global warming undertaken in the Contribution of Working Group III to the 
Second Assessment Report of the IPCC (= Pearce / Cline 1996). The Global 
Commons Institute e.g. during the process of appoval of the contributions of 
Working Group III organized a campaign "Defending the 'value of life'" against 
this particular chapter of the report. This campaign, among others, lead to a 
very critical comment in the "Summary for Policymakers". (In the reports of the 
IPCC the "Summaries for Policymakers" ― as opposed to the single chapters, 
which are signed by the respective authors ― are intergovernmentally 
negotiated texts drawing generally accepted conclusions from the single 
chapters.) The "Summary" e.g. relativized in the following way: Assuming an 
equally high, namely as in developed countries, value of statistical lives in 
different countries and correcting for purchasing power parity of different 
currencies would lead to damage estimates several times larger than those 
estimated according to the usual methods of cost-benefit analysis (IPCC 1996d, 
10). 
4 General criticisms of cost-benefit analysis can be found e.g. in: 
Adams 1993; Kelman 1981; Leist 1996a; MacLean 1994. A good philosophical 
critique of discounting is: Cowen / Parfit 1992. 
5 Another modification relevant in the present context is that the Global 
Commons Institute included some damage categories neglected by Fankhauser, 
in particular deaths by malaria and malnutrition. All these modifications lead to 
world-wide damage costs 42 times as high as those calculated by Fankhauser. 
(Meyer / Cooper 1995.) 



























2. Methodology of the Welfare 
Inquiry in this Study 
2.1. The Steps of the Inquiry 
 
The following welfare assessment of the options with respect to the 
greenhouse effect proceeds in three large steps: 
1. On the basis of information published in the cost-benefit analyses, 
which can be corrected and completed if necessary, first the health, 
economic and the social effects of four alternatives are determined: a1: 
business as usual; a2: stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions; a3: 
strong (25%) CO2-reduction; and a4: sustainable (60%) CO2-reduction. 
For further calculation it is assumed that these effects are known with 
certainty. As a matter of fact some of these findings are, of course, very 
speculative but they are each best estimates allowing upward and 
downward deviations according to today's knowledge. And the, 
sometimes ridiculously exact, figures are only the middle in a range. 
Then, at best, the expected value for single items will meet the best 
estimations; in this case the expected moral desirability may be 
identical with the desirability obtained by my simplistic calculations. 
(At the present state of information a more subtle calculation, including 
appraisal of risk, is hardly possible or not worth the effort.1) I will 
regard the effect of each alternative for periods of 25 years, roughly 
corresponding to one generation: 2000-2025, 2025-2050 and 2050-
2075. With BAU temperature rises will persist longer, but the effects 
after 2075 can be largely compensated by new decisions which will 
10 The Greenhouse  
  
have to be taken by 2025. In addition, estimates regarding social effects 
after 2075 are rather scarce. Therefore, later consequences in the 
following assessment will be ignored. 
2. Then, as a second step (which in the presentation is interwoven with 
the first step), these damages are evaluated from a personal point of 
view. This step presupposes some sort of rational hedonism, that 
changes in individual desirabilities or prudentially conceived utilities 
are proportional to changes in well-being, i.e. the state of the subject's 
feelings. (For some more details about the desirability function of 
rational hedonism cf. below, sect. 3.3.) This is not the place to defend 
such a hedonistic theory of individual desirability in detail - I have done 
it elsewhere (cf. Lumer 2000, ch. 4-6; Lumer 1998); but some hints of a 
justification are given below, in sect. 2.2. (This section can be skipped 
entirely without problems for understanding the rest of this inquiry.) 
But even according to a purely preferentialist view of individual 
utilities (which takes the uncriticized preferences of people as the basis 
of utility calculation), hedonic changes of life normally will be the 
major component of utility; and the other, non-hedonic components are 
difficult to find out. Rational hedonism equates changes in personal 
desirabilities by an event with the changes in the person's well-being 
provoked by this event. Therefore, the second step of this inquiry, i.e. 
the personal evaluation of the consequences of BAU and the abatement 
options, is nearly identical with finding out the influences of the 
"visible" social consequences of the greenhouse effect (like illness, loss 
of relatives, migration, unemployment, property loss, absolute or 
relative poverty) on subjective well-being. These influences are 
estimated, relying on psychological findings about the effects of various 
life events on the level and distribution of subjective well-being. 
3. Finally, the information about the hedonic changes, which are 
equated with individual desirabilities, are used for moral aggregations 
of desirabilities, that is for welfarist assessments of the considered 
options. The assessments are made according to the criteria of 
hedonistic utilitarianism, utilex, and some variants of these systems 
which discount consequences in the distant future. Cost-benefit 
analyses monetize damages for well-being and welfare; the aim of the 
present analysis is to welfarize, among others, monetary damages. In 
addition to these purely welfarist assessments, cost-welfare analyses for 
the three abatement options are undertaken providing ratios of social 
economic net costs for the OECD to the utilitarian and utilex welfare 
net gains. 
Unfortunately, not only are the data concerning the socio-economic 
impacts of the greenhouse effect very insecure but the presently 
available information about the influence of impacts of this sort on 
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subjective well-being is even worse and very scattered - in particular 
because cardinal measurement of well-being is required. I have 
gathered the material I could find from the psychological literature and 
processed it for the current purposes. Unfortunately, in some cases of 
probably less important effects, due to a lack of information and to 
arrive at a complete welfare assessment, I had to guess the necessary 
well-being figures. But this procedure is probably rather innocuous for 
the final result because the most important classes of damages are not 
determined in this way and because the two most important classes, 
namely death and economic loss, already cause at least about 80% of 
the utility losses of all alternatives. So the resulting preference orders 
are rather stable with respect to plausibly limited alterations in the 
assumptions made about some specific influences on well-being. 
Anyway, a further aim of my executing a complete calculation, if 
necessary with only guessed figures, is to show vividly what further 
information is missing and should be urgently collected. Such 
information would not only be necessary for a welfare assessment of 
the greenhouse effect but in many other fields of applied ethics as well 
(e.g. in all cases of distributing resources). Empirical collection of such 
data requires a lot of person years of psychological investigation but it 
is not more difficult than what is done in much of the usual 
psychological empirical research. Rather, the lack of such data (at least 
in part) is due to lack of - in particular philosophical - demand. 
Therefore, by executing a complete welfare assessment in spite of all 
these deficiencies I hope to give at least some stimulation for further 
research in this field. In any case, the following assessments are only 








Strong rational hedonism is the view that precisely a person's 
feelings have intrinsic desirability for that person, i.e. desirability for its 
own sake, independently of any consequences. "Feeling" as used here 
means, bodily feelings (like pleasurable sensations and pain), emotions 
(like joy, satisfaction, anger and grief) and moods (like elation and 
depression). Pleasant feelings have positive intrinsic desirabilities, 
unpleasant feelings have negative intrinsic desirabilities. And their 
amount of intrinsic desirability is equal to the integral of their intensity 
over time. The (personal) intrinsic desirability of a life is equal to the 
sum of the intrinsic desirabilities of all the feelings experienced in it. 
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And the total personal desirabilities of things other than feelings, e.g. 
the single impacts of the greenhouse effect, are equal to the amount in 
which they influence the intrinsic desirability of the person's life. These 
definitions of 'desirability' do not rely on the person's opinion about e.g. 
the integral of the intensity of that feeling or about the influence of 
certain events on his feelings. Instead, they rely on the objective facts, 
that is if these things are really so. Hence objective knowledge about 
such facts is required to establish hedonist desirabilities. 
Hedonism here will be defended by the prudentialist desirability theory (cf. 
below). This theory only roughly leads to (pure) hedonism as just explained. 
More precisely it leads to a corrected hedonism. According to this theory, in 
order to account for such things as experience machines (à la Nozick), i.e. that a 
person lives her whole life in a machine which provides all kind of pleasant 
feelings, positive experiences relying on manipulation have to be discounted in 
different degrees (cf. Lumer 2000, sect. 5.4; Lumer 1996). But this peculiarity 
of corrected hedonism is not relevant in the context of assessing effects of 
global warming. 
Rational hedonism is only a criterion for personal desirabilities, 
which then may be justified in different ways. The justification to be 
sketched here is taken from the prudentialist desirability theory (Lumer 
2000, ch. 4-6; Lumer 1998). It relies on three main adequacy conditions 
or normative axioms. 
1. Motivational preferentialism: Desirability theories rely on various 
sources like motivational desires or preferences, or the valuations 
implicit in our emotions, or objective values. The prudentialist 
desirability theory is motivationally preferentialistic. That means it 
relies on motivational desires, i.e. the desires - in the technical sense - 
underlying our decisions: something is positively or negatively 
evaluated to a certain degree with motivational consequences; these 
desires can, but need not, be accompanied by emotions of craving or 
abhorring. This motivational preferentialism is the practical component 
of the prudentialist desirability function. The first reason for this is 
internalistic, namely that a desirability theory is to be used by a subject 
as a tool for decision-making and that it can be used as such only if the 
subject has motivational reasons for following the recommendations of 
that theory, which, therefore, in turn must already be arranged 
according to such possible motivational reasons on the part of the 
subject. Or in other words, desirability theories not relying on 
motivational desires are practically impotent: they cannot affect the 
subject's decision unless they hiddenly rely on motivational desires. 
Such practical impotence holds for objective value theories or theories 
relying on those evaluations which are implicit only in our emotions but 
are not part of our motivation. Another reason for motivational 
preferentialism is that it respects the subject's autonomy: the decisions 
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about what is important for the subject rely on the subject's preferences. 
(This argument is more general and also sustains other forms of 
subjectivism.) - Rational hedonism usually is taken to be in opposition 
to preferentialism. This must not be so and does not hold for the 
prudentialist desirability theory for the following reasons. Rational 
hedonism is a theory about the content of the desirability function; 
preferentialism instead is a theory about the ssources of the desirability 
function. Therefore, there is no contradiction in justifying rational 
hedonism preferentialistically. 
2. Prudentialism: Motivational preferences always rely on and 
contain biologically fixed inclinations. But in addition to that most of 
our motivational preferences are cognitively formed, linking such 
inclinations with the subject's beliefs. The really basic inclinations are 
hard to criticize; they are simply biological facts - though they can 
develop by confrontation with new information (cf. below). However 
information used in developing complex preferences may be false or 
falsely applied. Prudentialism then requires that the information used in 
calculating desirabilities be true. Therefore, very often there is a 
difference between the desired and the desirable, namely if the desire 
relies on false or falsely applied information. Thus, prudentialist 
desirability theories cannot rely on all the subject's - uncriticized - 
preferences but only on selected preferences which are stable with 
respect to cognitive criticism, i.e. resistant to further (true) information. 
There are two methods of implementing this idea: 1. Full information 
approaches of rationality require the preferences used for defining 
desirability to be formed while the subject has all the relevant 
information. 2. Stability approaches require the preferences to remain 
stable when the subject is confronted with new (true) information. The 
differences between these two accounts will be discussed below. - 
Prudentialism is the epistemically rational component of the 
prudentialist desirability theory. It is intended to guarantee something 
like desirabilities resulting from wisdom. In addition this kind of 
prudentialism guarantees that the resulting desirabilities express what 
the subject in a certain sense really wants, namely if not misguided or 
irritated by false information. 
The main alternative to prudentialist accounts is the decision 
theoretic utility theory. This theory is criticized, legitimately as I think, 
by many philosophers because they do not regard it rational enough. In 
particular they criticize the use of unfiltered preferences. 
The use of unfiltered preferences in classical subjective expected utility 
theory, e.g. in the von Neumann / Morgentern version, entails several problems: 
1. The axioms of these theories, which must be fulfilled for the utility of the 
preferred objects to be defined, are violated by literaly everybody. Many more 
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or less systematic violations of such axioms have been found (cf. e.g. 
Kahneman / Tversky 1979; Kahneman / Tversky 1984; Camerer 1995).3 Nor 
does the utility theory give any advice as to how we can and should arrive at 
consistent preferences. Therefore, in many cases the subjective utility of an 
object is not defined. One reason for the violations is that even if the axioms of 
the classical utility theory were accepted by the subjects as requirements of 
rationality, it would mean asking too much of the same subjects to always 
comply with them. Preferences are not natural or even inborn, they have to be 
formed in the particular moment relying on very many informational inputs. 
And this informational process can go astray. 2. The whole strategy of the 
classical subjective expected utility theory is paradoxical for the following 
reasons. Subjective expected utility originally was thought of as a part of the 
theory of rational decision. The theory of rational decision should give 
recommendations as to how a subject should decide. On the one hand, this 
presupposes that people do not always decide rationally, so that the advices of 
rationality theory would be helpful to them. On the other hand, the axioms of 
the utility theory, which must be fulfilled for 'utility' to be defined, already 
presuppose complete rationality of preferences. So we have a dilemma here. 
Either people already obey the rules of the rational decision theory, in particular 
the axioms of the utility theory (which is not the case); so then this theory is not 
a, counselling, theory of rational utility and decision. Or people factually often 
violate these rules (which is the case); then utilities, the most central ingredient 
of the theory, are not defined in many cases. The underlying problem is that the 
usual subjective expected utility theory does not differentiate between basic 
preferences, which cannot be criticized and which shall be used for defining 
utilities, and non-basic utilities (cf. Lumer 1998a). 3. The first two criticisms 
were immanent; the next one is emanent. The axioms of the subjective utility 
theory are much to weak (perhaps in part even false) to define rational utilities. 
Even if the preferences of a subject are coherent (in the sense of complying 
with the axioms) they may rely on false information. Surely, one cannot 
rationally decide on the basis of information one simply does not have. But this 
does not mean that 'desirability' must be defined relative to the subject's 
information. It seems clear that during decision making people try to estimate 
the real desirability of the alternatives at hand, i.e. they implicitly use a stronger 
concept of desirability with much stronger information requirements; and they 
will revise their preferences when they believe they have better information. 
The utility of the subjective expected utility theory then does not express this 
ideal that people are seeking. 
Another instrument for measuring utilities, currently used in health 
economics, is quality adjusted life years or QALYs.4 QALYs are to measure 
utilities of life situations in a way that is much closer to that of rational 
hedonism: The value of a subjectively felt health state is measured by - again 
unfiltered - preferences for that verbally described type of state (which is equal 
to the quality of life) and multiplied by its duration. The value for complete 
health is 1 and for death 0. The total desirability of other (states and) events 
(like having a heart attack), i.e. states and events different from subjectively felt 
health states, then is (or should be) equal to the difference between the value of 
the health states following this state or event and the normal value multiplied by 
its duration. (Or more exactly: The total desirability should be equal to the 
difference between the two respective integrals of the quality of life. I wrote 
"should be equal" because this part of the QALY-framework usually is not 
made explicit.) - The QALY approach differs from hedonistically measuring 
social well-being for large groups in the following way. The hedonist (at many 
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different moments) would ask people having experienced an event (or state) of 
the specific type how they feel right now and would take the difference between 
the mean of their answers and the normal mean of well-being as an 
approximation of the mean total desirability of events (or states) of the specific 
type. (Or more exactly: The mean total desirability is equal to the difference 
between the two socially mean integrals of well-being, of the well-being with 
and without the event.) The QALY-researcher instead in a first step asks people 
about their preferences concerning a limited set of subjectively felt health states 
(and their possible combinations), which shall constitute the complete spectrum 
of such states, e.g.: "What would you prefer, to depend on a wheel chair, not 
being able to speak and the rest being normal or ...?" From the answers to these 
questions the (real) personal cardinal quality of life of the specific type of 
situation is calculated for all subjects as well as the social mean. For 
determining the total desirability of other types of events (like suffering from a 
specific disease), in a second step the (mean) influence of these events on the 
subjectively felt health states should be found out empirically, so that the 
(mean) difference in (the integral of the) quality of life with respect to the 
(mean) normal course can be calculated. This difference then is regarded as an 
approximation of the total desirability looked for. Usually, though, the 
information about the influence of the various diseases on the felt health states 
is taken from medical wisdom, and complete health (with a quality of life of 1) 
often is regarded as the normal course. 
QALYs are problematic in several respects and therefore not used here: 1. 
Currently QALYs are available only for health states but not for other 
conditions such as unemployment, the situation of migrants and the like. 2. The 
QALY-approach rests on an uncritical stipulation of the intrinsically relevant, 
leading to conceptually confused values of the quality of life. The two-step 
procedure of the QALY-approach would make sense if the states valued in the 
first step and being the value basis for the other objects had been exactly the 
intrinsically relevant states. So establishing the respective list of fundamental 
health states comes up to determining what is intrinsically relevant. Most health 
states investigated with the QALY method however (e.g. being able to move 
around, being able to communicate) have no intrinsic desirability, and their 
total desirability depends on the accompanying circumstances. This leads to 
confusions and quantitative distortions. 2.1. If subjects are asked to rate the 
desirability of such health states they will rate their total desirability. But this 
changes over time, depending on the changing circumstances the person is 
surrounded by and the plans (s)he may have. So if subjects are asked to rate one 
specific health state it is not clear what they should rate and what they are 
actually rating. (It would be a clear task to let people rate the total desirability 
of specified single events or the intrinsic desirability of any event of a certain 
type, which then, in combination with empirical information, may be used to 
calculate the total desirability of other events leading to this type of event. But 
to let people rate their total desirability of any event of a certain type is 
nonsensical. The hedonistic method instead takes the second route: it tries to 
find out how certain single events change the integral of well-being, where 
well-being is something intrinsically relevant.) 2.2. Because the total 
desirability of complete health (the quality of which is defined as being equal to 
1), depending on the different life situations and plans, is different for different 
people (and for the same people at different times) there is no interpersonal 
comparability of the measured qualities of life. (Hedonism instead gives the 
same desirability to each person's highest possible happiness.) 3. QALYs are 
measured by uncritically taking over the persons' preferences for such states, 
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even of persons who are not in that state. So the third objection advanced 
against the subjective expected utility theory applies here as well: The 
preferences of the people asked are often irrational or far from being well 
informed, e.g. most people have insufficient or false beliefs about the effects of 
such health states on their well-being or they put too much weight on irrelevant 
factors. Therefore, uncritical preferences often do not reflect the real value of 
the preferred objects. the persons' subjective well-being), equate this happiness 
with the intrinsic desirability of that part of their life and then take the 
difference of this intrinsic desirability to the usual intrinsic desirability as the 
total desirability of such states. The mean of the total desirabilities may then be 
equated with the expected desirability for other people eventually being in such 
states. In this way desirabilities are calculated relying completely on objective 
empirical information (about the influence of the states in question on 
subjective well-being) and the hedonistic approach of equating well-being with 
intrinsic desirability, which is justified in a different way (cf. below).) 
(According to the hedonistic approach instead all the information about the 
influence of the objects in question on the intrisically relevant (i.e. well-being) 
is taken from empirical research (asking people who have experienced an event 
of the specific type for their well-being), whereas establishing intrinsic 
desirabilities is undertaken in a different way (cf. below).) 4. Most methods for 
measuring the felt quality of life have additional problems. Cardinal 
measurement by probability weighting for example is influenced by the 
subject's risk aversion, whereas time weighting is problematic because different 
durations of the same health state very often have different impacts e.g. on 
subjective well-being. 5. The way of ascertaining the total desirability of other 
objects (different from felt health states) from the quality of life pertinent to the 
various felt health states comprises some - though not insurmountable - 
difficulties, too. 5.1. According to the QALY-approach, the relevance of these 
other objects is always procured /filtered /must be expressed by their influence 
in the dimension of felt health states. This should be no problem if the 
respective list of possible health states contains everything which might be 
intrinsically relevant - from a (corrected) hedonist point of view this would be 
the well-being (and its generation); the rest then mayy be ignored. If these 
intrinsically relevant things are not comprised, which is the case in several 
QALY-models, the calculated total desirability necessarily must be incomplete. 
5.2. After determining the quality of life pertinent to the various health states 
the, possibly very long acting, influence of the object in question on these 
health states must be measured empirically. This task usually is underrated, ad 
hoc assumptions are used and the respective empirical research is concentrated 
far too much on physical health variables, thus tending to be health-fetishistic 
and to ignore the long-term influences on well-being. 
3. Reconstructivism: The information requirement of prudentialism 
should be fulfilled in a particular way. The process of decision making 
has to be scrutinized in a very detailed manner with the aim of finding 
out what basic, biologically fixed, inclinations we have and how and 
what information is used to arrive at a decision. In particular we must 
find out how (true) information changes the way or criterion of 
decision. After this empirical step 'desirability' should be defined 
according to the following conditions: 1. From the biologically basic 
inclinations we take those that are stable with respect to confrontation 
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with further information as the basis of definition (stability approach of 
prudentiality). 2. From the various ways to arrive from basic 
inclinations at decisions that way is taken as defining 'desirability' (on 
the basis of inclinations) which in cases of the most thriftiest decisions 
may be used and would be stable with respect to confrontation with 
further information. 3. The way to a decision always encompasses 
empirical assumptions; the empirical information which, according to 
the desirability definition, must be used for establishing desirabilities 
has to be true. - The upshot of this reconstructivism is that the definition 
of 'desirability' prescribes in detail on what inclinational basis which 
cognitive operations have to be executed for calculating the desirability. 
So even a third person can calculate the personal desirabilities of 
another person following these instructions. Some advantages of this 
reconstructivism are: It gives clear instructions on how to calculate 
desirabilities; i.e. it fulfills an advisory function. It fulfills the 
prudentialist idea of stability with respect to further information to a 
maximum. It can be used by third persons in cases of paternalistic 
decisions or bigger social studies where not all the people affected can 
be queried. 
The main alternative to reconstructivism (which here includes the stability 
approach) is the full-information approach of desirability:5 According to this 
approach the subject is treated as a black box which is filled up with all relevant 
information and then spits out the right decision and the rational preference 
order. In a certain sense there is no possibility of surpassing the degree of 
rationality inherent in the resulting preferences: if these preferences are based 
on all relevant information what can be added to make them more rational? But 
the problem with this desirability definition is that it asks too much and gives 
too little: 1. The definition never or only in rare cases makes it possible to find 
out the desirability of an object because the condition of full information is 
literally never or at least hardly ever fulfilled. This generates a dilemma. Either 
the decisions meant in the definition are factual decisions, i.e. decisions which 
really must take place; then the desirability of most, perhaps of all, objects is 
not even defined. Or the decisions are hypothetical (or factual) decisions; then 
the desirability of all objects may be defined but we will not know what they 
are because the full information approach does not give us the means to find out 
how a person with full information would decide on a particular object. 2. The 
full information approach does not give any support or suggestions to the 
subjects how they should decide. It just recommends procuring all the relevant 
information. But if the subject then asks, 'but which information is relevant?', 
the theory answers in a scarcely helpful way: 'It is the information which would 
alter or influence your decision.' If the subject then specifies, 'but I wanted to 
know which information rationally should influence my deliberation and in 
what way', the theory does not give any answer. How to decide rationally, 
surely, is a relevant information; it is exactly this information which the rational 
decision theory or desirability theory should provide; however, the full 
information approach does not do this. 3. Full information approaches lead to 
problems with decisions about actions which have to do with the acquisition of 
information: Actions aimed at providing information or suspense, according to 
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this approach, must always have a low desirability because a fully informed 
subject already possesses the crucial information. But this does not hold for the 
actual subjects. 4. Full information approaches lead to problems where taste 
matters. Taste refinement, besides other things, comes about by gathering 
information about and making experiences with the objects of taste. Fully 
informed subjects, therefore, will always have a very refined taste, and the - 
hypothetical - decisions with full information will be made from this 
perspective. But the resulting preferences - e.g. for eating oysters or listening to 
twelve-tone music - may be disgusting for the subject with his current taste. 
How do the three adequacy conditions of the prudentialist 
desirability theory, i.e. motivational preferentialism, prudentialism and 
reconstructivism, lead to rational hedonism? About this question, too, I 
can only give some sketchy hints (for more details cf.: Lumer 2000, 
chs. 4-5). According to reconstructivism and motivational 
preferentialism, the decisional process has to be scrutinized empirically. 
One main result about the structure of decision-making is that the basic 
inclinations are originally intrinsic desires. "Intrinsic" means that these 
desires are desires about final ends, i.e. for things desired for 
themselves and not for their consequences. And "originally" roughly 
means that these desires are not only intrinsic because the subject has 
forgotten that in the first place these desires were not intrinsic. The way 
from intrinsic desires to total desires and motivational preferences is to 
find out how an option changes the intrinsic desirability of one's life, 
i.e. the way already described in the definition of 'total desirability' at 
the beginning of this section. 
The crucial question then is: Which things are originally desired 
intrinsically and to what extent? Or what is the originally intrinsic 
desirability function?6 One clear type of originally intrinsic desires are 
hedonist desires with the desirability function explained above.7 
Another type of originally intrinsic (motivational) desires are those 
desires caused by our emotions and which can be called "emotionally 
induced desires": Emotions of every type seem to cause originally 
intrinsic desires of a certain type appertaining to this emotion. E.g. rage 
induces the desire to destroy or impair the object of rage; pity induces 
the desire to improve the object's miserable state; joy induces the desire 
for others to share this joy. But these emotionally induced desires are 
completely dependent on the emotion in the sense that they grow and 
fade with the underlying emotion. This means these desires are not 
stable over time, or the desirability function relying on these desires is 
not coherent in time. In the state of emotion a certain object is desired 
to a certain positive degree; later its intrinsic desirability is reduced to 
zero. This is the reason why acts committed in the heat of passion, 
which rely on such emotionally induced desires, are regarded as 
irrational. And in the prudentialist desirability theory they are excluded 
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as a basis of intrinsic desirability because of their instability over time. 
Further originally intrinsic desires have not been found. So the hedonist 
desires alone define the intrinsic desirability function of the 
prudentialist desirability theory. 
 
 
Notes to Chapter 2 
 
                                                 
1 An example for densities of probabilities (and not only best estimates) 
and their relation to mean and median probability is given in: Hourcade 1996, 
337. But this kind of precision is an exception in the literature. 
2 This section can be skipped without problems for understanding the 
rest of this inquiry. 
3 In the last 25 years many non-linear "utility" theories which use much 
weaker axioms than those of von Neumann / Morgenstern have been developed. 
But these theories do not claim to measure any sort of rational utility, instead 
they are intended to explain and forecast factual behaviour. 
4 "QALY" is not an expression for the product of duration and just any 
measure of quality of life (which would include well-being in the above defined 
sense) but for such products with rather specific measures of quality of life 
developed in health economics. ― Theory: e.g. Broome 1993; Kind / Gudex / 
Godfrey 1990; Kind / Rosser / Williams 1982; Nord 1992. 
5 E.g.: Brandt 1979, part 1; Griffin 1986; Sumner 1996. 
6 For the following cf. also: Lumer 1997b. 
7 The hedonist desirability function at first has the simple form that the 
amount of desirability of a feeling is proportional to its integral of intensity over 
time. But this simple hedonist desirability function is not stable with respect to 
confrontation with further information. Specifically when people are confronted 
with thought experiments of the experience machine kind (i.e. the information 
that such things as experience machines might be possible) or with real options 
of manipulating their feelings, after some reflection, they change their hedonist 
desirability function step by step in the direction of the corrected version of 
hedonism explained above. 



























3. Alternative a1: Business as Usual 
3.1. General Features of a1 
 
For business as usual the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (= IPCC) estimates that the concentration of greenhouse gases, 
the most prominent of which being CO2, will double compared to 
preindustrial levels (= 2xCO2) by 2050-2060. This will raise the mean 
global temperature by about 2.5°C (ranges: 1.5-4.5°C for equilibrium 
2xCO2 and 1.0-3.5°C for transient warming), but with strong regional 
differences. For mid-continental areas the actual warming may be about 
twice the global mean estimate (IPCC 1996a). The sea level will rise, 
with some delay, by about 50 cm by the year 2100 (Pearce et al. 1996, 
189). - Most studies about the social and economic impacts of the 
greenhouse effect estimate the consequences for the year when 2xCO2 
will be reached; this may be the case at the beginning or in the middle 
of the third period (2050-2075). I follow this practice. In addition I 
generalize the results for this specific year taking them as the mean for 
the whole period, which might be a good approximation. For the second 
period (2025-2050) the effects could be supposed to be half as strong as 
in the third; because of inertia of climate, however, these effects are 
roughly equal in all considered alternatives, that is why they are ignored 
here. - The following list attempts to include all major types of possible 
positive and negative consequences of a1 for human well-being. Three 
main categories of effects are distinguished: 1. Rather direct changes in 
well-being, 2. real economic changes resulting in indirect changes in 
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well-being, 3. other indirectly caused changes in well-being. This list 
will be dealt with in more detail below: 
 
Table 3.1    
Damages and improvements resulting from the greenhouse effect: 
1. Direct (or approximately direct) changes in well-being: 
 1.1. Casualties, decreased life span or their prevention: due to: 
 1.1.1. Catastrophes: floods, high-waters, tropical cyclones, 
extratropical storms, droughts (famines), other bad harvests, 
epidemics. 
 1.1.2. Migration: strains of migration. 
 1.1.3. Social conflicts: ecologic wars, conflicts due to 
immigration. 
 1.1.4. Worsened conditions of life: poverty (increase of food 
prices),1 (universal) shortage of water, infectious diseases, air 
pollution, hot spells; positive: prevention of cold spells. 
 1.2. Injuries, diseases, deformations, physical pain: in analogy to 
1.1.1-1.1.4. 
 1.3. Psychic suffering: in analogy to 1.1.1-1.1.4. 
2. Real economic ("market"), monetary changes, causing indirect 
changes in well-being: 
 2.1. Changes in productivity of the primary economic sector: 
 2.1.1. Agriculture: changes in growth, aridisation. 
 2.1.2. Forestry: deforestation. 
 2.1.3. Fishery: loss of coastal fishing-grounds. 
 2.1.4. Energy production: decrease of hydro-energy. 
 2.2. Changes in productivity in other economic sectors: 
 2.2.1. Water supply: shortage of usable water. 
 2.2.2. Leisure and tourist industry: loss of beaches, shortening of 
skiing seasons. 
 2.2.3. Transportation, construction. 
 2.3. Property losses: 
 2.3.1. Dryland losses: by inundation of low coastal land, 
aridisation. 
 2.3.2. Wetland losses. 
 2.3.3. Damages due to extreme events: hurricanes, droughts, 
nontropical storms, high waters, hot and cold spells, other 
catastrophes. 
 2.3.4. Damages to buildings. 
 2.3.5. Forest loss: dying of forests. 
 2.3.6. Increased costs of living: increase of food prices. 
 2.3.7. (Property) damages by air pollution. 
 2.4. Costs of measurements of prevention and compensation: 
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 2.4.1. Coastal protection: construction of dams. 
 2.4.2. Energy demand: less heating, more space cooling. 
 2.5. Economic effects of damages to eco-systems: 
 2.5.1. Species loss: pharmaceutical value. 
 2.6. Economic losses through casualties, disease and migration: 
 2.6.1. Deaths: loss of human capital. 
 2.6.2. Disease: days of illness. 
 2.6.3. Loss of human capital due to emigration. 
 2.6.4. Immigration: costs for integrating immigrants. 
3. Other consequences causing indirect changes in well-being: 
 3.1. Damages to eco-systems and natural spaces: recreational value, 
existence value. 
 3.1.1. Wetland losses. 
 3.1.2. Forest losses. 
 3.1.3. Species loss. 
 3.1.4. Other damages to eco-systems: coral reefs, protected 
ecotopes. 
 3.1.5. Loss of natural spaces: islands, coasts, lakes. 
 3.1.6. Decimation of animals. 
 3.2. Political and social stability: dictatorships, restrictions in liberty 
rights. 
 3.3. Damages to cultural goods. 
  
 
Unfortunately, I have not found any basis for estimating the extent of 
some of these possible impacts; therefore, I shall not discuss them in 
detail. Some of these uncertain impacts could be rather irrelevant: 
decrease of hydro-energy (2.1.4), damage to buildings e.g. due to 
decreased ground-water level (2.3.4), losses for the tourist industry 
(2.2.2), transportation and construction (2.2.3), damage to cultural 
assets, e.g. destruction of historic buildings by storms or decreased 
ground-water levels (3.3). But the other uncertain impacts may well be 
important: ecological wars (e.g. for water resources, cf. 1.1.3), deaths 
and suffering from diseases other than malaria (part of 1.1.4; 1.2.4), 
dryland losses through aridisation (cf. 2.3.1), loss of human capital by 
death (2.6.1) and by emigration (2.6.3), dictatorships and restrictions in 
liberty rights arising from social conflicts (3.2). 
 
 
3.2. Direct Losses in Well-Being: 1. Casualties 
 
1.1.1. Casualties due to natural disasters: The most important 
category of damage is the dead. There are several ways people may be 
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killed by 2xCO2. Floods and storms: A rise in the global mean 
temperature of 2.5°C will lead to turbulence in the global weather. 
There will be more tropical cyclones and a rise in their destructive 
power, affecting not only inland areas but also leading to major 
inundations of coastal areas - which has often been the case in 
Bangladesh. (E.g. in April 1991 a cyclone caused a six-meter-high 
storm surge which penetrated far inland and killed 200,000 people 
(Myers 1993, 753; Der Spiegel 1991, no. 19, p. 181; no. 20, pp. 197-
207)). Monsoons will be more abundant causing more river floodings 
like in China in August 1998. From 1989 to 1992 worldwide 42,000 
people died annually from extreme weather events (Pearce et al. 1996, 
202). Fankhauser assumes an increase in damages due to extreme 
weather events of 42% (Fankhauser 1995, 53). This would result in 
17,640 additional casualties per year or 441,000 in the 25 years of the 
third period. - Famines: Global warming will have positive effects on 
agriculture in some parts of the world, and negative in others, in 
particular in areas at low latitude, where most of the developing 
countries are situated. The net effect for the whole world will probably 
be negative,2 whereas the population will increase to about 10 billion 
people (Myers 1993, 757; Pearce et al. 1996, 190; Fankhauser 1995, 
35). In this already strained situation droughts and other events could 
drastically aggravate the situation. Myers (1993, 757) quotes estimates 
by Daily / Ehrlich that three times in ten years there may be a shortfall 
of 10% in global crop yields, which will lead to huge catastrophes in 
developing countries because international aid will be available to a 
much lesser extent than today. Though their estimate that this will lead 
to 50-400 million casualties each time seems to be exaggerated, a tenth 
of their lower bound, i.e. 5 million casualties three times in ten years, 
might be a reasonable figure, resulting in 37.5 million deaths from 
famines in 25 years. 
1.1.2. Casualties of migration: Floods, loss of coastal land, famines, 
aridisation will force many people to leave their homelands. Myers 
(1993, 757) estimates that 2xCO2 will lead to 150 million additional 
environmental refugees with a large part of them emigrating. Corrected 
for some errors 3 Myers' estimates amount to 104.6 million additional 
refugees caused by 2xCO2 spread over the 25 years of the third 
period.The psychic hardship caused by emigration is considerable, it 
will be treated below. What has to be considered here are casualties 
brought about by migration. And according to many experiences in the 
recent past, migration, in particular of poor people, costs a high death 
toll, namely by: exertions of migration (exhaustion, malnourishment 
during migration, disease, death from exposure to cold or thirst etc.), 
departure in disorder (children and old people getting lost in the 
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crowds, people are stampeded to death or hit by cars ...), bad means of 
transport (sinking of ships with refugees), danger in being smuggled 
across the border (being left helpless or being killed for greediness etc.), 
killing by border guards of immigration countries, robberies etc. I 
consider that a figure of 1% of all environmental refugees to be killed in 
the course of their migration is a rather conservative estimate. We must 
reckon then with 1,046,000 additional people being killed during 
migration. 
1.1.4. Deaths from deteriorated conditions of living: Poverty and 
famine: The already mentioned decline in the food supply will involve 
increases in world food prices, according to some estimates, in the order 
of 40% or more (Pearce et al. 1996, 190). This in turn will raise the 
number of people at risk of dying from hunger from a baseline of 
presently 640 million by about 10%, i.e. 64 million (ibid.; Fankhauser 
1995, 36). Today 14 million children under 5 years of age die from 
deficiency diseases and infections resulting from them every year 
(Singer 1993, 218). If we add perhaps half as many older children and 
adults dying from hunger, an increase of 10% of the people at risk of 
dying from hunger would mean: annually 2.1 million additional people 
actually dying from absolute poverty induced by 2xCO2 or 52.5 million 
people in the 25 years of the third period. - Infectious diseases: The 
conditions for several diseases will be "improved" by global warming: 
malaria, cholera, bacterial dysentery, amoebiasis and diseases 
transmitted by hookworms. I have found global estimates only for 
malaria. Malaria is restricted to areas where daily temperatures are 
above 16°C throughout the year. By benchmark warming the boundary 
of the area where this condition holds will extend some 400 km to both 
sides of the equator, exposing an extra 200 million people to the risk of 
malaria (Hohmeyer / Gärtner 1992, 38). Hohmeyer and Gärtner 
estimate that this will result in 10 million additional malaria infections 
per year and that 50,000 of these infected people will die (ibid.). That is 
1.25 million additional deaths from malaria in the 25 years of the third 
period. - Hot spells: Although global warming will reduce the number 
of people dying from cold it will increase the number of hot spells, 
which leads to an increase of heat-related deaths from coronary disease 
and stroke. Unfortunately, the net effect will be negative. Fankhauser 
(1995, 46), relying on Kalkstein's calculations for the US, estimates an 
increase of 27 deaths/million annually and therefore assumes in the 
countries that do not belong to the OECD (=NOECD) an increase by 
114,804 casualties (the ex-SU contributing 7,722) and within the OECD 
an increase by 22,923 casualties per year due to the warmer climate. 
These figures seem to be plausible for the OECD, but too high for the 
ex-SU and too low for the rest of the NOECD-countries, where there 
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are only few possibilities of space cooling. Correcting these 
implausibilities, i.e. assuming a zero-increase for the ex-SU and for the 
rest of the NOECD an increase which is twice as high as assumed by 
Fankhauser, the result is: 237,087 additional deaths/year (NOECD: 
214,164 deaths/year; OECD: 22,923 deaths/year) from heat-related 
diseases or 5,927,175 deaths in the 25 years of the third period. 
Discussion of indirectly, economically caused damages (which fall 
into category 2) will reveal a further 59,000 casualties due to 
pauperization by economic ruin. Summing up all these figures there 
will be about 100 million additional deaths in 2050-2075 by option a1. 
 
Table 3.2     
a1: 2050-2075: additional deaths during 25 years by 2xCO2: 
floods and storms 441,000 
famines due to crop failures (droughts) 37,500,000 
migrants during migration 1,046,000 
absolute poverty, malnutrition due to increased prices 52,500,000 
malaria 1,250,000 
hot spells 5,927,175 





3.3. Insertion: Methods of Hedonistically Measuring Personal 
Gains and Losses 
 
How do death and other kinds of damages have to be valued from a 
personal point of view, in particular hedonistically? (Strong) rational 
hedonism above (in sect. 2.2) was defined as the view that exactly a 
person's feelings have intrinsic desirability for that person, i.e. 
desirability for its own sake, independently of any consequences. With 
"feeling" thereby bodily feelings, emotions and moods are meant. 
Pleasant feelings have positive intrinsic desirabilities, unpleasant 
feelings have negative intrinsic desirabilities. And their amount of 
intrinsic desirability is equal to the integral of their intensity over time. 
The intensity of positive and negative feelings at a certain time plus the 
(positive respectively negative) sign for pleasant respectively 
unpleasant feelings here is called the person's "well-being" at that time. 
So the intrinsic personal desirability of a certain section of a life is 
equal to the integral of well-being for that section. The total personal 
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desirabilities of other things than feelings are equal to the amount they 
change the intrinsic desirability of this person's life. (The total 
desirability of a feeling is equal to the sum of its intrinsic desirability 
and the amount of its influence on the intrinsic desirability of the rest of 
the respective person's life.) So total desirabilities are calculated relying 
on the intrinsic desirabilities and the empirical knowledge about 
causation of hedonic events (feelings). 
Losing one's life by force, injuries etc. means losing possible 
positive life events, i.e., from a hedonistic point of view: losing all sorts 
of possible pleasures and pains. And the loss due to death is equal to the 
integral of the expected well-being during the lost time. So, for 
calculating the individual desirability loss due to death we must know 
the expected mean of the person's well-being and the time in which this 
well-being would occur and then multiply these two figures. Assuming 
that premature death would strike the members of the mentioned groups 
according to a symmetric pattern of age (e.g. killing more children and 
elderly people and fewer people of an intermediate age) the mean time 
lost by one death would be equal to the half of the life expectancy of 
that group. The life expectancies taken as a basis for the following 
calculations are 76.31, 65.01 and 62.92 years for the OECD, the world 
and the NOECD respectively (my own calculations from: UNO 1997, 
93-100); so one mean person in these countries would lose about 38.16, 
32.51 and 31.46 years respectively. 
For certain ethics, which treat gains and losses for differently 
situated people differently, in particular ethics which, like utilex, give 
more weight to gains and losses of people badly off, the information 
about desirability losses does not suffice: the individual desirability of 
the originally expected life must be known as well. This holds because 
these ethics can value directly only whole lives; the moral desirability 
of a single event can be calculated only indirectly by comparing the 
moral desirability of the life with this event with the moral desirability 
of the life without this event. (This derives from the fact that the moral 
desirability function above individual desirabilities is not linear. 
Applying the moral desirability function simply to the individual 
desirability of the event in question, therefore, usually leads to a 
different result compared to calculating the difference between the 
moral desirabilities of the life with respectively without the event. For 
utilitarianism instead these two ways of calculating moral losses make 
no difference because the utilitarian moral desirability function is 
linear, i.e. the moral desirability is proportional to the individual's 
utility.) Therefore, in the following collections of data for every type of 
damage always 1. length and 2. average well-being of the originally 
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expected life have to be estimated as well as 3. the individual reduction 
in well-being and 4. its duration and, of course, 5. the number of people 
affected (cf. tables 3.5, 4.4-4.6). (The reduction inflicted by death is a 
reduction to a zero level of well-being during the lost years.) The 
individual desirabilities of the undamaged and (by simple subtraction of 
the loss) of the damaged or shortened life can be calculated from this 
information. (Then the moral desirability function is applied to these 
individual desirabilities, and finally the difference of the two moral 
desirabilities is calculated.) 
Data about life expectancy are easily available. Quite the contrary 
holds true for data concerning individual means of medium or long term 
well-being because the data needed should fulfill the following 
conditions: 1. Over a long period 2. the subjective well-being, i.e. the 
subject's present hedonic state, in particular his good or bad mood (and 
not his life satisfaction or subjective valuation of other things), 3. is 
measured on a cardinal level; 4. this has to be done for a sufficiently 
large sample of the group involved so that the social distribution of the 
individual average or long term levels of well-being can be calculated. 
The social distribution and not only the social mean is needed because 
again for some non-utilitarian ethics this makes a difference: If moral 
desirability is not proportional to individual desirability the moral 
desirability of two lives with a mean well-being of e.g. 0.1 and 0.3 
respectively may be different from (in fact smaller than) the moral 
desirability of two lives with a mean well-being of 0.2 each. 
The best data I have found, which come closest to these conditions, 
are those of Wessman et al. (Wessman et al. 1960), who collected 
means, minima and maxima of daily moods of 21 subjects during 42 
days. In the following all levels of well-being are normalized in the 
interval [-1;1] with 1 being the most pleasurable state within reach 
under optimum conditions, -1 being the contrary and 0 being a neutral 
state of zero intensity of all feelings. I call the units of levels of well-
being normalized in this interval "well-being intensities" or "wi" for 
short. Via some plausible assumptions the data of Wessman et al. then 
can be interpreted like this: the social distribution of the medium-term 
means of well-being is a normal distribution with a grand mean of 
µ=0.142wi and a standard deviation of σ=0.109wi. This means that 50% 
of the people have a medium-term mean level of well-being above 
0.142wi and 50% below 0.142wi; 68.27% have a medium-term mean 
level which lies in the interval [µ-σ;µ+σ], i.e. in our case 
[0.033wi;0.251wi]; and 95,45% have a medium-term mean level out of 
the interval [µ-2σ;µ+2σ], i.e. in our case [-0.076wi;0.360wi]; only 
7.36% have a medium-term mean level above 0.3wi. 
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The grand mean and the standard deviation have been calculated from the 
data reported by Wessman et al. in this way: Wessman et al. asked 25 students 
to record their best, worst and average mood of the day on a scale with mood 
descriptions every night for six weeks. Subsequently these were numbered from 
1 to 10 with 5 being the highest negative mood and 6 being the lowest positive 
mood, so that 5.5 corresponded to neutrality. The descriptions of the moods 
were chosen so that there would be approximately equal subjective gradations 
between units, and the ends of the scale would be so extreme that few subjects 
would experience them and only on rare occasions (Wessman et al. 1960, 118). 
Because of this scale construction I have interpreted the rating values as 
representing cardinal values. The individual means of the daily ratings of 
"average mood for the day" over the entire period varied from 5.43 to 7.37 with 
6.14 being the mean and the medium of the means; only one subject had an 
average mean below 5.5 (Wessman et al. 1960, 120). Translating these figures 
from the interval [1;10] by positive-linear transformation in the interval [-1;1] 
minimum and maximum of the average moods are -0.016wi and 0.416wi 
respectively; and the grand mean and medium is 0.142wi. Because the single 
values of the distribution we are looking for already consist of (medium-term) 
means of (daily) means (so that it is rather improbable that they contain exotic 
runaways) and because the mean is equal to the social medium this distribution 
probably is a normal distribution. Unfortunately, Wessman et al. do not report 
the standard deviation. Therefore, I have estimated the standard deviation this 
way: The reported data are from 21 subjects (N=21). Therefore, the probability 
of finding more extreme individual means than the two obtained (-0.016wi and 
0.416wi) roughly could be 1/2N = 1/42 in both cases. The standard deviation of 
the normal distribution then can be calculated in such a way that the integral of 
this distribution from -1wi to -0.016wi equals 1/42 or that the integral from 
0.416wi to 1wi equals 1/42. The standard deviations obtained with this sort of 
calculation are 0.080wi and 0.138wi respectively; the mean of these figures, i.e. 
0.109wi, then has been taken as the actual standard deviation. 
These data imply that 9.63% of the population has a medium-term 
mean level of well-being below zero. This makes it probable that the 
variance of the long-term (in particular the lifelong) mean level of well-
being - which we are interested in - is smaller than the variance of the 
medium-term mean just calculated because otherwise it would be 
rational for at least 9.63% of the population to commit suicide, which is 
far too much. Simply taking the variance of the medium-term mean as 
an approximation of the long-term mean's variance would lead to 
strange results; so we cannot simply ignore this error. (E.g. for 9.63% 
of the population to be killed by the consequences of the greenhouse 
effect would be good; this would hold for even higher percentages in 
groups worse off than the mean, thus reversing the effects one has 
hoped to obtain by welfare ethics containing justice components.) 
Therefore, in the following the variance of the medium-term mean is 
used as an approximation of the lifelong variance only in combination 
with a discontinuance hypothesis for correcting such errors. This 
hypothesis states that there are no lifelong mean levels of well-being 
below zero because people who risk arriving at this level due to an 
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expected mean decline of their well-being below zero during the rest of 
their life would commit suicide; furthermore the virtual percentages of 
lifelong mean levels of well-being below zero are taken as percentages 
of lifelong mean levels of zero. The discontinuance hypothesis seems to 
be plausible (independently of the present context); the only remaining 
problem is that it has to correct a virtual distribution of well-being 
which is only a rough approximation of the distribution of the lifelong 
means of well-being. 
The distribution of lifelong means of well-being obtained so far is an 
ordinary distribution for normal circumstances, which can be taken as 
the baseline for eventual reductions.4 Common hardships of every type 
other than death lead to a more or less dramatic reduction of the 
ordinary mean for some time, in extreme cases for the whole life. It is 
assumed that the variance is not affected by such hardships, i.e. all 
members of that group suffer the same diminution of well-being (they 
are not reduced e.g. to a certain absolute level of well-being). This is 
not quite the truth but a reasonable approximation. Diminutions of well-
being in some group from an original distribution of well-being with the 
mean µ=x (and the variance σ=0.109wi) to a distribution with the mean 
µ=y (σ=0.109wi) here simply are called "reductions of well-being from 
x to y" or "reductions of well-being by x-y". 
The hardships, apart from death, that are the most important in the 
following calculations quantitatively are poverty and income losses. 
The best data I could get about well-being in these types of life 
situations are the representative surveys by Campbell (1981) in the 
USA which relate subjective well-being to family income. Translating 
his results in the framework established so far leads to the following 
means of well-being: the social means of the individual means, i.e. the 
grand means, of well-being of the highest, second, third and lowest 
income quartile were 0.1655wi, 0.1494wi, 0.1352wi and 0.1145wi 
respectively. Another important grand mean of well-being which can be 
calculated from Campbell's results is that of the unemployed; it is 
0.0643wi. According to Campbell, well-being of the unemployed is 
nearly independent of their income (Campbell 1981, 122) and is not due 
to low income or financial problems (ibid. 120). Rather their very low 
level of well-being originates from the feeling of having been deceived 
by life, leading a particularly hard life and not being able to control 
their lives (ibid. 121 f.). This feeling may be similar to the experience 
someone has when e.g. losing all his property because of natural 
disasters. Therefore, the grand mean of well-being of 0.0643wi in the 
following will also be used for estimating the impact of events of this 
type on well-being. 
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In national surveys undertaken in 1957, 1971, 1972, 1976 and 1978 with at 
least 2164 participants each (Campbell 1981, 241) Campbell asked people, 
among other things, for their family income and: "Taking all things together, 
how would you say things are these days - would you say you're very happy, 
pretty happy, or not too happy these days?" (ibid.).  Cumulating the results of 
all five surveys the percentages were the following (cf. table 3.3): 
 
Table 3.3    
Subjective well-being related to income: 
family income ratings in %  
 very happy pretty not too sum 
highest quartile 37.77 57.77 4.47 100.01 
second quartile 32.28 61.48 6.24 100.00 
third quartile 27.77 62.40 9.83 100.00 
lowest quartile 21.80 61.26 16.95 100.01 
mean 29.91 60.73 9.37 100.01 
(Own calculations on the basis of: Campbell 1981, 241) 
  
 
Taking the means of the last line of table 3.3 as a basis the quantitative 
interpretation of the expressions "very happy", "pretty happy" and "not too 
happy" with respect to the interval [-1; 1] can be calculated so that the 
percentages of the last line are equal to three adjacent integrals of the ordinary 
distribution of well-being (with µ=0.142wi and σ=0.109wi). According to this 
method, the three expressions can be attributed to the following intervals of 
well-being: very happy = [0.1995wi; 1wi]; pretty happy = [-0.002wi; 
0.1995wi]; not too happy = [-1wi; -0.002wi]. (So "not too happy" roughly 
means "unhappy", i.e. having a well-being below zero; "very happy" means 
having a well-being above 0.2wi; and "pretty happy" covers the well-being in 
between. "Feeling pretty good" in the rating scale of Wessman et al. (1960, 
118) corresponds to [0wi; 0.2wi] too; so we have a good confirmation of the 
quantitative interpretation obtained with the method just described.) The 
quantitative interpretations of the three expressions "very happy", "pretty 
happy" and "not too happy" finally are used to calculate the grand means of 
well-being of the four income groups: The variance is taken to be equal to that 
of the ordinary distribution (i.e. σ=0.109wi); the (grand) mean then is chosen so 
that the integrals from -1wi to -0.002wi, from -0.002wi to 0.1995wi and from 
0.1995wi to 1wi are equal (or nearest, minimizing the sum of the three 
differences) to the percentages in the four middle lines of table 3.3. (The highest 
sum of the errors was 0.054 for the lowest quartile.)5 
For calculating the grand mean of well-being of the unemployed a similar 
method was used: Campbell reports the portion of the unemployed who in his 
1971 and 1978 surveys considered themselves as "very happy", namely 12% 
and 10% respectively (Campbell 1981, 120). Calculating the means according 
to the number of people interviewed leads to 10.74% very happy unemployed 
people. Again interpreting "very happy" as well-being above 0.1995wi and 
retaining the variation σ=0,109wi the grand mean now can be calculated on the 
basis of the condition that the integral from 0.1995wi to 1wi of the function 
looked for has to be 0.1074. The result is µ=0.0643wi. 
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The results of these methodological considerations now have to be 
applied to the valuation of casualties calculated in the last section. 
Floods, storms and hot spells with fatal effects may take place in OECD 
as NOECD countries alike so that a population with the world mean life 
expectancy (65.01 years) is afflicted (cf. table 3.5). The other causes of 
casualties (i.e. famines due to crop failures, migration, absolute poverty, 
malaria) are present nearly exclusively in NOECD countries so that the 
NOECD mean life expectancy (of 62.92 years) has to be applied here. 
Additional casualties due to absolute poverty will afflict only people 
who are already very poor and therefore have a long-term mean level of 
well-being at least as low as that of the lowest income quartile (i.e. 
µ=0.1145wi). All the other casualties caused by the greenhouse effect 
instead may occur in all social groups, i.e. in a population with the 
ordinary distribution of well-being (with µ=0.1420wi). 
 
 
3.4. Direct Losses in Well-Being: 2. Injuries, Diseases, Directly 
Caused Psychic Suffering 
 
1.2.1-4. Injuries and diseases: In all above mentioned events leading 
to deaths additional injury or illness of other people is quite likely. 
(This is quite clear for malaria, as the numbers of deaths from malaria 
are derived from the number of infected persons.) There are hardly any 
figures in the literature regarding this category of damage. Prevailing 
data, however, give clues for informed guesses. Reductions in physical 
well-being through catastrophes, migration and heat-related diseases: 
The amount of injuries and illnesses due to flood and storm 
catastrophes, acute famines, exertions of migration and heat stress can 
be guessed by the number of deaths. Death is regarded here as the tip of 
an iceberg. That is to say in all these catastrophes death occurs from 
relatively short extreme stressful events so that one group of the victims 
does not survive; others manage to survive badly injured or ill. 
According to this iceberg-hypothesis, physical injuries correlate 
roughly with the number of deaths, only higher. For each death I 
presume ten people to be severely physically injured with diminished 
well-being matching an average of ten days (=0.027 years) of reduction 
of well-being from the level of the ordinary distribution (with 
µ=0.1420wi) to the level of the distribution where 0 is the mean (cf. 
table 3.5 6). - Malaria: Symptoms of malaria are fever, chills, headache, 
myalgia, splenomegaly, anaemia. The disease occurs in attacks of 
different regular intervals, each lasting one day. Febrile attacks occur 
every second day in malaria tertiana, every third in malaria quartana, 
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irregularly in malaria tropica. Untreated, attacks will continue for 
weeks. The most dangerous form is malaria tropica, where the 
symptoms depend on which organs are involved. (Cerebral malaria can 
lead to paralysis, delirium, coma, death; pulmonal malaria to 
haemoptysis, gastrointestinal malaria can finally result in renal failure, 
etc.) (Petersdorf et al. 1983, 1190.) These are the qualitative 
descriptions. But what is the effect on the amount of well-being? On 
feverish days the level of well-being might be reduced from the level of 
the ordinary distribution (µ=0.1420wi) again to 0wi or slightly more, 
while it could be hardly reduced on other days, so that this may be 
ignored. Taking "several weeks" to average six weeks, which can be 
reduced by treatment to four weeks and taking three days as mean 
length of one cycle, this leads to an average of 28/3 days (or 0.026 
years) of reduction of the ordinary well-being by 0.1420wi per malaria 
infection. This holds for 9,950,000 additional non-lethal cases of 
malaria per year (Hohmeyer / Gärtner 1992, 38), i.e. 248.75 million 
cases in 25 years (cf. table 3.5). - Air pollution: Rise in temperature 
leads to increased emissions of HC, NOx and SOx and to an increase in 
the ozone concentration, which in turn may lead to health problems and 
damage to physical objects e.g. via corrosion. Fankhauser (1995, 48) 
estimates that 2xCO2, by air pollution, leads to monetized damages of 
about 15 bn. US-dollars/year, the bigger part of which being damage to 
human health. In a somewhat speculative way these monetary damages 
may be 'rewelfarized';7 the results of this calculation are 477 million 
cases of 0.013 years reduction from the ordinary level to 0wi due to air 
pollution induced by the greenhouse effect. 
1.2.4. Absolute poverty and hunger: Malnutrition caused by absolute 
poverty has various terrible impacts on human well-being, even if it 
doesn't lead to death. Many of these people constantly suffer from 
hunger-pangs; others suffer from deficiency diseases and infections 
which could be avoided by better nourishment, e.g. goitre, or vitamin A 
deficiency induced blindness. Malnutrition in infants inhibits their 
psychic and physical development (Singer 1993, 218-220). The effects 
on the subjective well-being are hard to estimate, in particular because 
subjective well-being is usually investigated only in richer countries (cf. 
fn. 4); therefore, I have only estimated the levels of well-being. The 
group afflicted by this further deterioration of the conditions of life are 
the poor people of the NOECD countries with a starting position of 
62.92 years life expectancy and a distribution of well-being with 
0.1145wi being the mean. The most terrible effect seem to be hunger-
pangs. They do not reduce well-being to a grand mean of 0wi 
permanently but perhaps to a level half as high as that of the 
unemployed, who have a grand mean of 0.0643wi (see above), i.e. 
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0.03wi (the reduction then amounts to 0.0845wi). This could be true for 
all the 25 years of the third period and 10% of the additional 64 million 
people suffering from malnutrition. Deficiency diseases may affect 
another 40% of the 64 million people (= 25.6 million people) leading to 
a permanent but not that dramatic decrease so that the reduced grand 
mean may be a bit higher than that of the unemployed, perhaps 0.08wi 
(so that the reduction amounts to 0.0345wi). 
1.3.1. Psychic suffering through catastrophes: Psychic suffering 
from the effects of 2xCO2 is practically ignored in the literature. So the 
following considerations will be very tentative. - Sorrow for and 
psychic losses due to deaths: For everybody dying from catastrophes 
like floods, storms and famines there will be, on the average, several (I 
assume 10) partners, relatives and friends mourning for the lost person 
(altogether 379.41 million people with an originally ordinary 
distribution of well-being). Of course, the victim would have died 
anyway some day in the future; but the mourning will be more intense 
around someone who is killed in the middle of his life than if he dies 
naturally at a ripe old age having finished his life-projects. This 
additional sorrow may be equal to 60 days (= 0.164 years) of a 0.035wi 
reduction in well-being (which is approximately equal to the difference 
in well-being between the richer and the poorer half of the population). 
In addition to that, the bereaved suffer from a greater loss due to the 
unnatural death of dear ones who have greatly contributed to their well-
being and cannot be easily replaced because of their shared history. 
Naturally, this is strongest for persons who have lost their children, 
parents, or partner. Per deceased I assume two such persons (altogether 
76 million) whose well-being is reduced again by 0.035wi but over two 
years. This second group is a subset of the first group. Therefore, we 
have to split up the first group into two groups: one group (let us say the 
close friends) which is afflicted only once; the other group (children, 
parents, partners) which is afflicted twice. For the second group the 
losses have to be added. It is important to be exact in this respect 
because in welfare ethics with a nonlinear moral valuation of individual 
desirabilities it makes a moral difference if two persons are afflicted or 
if one person is afflicted twice by the same loss. 
1.3.2. Misery of migrants: Refugees usually suffer from their fate for 
a very long time: Not only do they lose most of their property, often 
they also lose their relatives, their home country, their familiar cultural 
and linguistic surroundings to move into a rather hostile environment, 
where it is difficult to find work and housing and to work their way 
upwards. Under these premisses the level of well-being of the 103.6 
million surviving migrants (with an originally ordinary distribution of 
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well-being) will supposedly be reduced in the long run - stronger at the 
beginning, decreasing slowly. More precisely, in the first thirty days (= 
0.082 years) there may be a 0.1000wi decrease, in the rest of the first 
year a 0.0777wi decrease (which is equal to the reduction suffered by 
unemployed) and for further 10 years a 0.0340wi decrease in well-
being. To these losses for 10% of the refugees (i.e. ten times as many as 
were supposed to die during migration) we have to add the losses by 
injuries and diseases according to the iceberg-hypothesis (i.e. a 
reduction by 0.1420wi for 0.027 years). So we have to split up the 
group of the 103.6 million surviving migrants in 10.45 million with this 
additional loss and 93.09 million without it. 
1.3.3. Psychic suffering through worsened social climate: Huge 
numbers of immigrants may cause social problems in the countries of 
immigration. Fear of immigrants, rougher domestic climate, increased 
crime rates, fear of wars etc. could lead to a measurable decrease of 
well-being for some people (e.g. not feeling safe in their homes or fears 
for the future). These problems are dealt with individually in very 
different ways; many of the poorest will hardly be affected by it. 
Counting one half of the population to be objectively unaffected by 
such problems and one half of the other half not reacting, this results in 
one quarter of the world population (1.5 billion) with impairment of 
well-being - even if only to a lesser extent. This small extent might 
consist of a 0.0170wi decrease in well-being (which is equal to the 
difference in well-being between two adjacent income quartiles) for 
half an hour per week. (This amounts to 0.112 years (= 25∙(0.5/(16∙7))) 
during 25 years if we take into account that all the well-being 
assumptions refer only to the 16 waking hours of the day.) 
1.3.4. Psychic suffering by worsened conditions of life: For many 
people increased food prices and water shortages will lead to noticeable 
reductions in well-being. This category of damages will be dealt with 
together with similar discomforts due to economic losses (category 2). 
 
 
3.5. Economic Losses and Their Influence on Well-Being 
 
3.5.1. Economic Losses 
Real economic damages through 2xCO2 are the major concern of 
cost-benefit analyses. Therefore, a huge wealth of literature, though 
only few global studies, exist on this topic. But as will be shown below, 
from a welfarist point of view these losses are not that important when 
compared with the losses already mentioned (about 5% of all damages). 
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For that reason I shall devote much less space to this topic and mostly 
rely on calculations by Fankhauser (1995), eventually correcting his 
estimates. - The final results of these corrected estimates are given in 
table 3.4, columns 2 and 5. The total loss is 165 bn US-dollars/year for 
the whole world, 61 bn for NOECD countries and 105 bn US-dollars 
for the OECD. 
 
 
Table 3.4    
a1: 2050-2075: Economic damages per year through 2xCO2 in billion 
US-dollars1990 in the year 2050 and the socialized portions of these 
costs: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cause or sphere of damage NOECD  OECD  
 total soc. soc. total soc. soc. 
 costs fract. costs costs fract. costs 
 BD % BD BD % BD 
agriculture 16.011 0 0.000 23.130 90 20.817 
deforestation 1.932 0 0.000 7.204 90 6.484 
estuarine fishing 1.298 0 0.000 5.006 90 4.505 
water supply 11.900 0 0.000 34.849 0 0.000 
coastal dryland losses 10.621 0 0.000 8.084 90 7.276 
wetland losses 7.346 0 0.000 8.466 90 7.619 
natural disasters 0.300 0 0.000 1.100 90 0.990 
air pollution 1.752 0 0.000 5.949 0 0.000 
coastal protection 1.037 100 1.037 0.994 100 0.994 
loss of species 3.000 100 3.000 4.000 100 4.000 
diseases and injuries 2.331 0 0.000 2.619 90 2.357 
integration of immigrants 3.453 100 3.453 3.103 100 3.103 
sum 60.981 12.3 7.490 104.504 55.6 58.145 
  
 
2.1.1. Agriculture: In some areas of the world the effect of benchmark 
warming on agricultural productivity is even positive, but much more often it is 
negative. Reductions in crop yields result from heat stress, reduced soil 
humidity, increases in pests and diseases (Pearce et al. 1996, 189 f.). The effect 
of C-fertilization will be minimal (ibid.). Fankhauser estimates losses of about 
39 billion US-dollars per year for the whole world (Fankhauser 1995, 36). This 
estimate is adopted in table 3.5. 
 
2.1.2. Forestry: Relying on Sedjo and Solomon, Fankhauser estimates that 
forests in boreal and temperate zones will be reduced by 9.6% and that tropical 
forests will extend by 5.2% from benchmark warming (Fankhauser 1995, 36; 
Fankhauser's estimates are also adopted by Pearce et al. 1996, 204). But an 
extension of tropical forests seems to be rather unrealistic: Where would the 
necessary space come from, in particular if one thinks of the deforestation 
already taking place? Correcting this there will be losses of 1,268,020 km2 of 
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forests in the NOECD and 901,000 km2 in the OECD. Fankhauser capitalizes 
these losses with 2000, 400 and 200 US-dollars/km2 in high-, medium and low 
income countries respectively (Fankhauser 1995, 37; Pearce et al. follow him: 
1996, 192). If these figures are applied to the forest losses mentioned above the 
monetary losses would be 0.483 bn US-dollars/year in the NOECD and 1.801 
US-dollars/year in the OECD. But Fankhauser admits that his calculations hold 
only for equilibrium damages, whereas transition damages may be much higher 
(Fankhauser 1995, 37). Therefore I have multiplied the last figures by 4; the 
result can be found in table 3.4. 
 
2.1.3. Fishing: Fankhauser reports estimates that rising sea levels may 
reduce estuarine catches by 8% thus leading to losses of 4.326 mill. t in the 
NOECD and 2.503 mill. t in the OECD (Fankhauser 1995, 38 f.; Pearce et al. 
1996, 204). Taking 300 US-dollars/t in the NOECD and 2000 US-dollars/t in 
the OECD as the price of raw fish this would imply losses of 1.3 bn US-
dollars/year in the NOECD and 5 bn US-dollars in the OECD. 
 
2.2.1. Water supply: In high latitude regions water run-off is projected to 
increase due to increased precipitation, whereas lower latitudes could 
experience decreased run-off due to the combined effects of increased 
evapotranspiration and decreased precipitation. The current arid and semi-arid 
regions, in particular, could experience the largest decreases in run-off. (Pearce 
et al. 1996, 193.) Fankhauser assumes a worldwide reduction by 7% for the 
current annual water withdrawal, multiplies the obtained absolute losses with 
current prices and thus calculates economic losses of 11.9 bn US-dollars/year 
for the NOECD and 35 bn US-dollars/year for the OECD. Being rather 
simplistic, because it does not account for increasing prices and secondary 
damages, this calculation still is the best estimate I could find. 
 
2.3.1. Dryland losses: Fankhauser assumes that all densely populated coastal 
zones will be protected against the rising sea. According to this assumption, e.g. 
in China no land will be lost because all coastal zones are densely populated (in 
the sense of the definition); on the other side the northern coast of the former 
SU will remain almost entirely unprotected. Then measuring the length of 
sparsely populated, low-lying coastlines and taking 0.46 km2/km as the average 
loss Fankhauser estimates that in the NOECD about 100,000 km2 and in the 
OECD about 40,000 km2 will be lost to the rising sea. (Fankhauser 1995, 30.) 
But the assumptions of this calculation seem to be too optimistic. Firstly, 
NOECD-countries often are too poor to be able to pay the assumed measures of 
protection; secondly, most of the biggest low lying deltas, which are very 
difficult to protect, are in the developing world. Therefore, in the NOECD, 
except the former SU, at least double the losses seem to be realistic, i.e. about 
176,000 km2. A monetarization of these losses which follows Fankhauser's 8 
leads to losses of about 10.6 bn US-dollars/year for the NOECD and 8 bn US-
dollars/year for the OECD. Note: these figures do not contain economic losses 
from aridisation. But a big part of the latter losses is already contained in the 
agricultural damages. 
 
2.3.2. Wetland losses: Wetland losses are the higher the better a coast is 
protected against the sea (Fankhauser 1995, 31). The services and benefits 
deriving from coastal wetlands are manifold and comprise among others: 
commercial fishing, recreation, furs, flood protection, salinity balance, life 
support for migratory birds and fish, landscape value (ibid. 32). Fankhauser 
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assumes a loss of 33% of all coastal wetlands by the rising sea and capitalizes 
these losses (e.g. with 5 million US-dollars/km2 for the OECD and a rent of 
10%) and thus calculates monetized losses of about 14.7 billion US-dollars for 
the NOECD and 16.9 billion US-dollars for the OECD (Fankhauser 1995, 32). 
But both estimates seem to be too high for our purposes: The reasons for this 
are that monetarization contains many non-economic losses, which will make 
up a much bigger portion in the OECD; and that for the NOECD we had 
already assumed higher dryland-losses so that the lost area of wetland may be 
smaller than Fankhauser assumes. In accounting for these deviations, in both 
cases I assume losses only half as high as Fankhauser. 
 
2.3.3. Economic damages from natural disasters: The causes for an increase 
in natural disasters by 2xCO2 have been explained above. Tol estimates such 
additional economic damages at 0.3 bn US-dollars/year in the NOECD and at 
1.1 bn in the OECD (Tol 1995, 369).9 - Forest losses are already included in the 
changes in forest productivity (2.1.2). The analogue holds for the rise of food 
prices (cf. 2.1.1). But the problem with this category of damages is that losses 
in consumer surplus are, to a great extent, gains in producer surplus because the 
decrease in the food supply leads to higher food prices, which are only partly 
due to more expensive ways of production. Therefore, even an economically 
neutral result may imply big welfare losses. 
 
2.3.7. Air pollution: Estimates of monetized damages due to increased air 
pollution above had been split into health and economic damages (cf. footnote 
7). The remaining economic damages are: 1.8 bn US-dollars/year in the 
NOECD, and 5.9 bn US-dollars/year in the OECD. 
 
2.4.1. Coastal protection: For estimating the total expenses for the 
protection against a 50 cm rise in the sea level Fankhauser multiplies the figures 
calculated by Delft-Hydraulics for a 1 m rise by 0.51.28=0.41; the resulting 
103.73 billion US-dollars for the NOECD and 99.41 billion US-dollarss for the 
OECD then are distributed over 110 (1990-2100) years and discounted. 
(Fankhauser 1995, 28-30.) In the present calculation discounting will only be 
considered below; and part of the 110 years has already gone by. Therefore, for 
determining the mean annual protection costs the total costs assumed by 
Fankhauser are simply divided by 100, obtaining about 1 bn US-dollars/year for 
the NOECD and the OECD each. 
 
2.4.2. Energy demand: In US studies of climate costs increased energy 
demand due to augmented space cooling is always a big item (Fankhauser 
(1995, 40): 20.5 bn US-dollars/year for the whole world). And savings in winter 
heating do not get enough attention. The first is partly due to an incorrect 
generalization about the American way of life. So European estimates are 
completely different. Pearce et al. (1996, 194) quote a British study which 
calculates 32 bn ECU/year net gains from a 3°C increase in mean temperature - 
but only for the European community. So, the assumptions in the literature are 
rather contradictory. Perhaps the net-effect is 0 for the whole world. Therefore, 
this item is ignored in the present estimate of economic losses. 
 
2.5.1. Species loss: 1/10000 to 1/1000 plants may have pharmaceutical value 
which, for the US, is estimated to be at least 300 mill. US-dollars/year and 
species. Pearce et al. estimate that the number of 60.000 plants expected to 
become extinct in the USA in the following 50 years may be increased by 10%, 
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thus obtaining annual losses of 1-18 bn US-dollars/year for the USA alone. 
(Pearce et al. 1996, 200 f.) Unfortunately, I have not found suitable figures for 
the whole world;10 therefore, I venture a rough estimation of the magnitude for 
the world. Extrapolating the estimates for the USA by population, the losses for 
the OECD may be four times as high as those for the USA alone, and for the 
NOECD 20 times as high. But the latter figure must be multiplied by 15%, 
accounting for the smaller purchasing-power parity of the NOECD. 
Conservatively taking the lower limit of the individual loss (i.e. 1 billion dollars 
for the USA) as the real value, the damages would be 3 bn US-dollars/year in 
the NOECD and 4 bn US-dollars/year in the OECD. 
 
2.6.2. Economic losses due to disease and injuries: The above estimates of 
losses due to diseases and injuries (summarized in table 3.5) imply that at least 
24.867 million years of severe illness in which people cannot work will be lost. 
This figure can be used as a basis for calculating at least the lower limit of the 
economic loss through disease and injuries. However, this calculation does not 
include the costs of medical treatment, but only the economic losses because of 
lost working days. The calculation is based on the following additional 
assumptions. Each year of a reduction to 0wi by disease and injuries (group 1.2 
(plus 1.3.c1) of table 3.5) counts for one year of disease. Half of the population 
does work in an economic sense. The all embracing mean gross salary 
(including taxes, social security etc.) may be 36,500 US-dollars/year in the 
OECD and 15% of this sum (i.e. 5475 US-dollars/year) in the NOECD. 95% of 
the injuries and diseases due to floods, storms and malaria could occur in the 
NOECD. The potential for heat-related diseases is proportional to population; 
but the possibilities for protection are better in the OECD. Therefore, 90% of 
the heat-related diseases may occur in the NOECD. Diseases from air pollution 
follow emissions; so 50% of these diseases will occur in the NOECD. Finally, 
famines as well as diseases and injuries due to migration are a problem of the 
NOECD-countries alone. According to all these assumptions the annual 
economic damage due to lost working days is 2.3 bn US-dollars/year in the 
NOECD and 2.6 bn US-dollars/year in the OECD. 
 
2.6.4. Costs for integrating immigrants: Immigrants will not find jobs 
immediately and often must be supported for some time by the country of 
immigration. Fankhauser estimates the costs per immigrant at between 4.500 
US-dollars for the USA and 72 US-dollars for poor countries (Fankhauser 1995, 
51). Taking the present distribution of refugees between countries of 
immigration as a basis for their future distribution, he estimates that the 
NOECD has to pay about 2.3 bn US-dollars/year and the OECD 2.0 bn US-
dollars/year for the integration of additional immigrants due to 2xCO2 (ibid. 
50). But Fankhauser assumes (in a not well-founded manner) a slightly lower 
number of total refugees, namely 2.734 mill. immigrants/year, than was 
assumed here: 103.6 million surviving immigrants distributed over 25 years, i.e. 
4.142 million additional immigrants/year. Therefore, Fankhauser's final figures 
of the costs of immigration here are multiplied by the relation of the two 
estimated numbers of immigrants (which is 1.515). The costs for integrating 
immigrants then are: 3.453 bn dollars/year for the NOECD and 3.103 bn 
dollars/year for the OECD. 
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3.5.2. Welfarizing Individually Borne Economic Losses 
In order to get an idea of the importance of economic losses for well-
being, firstly, the economic losses of the NOECD should be corrected 
for purchasing-power parity (= 17%). The economic losses of the 
NOECD then increase to 359 billion US-dollars/year. The next step is 
to correct for population. According to the current population 
distribution, the total individualized economic losses through 2xCO2 
would be: 72 US-dollars (corrected for purchasing-power 
parity)/inhabitant and year in the NOECD and 105 US-
dollars/inhabitant and year in the OECD. Thirdly, for to obtain an 
impression of the significance for family income these figures should 
then be multiplied by the number of family members. For the OECD 
such losses are not that important, but for people in NOECD-countries 
the resulting losses often will be considerable. 
However, the individualization of economic losses just intimated is 
conceptually wrong because the simple sums of economic losses say 
nothing about their distribution; and for a welfarist approach this 
distribution is essential. In particular, the most influential determinant 
of this distribution is if originally big individual losses will be 
socialized later on, e.g. via insurance or national aid programs, which is 
to be expected much more frequently in the OECD than in the NOECD, 
or if, finally they even have to be borne by the individual. The same 
initial loss could thus lead to a negligible final loss for the individual or 
to economic ruin. And the influences on well-being from the same 
initial loss may thus vary from leaving people nearly unaffected to 
plunging them into absolute poverty.11 Ignoring such facts, surely, is 
one of the main inadequacies of cost-benefit analysis. - Unfortunately, I 
have not found any estimates regarding the distribution of economic 
losses and their impacts on individual well-being. Therefore, I can only 
make a very rough guess as to that distribution and its consequences. In 
a first step I try to welfarize those economic losses which have to be 
borne even in the end by the affected individuals; the second step deals 
with welfarizing socialized economic losses. 
So who does bear the economic losses in the end? 1. Economic costs 
of coastal protection, loss of species and integration of immigrants here 
are assumed to be socialized completely all over the world (i.e. in 
OECD countries as well as in NOECD countries). They are payed for 
by tax revenues or diminish social income in general (cf. columns 3 and 
6 of table 3.4). 2. Economic losses due to reduced water supply and air 
pollution (in particular corrosion) instead are assumed to be borne 
completely by the individuals. 3. Economic losses in agriculture (esp. 
due to aridisation), due to deforestation, reduced estuarine fishing, 
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coastal dryland and wetland losses, natural catastrophes, diseases and 
injuries in the NOECD countries are assumed to be borne completely 
by the individuals, whereas the same types of losses in OECD countries 
will be socialized for the most part (90%) by national help programs or 
insurance. According to all these assumptions, in the NOECD countries 
53.491 billion dollars of economic losses annually have to be borne by 
the individuals and only 7.49 billion dollars are socialized, whereas in 
the OECD countries 46.359 dollars annually of economic losses are 
born by the individuals and 58.145 billion dollars are socialized. 
But even this modal split still does not tell us anything about how 
much different individuals lose. I can only speculate about this. Let us 
consider individually borne damages in NOECD countries first: 1. 
Economic ruin: Non-socialized economic losses in form of aridisation 
of arable land, inundation of costal dryland, reduced catches in 
estuarine fishing, property losses due to natural disasters, diseases and 
injuries (via costs of treatment, losses of income, losses of job or 
profession due to disease or disablement) and half of the losses from 
deforestation, which altogether amount to 31.5 billion dollars annually 
or 788 billion dollars in 25 years, may lead to economic ruin for 1% of 
the population (= 50 million people with an individual loss of 15,764 
dollars/person). These people will have to look for new sources of 
income, which eventually will be less rich. 1.1. Migrants: The major 
part of this group, namely all of those who have lost coastal dryland and 
most (perhaps 3/4) of those who have lost arable land because of 
aridisation will emigrate from their native homes because simply there 
is no land left for them to live respectively because due to aridisation 
the whole region has lost the basis for living. If we take the portion of 
this group as being equal to the portion of the economic damages 
leading to migration this holds for 35.9 million people. This group has 
already been considered in the group of the migrants. The rest of the 
people who are economically ruined (i.e. 14.1 million people) has to be 
split up in three groups. 1.2. Absolutely poor: One group will fall into 
absolute poverty. This portion of the economically ruined non-migrants 
may be equal to the ratio of the quantity of the absolute poor to the 
number of people living in NOECD countries (i.e. 640 mill./5 bn = 
12.8%), resulting in an additional 1.8 million absolutely poor people. 
The fate of these people will be equal to that of the absolute poor 
considered in the above categories 1.1.4 and 1.3.4 (cf. p. 25, 35) but 
with two differences. Firstly, the initial well-being of the economically 
ruined is ordinary (= 0.1420wi) and not yet reduced. Secondly, these 
people have most probably lost their original economic existence 
forever, reducing the greenhouse effect will not bring it back. So if 
these people lose their economic basis with long-term consequences 
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these long-term consequences will last for the rest of their lives,12 i.e. in 
the mean for half the life expectancy of these people. (These two 
differences hold for OECD countries, too.) If we respect these two 
differences but otherwise take over the assumptions for categories 1.1.4 
and 1.3.4 the results are: 3.28% of the 1.8 million people (= 59,200 
persons) will starve or die from deficiency disease etc.; 10% (= 180,000 
persons) will suffer from permanent hunger-pangs for the rest of their 
lives; 40% (= 722,000 persons) will suffer from serious deficiency 
diseases; and the well-being of the remaining 46.28% (= 843,000 
persons) may be reduced "only" to the level of the lowest income 
quartile (from 0.1420wi by 0.0275wi). 1.3. Relatively poor: The first 
half (i.e. 6.1 million persons) of the remaining people will find new jobs 
but poorly paid jobs so that they will be reduced to relative poverty with 
a mean well-being at best as high as that of the lowest income quartile 
during the rest of their lives - except from an additional transitory 
reduction to the level of unemployed (i.e. by 0.0777wi) for six months. 
1.4. Return to ordinary well-being: The other half (i.e. again 6.1 million 
people) may find sufficiently good new jobs for returning to a well-
being as before and so may suffer only from transitory reductions in 
well-being (because of having lost their property and personal 
belongings, initial insecurity of prospects etc.) perhaps of that of an 
unemployed (i.e. by 0.0777wi) for 3 months and for 0.017wi (equal to 
the difference between the lowest income-quartiles) for another 9 
months. 2. Inconveniences of daily life: Rising food prices, increase in 
water prices or reduced availability (which have been postponed from 
the discussion about category 1.3.4), loss of firewood and other freely 
available resources due to (the second half of the) losses of forests, 
losses of wetlands and mangroves, etc. for the poorest part (20% or 1 
billion persons) of the population (with an initial well-being of 
0.1145wi) may lead to noticeable sacrifices and increased discomforts. 
These discomforts may worsen well-being by 0.0170wi (i.e. the 
difference in mean well-being between the two lowest income-
quartiles) for in the mean 30 minutes of 16 hours of the waking part of 
the day or e.g. the duration of a then frugal meal, which in 25 years 
amount to 0.781 years. 3. Small economic damages: The other 79% of 
the population are assumed to be able to bear the remaining economic 
losses (due to reduced water supply, air pollution leading to corrosion 
and perhaps small portions of the damages already dealt with) and 
increased food and water prices without reductions in well-being worth 
mentioning. 
Individually borne damages in OECD countries: 1. Economic ruin: 
Non-socialized economic damages due to aridisation, deforestation, 
reduced catches in estuarine fishing, inundation of coastal dryland, 
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property losses due to natural disasters, diseases and injuries amount to 
118 billion dollars during 25 years. These losses may be spread over 
0.05% of the population or 500,000 people (with mean economic losses 
of 235,700 dollars/person), who will be ruined economically with 
effects partially similar to but much less dramatic than those in NOECD 
countries: Absolute poverty and real emigration will occur only to a 
negligible degree. 1.1. Social degradation: The first half (i.e. 250,000) 
of these people even in the long run will get jobs and social positions 
only considerably worse than before, thereby being reduced in well-
being by an amount equal to a degradation by one income quartile (= 
0.0170wi) for the rest of their life. In addition these people will suffer 
from transitory reductions perhaps equal to those of somebody 
unemployed (i.e. by 0.0777wi) for three months. 1.2. Return to 
ordinary well-being: The other half may suffer from the same transitory 
reductions (by 0.0777wi during three months) plus some further 
transitory reductions (by 0.0170wi during nine months) but then return 
to ordinary well-being because they will have found sufficiently good 
new sources of income which allow this return. 2. Mourning for lost 
property: A group nine times as big as the first group will be 
compensated for their property losses. Nonetheless a part of these 
people, perhaps one half (= 2,25 million people) may mourn for lost 
personal belongings, homes, professions and similar things, which may 
reduce well-being transiently by 0.0777wi for three months and by 
0.0170wi for another nine months. 3. Small economic damages: 
Economic damages like reduced and more expensive water supply, 
wetland losses and air pollution with corrosion effects are assumed to 
be borne individually. But their individual impact will be hardly 
noticeable and, therefore, is neglected here in the calculation of 
damages. 
 
3.5.3. Welfarizing Social Economic Costs 
Only parts of the economic losses due to 2xCO2 are directly borne 
by individuals, the other parts are social economic costs, e.g. expenses 
directly made by public authorities (such as publicly paid coastal 
protection), losses of public property (such as losses of public forests) 
or socialized individual costs (such as public aid for victims of 
catastrophes). The social economic costs for NOECD and OECD 
countries are calculated in columns 4 and 7 of table 3.4. They amount to 
about 7.5 billion US-dollars1990 annually in the NOECD and 58 billion 
US-dollars1990 annually in the OECD during the third period. 
Welfarizing these costs is rather difficult. It would require 
information about what would have been done with this money; and 
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this depends largely on the political aims of the respective public 
authorities and the necessities and urgencies felt by them - which is 
hard to predict 50 or more years in advance. In the worst case the 
money would be used for reducing human welfare e.g. by war. A more 
appropriate worst case may be that this money is spent without effects 
for social welfare, such as for raising the income of already prosperous 
people. The best case from a welfarist point of view may be spending 
the saved money for programmes prolonging life expectancy or 
efficiently raising the income of non prosperous people. The prospects 
of prolonging life expectancy again are hard to predict, so I will 
consider only investment in mass income. The actual expenditure of the 
saved money is then taken to be half way between the two extremes, 
expenditure neutral to welfare and pure welfare policy; i.e. the possible 
welfare produced by a pure welfare policy will be halved. This, 
probably, is a rather optimistic estimate - matching the conservative 
approach of this study because it handicaps the abatement options in the 
following way. The social economic costs due to BAU may be valued 
rather highly by this half-way hypothesis; but the same will hold for the 
abatement options, where this type of damage is much, much more 
important. 
In OECD-countries the biggest potential for increasing welfare by 
raising incomes would be to lift people from below the poverty line 
(which in the USA 1990 was approximately equal to the 87.5th income 
percentile, i.e. the median of the lowest income quartile and 3707 
dollars1990/year∙person (cf. calculation below)) to a level only "near to 
poverty" (which is defined as lying between the poverty level and twice 
the poverty level). Mean expenditures for this would be equal to the 
mean poverty line, i.e. 3707 dollars1990/year∙person; the gain would be 
an increase in well-being from a grand mean of at most 0.1145wi 13 by 
0.0163wi (cf. the calculation in the next paragraph in small print). 
Inversely, social economic losses due to business as usual would 
prevent such an increase, and therefore must be considered as a 
reduction in well-being from a grand mean of 0.1308wi by 0.0163wi for 
25 years. According to these assumptions, this would hold for about 7.8 
million people (= (0.5∙58.145 bn dollars)/(3707 dollars/person)). 
Similar calculations may hold for NOECD countries. But one main 
difference is that in NOECD countries there are many absolutely poor 
people and many more relatively poor people than in OECD countries. 
Unfortunately, I have no good data about these people. Therefore, I 
assume that the available money in the best case would be spent for 
people with a grand mean of well-being of 0.1000wi and that the 
gradient of the well-being function (over income) for this value is 1.5 
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times as high as for 0.1145wi so that an increase by 0.0163wi may be 
achieved with just 2471 dollars annually. The other main difference is 
the greater purchasing power, which implies that the 2471 dollars 
decrease to 420 dollars. Assuming again that a more realistic scenario 
would lie in between this best case and a worst case with a zero 
increase of welfare the 7.5 billion US-dollars of annual social economic 
costs will lead to a reduction of well-being from 0.1163 by 0.0163 over 
25 years for 8.9 million people (= (0.5∙7.49 bn dollars)/(420.07 
dollars/person)). 
A rough well-being function over individual income has been computed as 
follows.14 Statistical data about the percentages of different income categories 
(e.g. up to 4,999 dollars/year: 5.2%; 5,000-9,999 dollars/year: 9.7%) in 1990 in 
the USA (Statistical Abstract US 1992, 446) imply the income of certain 
income positions, where "income position" shall mean the income percentile 
counted beginning from the lowest income (e.g. the income of position 5.2 is 
4,999 dollars/year, of position 14.9 it is 9,999 dollars/year). From this, by linear 
interpolation, the income of optional income positions can be calculated 
approximately, in particular the income of income positions for which we know 
(cf. above, sect. 3.3) (taking the medium well-being being approximately equal 
to the mean) the grand mean of well-being: position 12.5: 8762 dollars/year; 
position 37.5: 22400 dollars/year; position 62.5: 38942 dollars/year; position 
87.5: 70301 dollars/year. - All these data (as well as the official definitions of 
poverty line) refer to household income - and not to individual income, the data 
for which are needed here. And the mean size of households varies strongly 
with income (the main tendency is that richer households are bigger on the 
average). So the mean household sizes of the interesting income positions have 
been calculated (from statistics giving the percentages of the various household 
sizes in the income categories (Statistical Abstract US 1992, 446) and taking 
again the medium of these categories being equal to the mean and then 
interpolating), which results in 1.943, 2.429, 2.839 respectively 3.174 
persons/household for the four positions. Finally, the previously obtained 
family incomes were divided by these sizes with the following results: position 
12.5 (with a grand mean of well-being of 0.1145wi): mean individual income of 
4510 dollars/year; position 37.5 (with a grand mean of well-being of 0.1352wi): 
mean individual income 9222 dollars/year; position 62.5 (with a grand mean of 
well-being of 0.1494wi): mean individual income 13717 dollars/year; position 
87.5 (with a grand mean of well-being of 0.1655wi): mean individual income 
22149 dollars/year. These anchor values then can be used for interpolating the 
well-being of further mean individual incomes. 
The mean poverty line was computed this way: On the basis of the 
definitions of the poverty line for different household sizes (Statistical Abstract 
USA 1992, 427) and data about the household sizes of various income 
categories (Statistical Abstract US 1992, 446), by interpolation, the number of 
households below the poverty line can be calculated as well as their mean size 
(which is 2.610 persons). Interpolating the definitions of poverty line for this 
mean household size leads to a family poverty line of 9674 dollars/year, which 
then has been divided by household size, resulting in a mean individual poverty 
line of 3707 dollars1990/year. 
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3.5.4. Sparing Parts of the Welfarization: Principles of Cost-
Welfare Analysis 
Admittedly, the welfarization of social economic costs in sect. 3.5.3 
is rather crude. This is not a problem so far because in BAU the social 
economic costs make up only a trifling part of the welfare damages (a 
bit more than 1%); this is different with the abatement options. In 
sustainable reduction (a4) they make up the lion's share of all damages 
so that inexact welfarization of these costs could make a difference. An 
alternative way of accounting for social economic costs is cost-welfare 
analysis (which is different from cost-benefit analysis with its complete 
monetarization): from the point of view of a given decider for several of 
his options the relations of (real economic) net costs (for this decider) to 
the net welfare gains (or losses), expressed in utilities or other moral 
values, caused by this decider are calculated and compared. "Net costs" 
means costs minus benefits, "net welfare gains" means welfare gains 
minus welfare losses. So the real economic costs for this decider do not 
have to be welfarized; the cost-welfare ratios then say how profitable 
some measure is from a welfarist point of view, i.e. from the 
perspective that this decider has the aim of creating much welfare and 
perhaps wants to maximize welfare. The community of OECD-
countries (i.e. states, and not individuals) here is treated as the decider 
because these countries have the key position for bringing about 
substantial greenhouse gas abatement. For our case the formula for the 
cost-welfare relation is:  
F1: cost-welfare relation of ai =  
 social costs of ai for the OECD - social costs of BAU for the OECD   _______________________________________________________  
 welfare losses by BAU - welfare losses by ai            
The options ai are the three abatement options (a2, a3, a4) and several 
other possibilities of spending public money. The costs are real 
economic costs for the decider. This means that only real public 
economic costs and gains for the OECD will be left in monetary terms, 
whereas non-socialized economic costs (running up in the OECD or in 
the NOECD) and socialized economic costs for NOECD-countries have 
to be welfarized ( translated into moral desirability) as before. The 
social economic costs of BAU (a1) prevented by an abatement option ai 
count as benefits of ai (cf. the subtrahend of the numerator). The 
utilities or desirabilities gained or lost are the moral desirabilities of the 
options. The welfare gains of abatement option ai are the prevented 
welfare losses due to BAU (cf. the minuend of the denominator). The 
welfare losses of ai are the hardships etc. imposed on the people by 
greenhouse gas reduction, e.g. unemployment (cf. the subtrahend of the 
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denominator). The social economic costs for the OECD due to BAU 
calculated in table 3.4, i.e. the 25∙58 billion dollars, will be the 
subtrahend of the numerator in the cost-benefit analyses; and the other 
welfare costs of a1, the estimate of which is still in course, will be the 
minuend of the denominator. 
The advantages of cost-utility analysis are, firstly, that the social 
economic costs for the OECD are not be welfarized so that some 
arbitrariness can be prevented and, secondly, that the efficiency of the 
abatement options can be compared not only between each other but 
with the efficiency of other alternatives as well, such as investing in 
health care programmes or developmental aid. In the following, both 
types of studies, complete welfare analysis and cost-welfare analysis, 
are undertaken. All losses which have to be treated differently in these 
types of studies, i.e. social economic costs for the OECD translated into 
welfare losses in the one case and left unchanged in the other, will be 
marked by "■". 
 
 
3.6. Other Damages and Integration of Reductions in Well-Being 
 
3.1. Damages to ecosystems and natural spaces: Erosion and 
flooding of beaches, death of coral reefs, dying forests, desertification 
of savannahs have consequences not only for tourism, agriculture, 
forestry, but also for human beings in general: for example by reducing 
possibilities of recreation and experience. But well-being should only 
slightly be influenced by that, as people looking for recreation and 
experiences of nature will turn to alternative possibilities, and damage 
for the expelled inhabitants of such natural spaces have already been 
taken into account. Therefore, the main remaining type of losses in 
well-being caused by the destruction of ecosystems probably are losses 
in what economists call existence value, i.e. losses due to sadness 
because of a conscious loss, and not losses in use value. Losses in 
existence value may stem from lost ecosystems at great distances from 
the subject; and for each subject a quite different set of ecosystems may 
be important. I have not found any reliable calculation of these 
damages. Therefore, I will try a very rough estimate. Most people 
(perhaps 75%), children, very poor people struggling for survival, have 
other sorrows or interests and do not care about losses of ecosystems. 
The minority who does care (= 1.5 billion people) may think of these 
losses now and then, let's say 20 minutes per month (= 0.017 years 
during 25 years), and will be a little sad so that their well-being is 
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reduced during this time by 0.017 (equal to the mean decrease in well-
being due to degradation by one income quartile). 
All welfare losses due to business as usual are summarized in table 
3.5. As already anounced, welfarizations of economic losses of the 
decider, i.e. the community of OECD countries, are marked with "■". 
They will be considered only in the pure welfare calculation. In the 
cost-welfare analysis instead of these welfarizations the original 
monetary losses of the decider have to be taken into account, which for 
BAU amount to 1454 billion dollars (= 25∙58.145 bn dollars) in the 
third period. 
 
Table 3.5    
a1: 2050-2075: Reductions of well-being (in wi) for specified periods from 
specified initial levels due to various causes: 
1 2    3³ 4    5³ 6 
cause init. position ³ reduction    ³ persons 
 LE³  WB³ durat.³ WB³  
 years³ in wi³ years³ in wi³ in 1000 
1.1. direct casualties: 
a floods, storms 65.01 0.1420 32.505 v0.1420 441 
b famines due to crop failures 62.92 0.1420 31.460 v0.1420 37500 
c migrants during migration 62.92 0.1420 31.460 v0.1420 1046 
d absolute poverty, malnutr. 62.92 0.1145 31.460 v0.1145 52500 
e malaria 62.92 0.1420 31.460 v0.1420 1250 
f hot spells 65.01 0.1420 32.505 v0.1420 5927 
 
1.2. direct physical suffering: 
a nat. disasters: injuries etc. 65.01 0.1420 0.027 0.1420 4410 
b famines: diseases, suffering 62.92 0.1420 0.027 0.1420 375000 
c malaria 62.92 0.1420 0.026 0.1420 248750 
d air pollution: diseases 65.01 0.1420 0.013 0.1420 447179 
e hot spells: diseases 65.01 0.1420 0.027 0.1420 59272 
f chronic hunger pangs 62.92 0.1145 25.000 0.0845 6400 
g deficiency diseases, pain 62.92 0.1145 25.000 0.0345 25600 
 
1.3. direct psychic suffering: 
a greater grief for deaths 65.01 0.1420 0.164 0.0350 303528 
b1 greater grief for deaths 65.01 0.1420 0.164 0.0350 75882 
b2 psych. gaps due to deaths  + 2.000 0.0350  
c1 migration: diseases, injuries 62.92 0.1420 0.027 0.1420 10460 
c2 misery of migrants  + 0.082 0.1000  
c3  + 0.918 0.0777  
c4  + 10.000 0.0340  
d1 misery of migrants 62.92 0.1420 0.082 0.1000 93090 
d2  + 0.918 0.0777  
d3  + 10.000 0.0340  
e worse social climate 65.01 0.1420 0.112 0.0170 1500000 
 
2. reductions in well-being by economic losses: 
a NOECD ec. ruin, starving 62.92 0.1420 31.460 v0.1420 59 
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b NOECD ec. ruin, hunger pa. 62.92 0.1420 31.460 0.1120 180 
c NOECD ec. ruin, defic. disease 62.92 0.1420 31.460 0.0620 722 
d NOECD ec. ruin, other paup. 62.92 0.1420 31.460 0.0275 843 
e1 NOECD ec. ruin, return to  62.92 0.1420 0.250 0.0777 6148 
e2    original level  + 0.750 0.0170  
f1 NOECD ec. ruin, social 62.92 0.1420 0.500 0.0777 6148 
f2     degradation  + 30.960 0.0275  
g NOECD harder daily life 62.92 0.1145 0.781 0.0170 1000000 
h1 OECD ec. ruin, return to 76.31 0.1420 0.250 0.0777 250 
h2    original level  + 0.750 0.0170  
i1 OECD ec. ruin, social 76.31 0.1420 0.250 0.0777 250 
i2     degradation  + 37.904 0.0170  
j1 OECD ec. ruin, reimbursem. 76.31 0.1420 0.250 0.0777 2250 
j2  + 0.750 0.0170  
k NOECD social monet. losses 62.92 0.1163 25.000 0.0163 8915 
l ■OECD social monet. losses ■76.31 0.1308 25.000 0.0163 7843 
 
3. other influences on well-being:      
a grief about ecological losses 65.01 0.1420 0.017 0.0170 1500000 
 
Social economic costs for the OECD countries in billion US-dollars1990: 
a1: undisc. BD discounted BD  
  
2050-2075: uncontrolled greenhouse effect 1,454 213  
Explanations: Column 1 describes the cause of reductions in well-being. If 
several losses with certainty hit the same persons these losses are grouped 
together and are differentiated by numbers behind the letter for that group. - 
Columns 2 and 3 represent the initial position of the group: its life expectancy 
in years and its long-term grand mean of well-being in wi. - Columns 4 and 5 
represent the reductions in well-being: its duration in years and the amount of 
reduction in wi. In most cases these reductions are assumed to be equal for the 
whole group. But a "v" indicates that the specified reduction is a mean 
reduction, and the individual reduction is equal to the original level: all 
members of that group by death are reduced to the level zero. - Column 6 
represents the size of the group in 1000 persons. - "■" indicates welfare losses 
which are welfarizations of the economic losses of the decider listed in the 




Notes to Chapter 3 
 
                                                 
1 "Poverty by worsened conditions of life" (in groups 1.1.4, 1.2.4 and 
1.3.4) is meant in the sense that consumer prices, in particular of food, increase 
so that the same earnings will provide less commodities. Group 2 instead covers 
monetary losses, in particular income losses which in certain cases may lead to 
poverty, too; but in this case the monetary loss is the cause of poverty. 
Subsuming the first type of poverty in the first group and the second type in the 
second group may appear a bit sophistic. But the two types are clearly different; 
so there is at least no double counting. 
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2 Some scientists hope for a fertilization effect of CO2. But according 
to others, this is an illusional hope: CO2 will not do alone; in addition water, 
fertilizer, trace elements and energy are needed ― which makes a big 
difference between laboratory experiments and open-field conditions (Pearce et 
al. 1996, 189 f.; Newton / Dillingham 1994, 184). 
3 In the cases of Bangladesh and Egypt, Myers counts all the refugees 
from relative sea level rise and does not subtract that portion which is due to 
subsidence; and he excludes nearly completely defense measures like diking, 
which at least in the cases of Alexandria and the Chinese Coast seems to be 
unrealistic. 
4 Eventual regional differences here are disregarded due to lack of data. 
― Indeed, Inglehart (1997) reports representative investigations even in very 
poor countries. But, apart from a rather crude analysis of the data, his results 
cannot be used here because that question of his coming nearest to what would 
be needed for our concern is: "Taking all things together, would you say you 
are very / quite / not very / not at all happy?" (ibid. 395). This question already 
aims at a rather cognitive appraisal of the subjective state or even the personal 
life situation (if "happy" is taken to mean "satisfied") and not at the current 
mood and feelings. 
5 Some researchers have doubted that increasing income (as such) 
could improve human happiness. Easterlin (1974) e.g., after re-analyzing some 
other studies, maintained that there is a strong correlation between income and 
well-being within nations (in particular in the USA) but no correlation between 
GNP/person and mean national well-being of different countries. He explained 
this alledged finding with a relativity hypothesis, saying that (intra-national) 
differences in well-being stem from comparing one's income with the income of 
the national environment. ― As has been shown in several studies since, 
Easterlin's explosive finding of a non-correlation is simply false. There is a 
grossly concave function of national mean well-being (measured with a 10-step 
scale comparison with the best and worst life respectively one can imagine as 
the two extremes) over the GNP/person (cf. e.g. Veenhoven 1984, 145-150, in 
particular 149). And it seems quite clear that income must have a nonrelativistic 
influence on well-being as far as the satisfaction of bio-psychic minimal needs 
is concerned (ibid. 400). 
6 Diseases of the migrants exceptionally are represented together with 
their psychic sufferings (as 1.3.e1) and not in group 1.2. 
7 Fankhauser's estimates of the damages from NOx and SO2 are: 
NOECD: 3.504 bn dollars/year; OECD: 11.898 bn dollars/year (Fankhauser 
1995, 49). He does not differentiate between damages for health and for wealth. 
I simply assume that these categories are of equal weight. In addition, 
Fankhauser uses a monetarization in the relation of 10/2/1 for countries with 
high, medium and low income, respectively. The mean relation OECD / 
NOECD is 5/0.98 so that the remaining monetized health-damages of the 
NOECD-countries should be multiplied by this fraction for getting fair 
monetarizations of their health damages, resulting in 8.939 bn dollars/year for 
the NOECD and 5.949 bn dollars/year for the OECD. Fankhauser monetizes 
one lost life with 1.5 million US-dollars (in countries with high income) so that 
the losses amount to 9,925 death equivalents per year or 248,133 death 
equivalents in 25 years, which during 25 years amount to 6.203 million lost 
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years. These lost years may be interpreted as being lost by days of illness. 
Assuming that diseases due to air pollution last only half as long as the other 
diseases considered so far, i.e. 0.013 years, the 6.203 million lost years spread 
over 477 million cases. 
8 The value of the lost land is taken to be 2 million US-dollars/km2, 0.5  
million and 1 million US-dollars for the OECD, the former SU, and the world 
as a whole, respectively. A rent of 10% is assumed. (Fankhauser 1995, 30 f.) 
9 Fankhauser's guess is 124 million US-dollars for the NOECD and 506 
for the OECD (Fankhauser 1995, 54). But he includes only cyclones. 
10 Fankhauser estimates 40 bn US-dollars/year losses from ecosystem 
damages for the whole world (Fankhauser 1995, 201). But the basis of this 
figure is more than obscure, and it includes non-economic losses, too. 
Therefore, it is not suited for the present purposes. 
11 This difference is important for utilitarianism too, because 
utilitarianism in the end counts utilities and not money, with different 
distribution of monetary losses leading to completely different disutilities. 
12 If for example a farmer loses his land to the rising sea and even if the 
sea recedes to its former position the farmer would have to move back to his 
land, recultivate it, and rebuild or at least renovate his house etc., for which he 
probably will not have the money ― if he has not succeeded economically in 
the meantime. But in the latter case the farmer probably will not have suffered 
from long-term economic degradation anyway. 
13 0.1145wi is the grand mean of the people on the poverty line (taking 
the medium of the lowest quartile as being equal to the mean) and therefore is 
too high. But, unfortunately, I have not found anchor values for poorer people 
so that to obtain more appropriate values we would have to extrapolate from the 
values calculated up to now. But such an extrapolation would be completely 
unfounded. Therefore, as a sufficient approximation the mean of the lowest 
quartile has been taken as the initial position of the poor. 
14 Surely, economists have developed many theories about the utility 
function of income. But these, usually, are established via the methods of 
subjective expected utility theory, which has been criticized above (sect. 2.2). 
But even for an approach which is rather near to the methods used here, namely 
that of van Praag (e.g. Praag 1971), holds the third criticism mentioned above, 
that unfiltered preferences are used which by no means are always rational. In 
particular van Praag establishes the utility function on the basis of answers to 
the question if the subject would call a particular income for themselves as 
"very bad, bad, insufficient, sufficient, good or very good". These six levels 
then were interpreted as cardinal valuations from 0 to 1. Apart from the 
problem of an inadequate translation of the rating values into cardinal values, 
the answers given often will correspond to social conventions but not reflect the 
real importance of the income in question for one's life. People mostly do not 
have good information about such impacts: for example they tend to overrate 
the importance of big income rises whereas empirical studies confirm that for 
average people they may not change well-being very much (cf. e.g. Brickman et 
al. 1978; Grom 1987, 87-92). 



























4. Alternatives a2-a4: Abatement 
Options 
4.1. Characterizing the Alternatives 
 
As with business as usual, I have analyzed three alternatives: 
a2, stabilization, i.e. freezing emissions of greenhouse gases at the 1990 
level,, 
a3, strong CO2-reduction, i.e. reduction of emissions by 25% (until 
2015) compared to the level of 1990, and 
a4, sustainable CO2-reduction, i.e. reduction of emissions by 60% (until 
2035) compared to the level of 1990. 
 
 
4.2. Monetary Abatement Costs 
 
The core of all counter measures against the anthropogenous 
greenhouse effect is the reduction of CO2-emissions. This aim is 
attainable e.g. by high taxes on CO2-emissions (= carbon tax or C-tax), 
which would create incentives for a more economic use of energy and 
for the technological development of alternative sources of energy. In 
the short run at least this will lead to increases in prices and probably to 
some unemployment in energy-intensive industries. Some of these 
negative effects, in particular unemployment, can be reduced 
considerably if the revenue of the C-tax is used in an economically 
positive manner, namely for reducing labour tax, costs for social 
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security, and personal income tax, thus reducing producer wages and 
creating new jobs (Hourcade et al. 1996, 309; Mabey et al. 1997, 403). 
And further reductions of costs are attainable by an economically 
efficient abatement, which means reducing emissions first where it is 
cheapest. This may be obtained by allocating emissions through 
tradeable emission permits. Such measures for efficiency are 
presupposed in the following calculation of economic costs. 
Among economists there are extensive discussions about the 
economic costs of such reductions. Above all there are two 
fundamentally different methods: top-down-models versus bottom-up-
models. Top-down-models strongly generalize prevailing experiences 
of effectiveness, utilization, and energy costs and presuppose an 
economically efficient utilization of sources of energy already in the 
present. Bottom-up-models are much more orientated towards 
technological possibilities and potentials of saving, but they neglect the 
effects on economy as a whole and end up with far too optimistic 
estimations about the costs for scenarios of reduction. As a precaution I 
used the pessimistic top-down-models as a guide-line, and averaged and 
extrapolated the results of whole series of such models. 
Hourcade et al. (1996, 335) list a collection of global CO2 abatement cost 
modelling studies. These studies inquire GWP (= gross world product) impacts 
for very different reduction aims. To get comparable data I have treated the 
results as if they were obtained according to the following formula: 
F2: cann = -1 + (1+f)
100g, 
where cann are the annual abatement costs in fractions of GWP, f are the 
fractional abatement costs, i.e. the costs (in fractions of GWP) of reducing CO2-
emissions for 1 further percent with respect to an assumed baseline (i.e. 
business as usual), and g is the reduction target in fractions of the assumed 
baseline. The reduction target g with respect to the baseline (BAU) can be 
translated into a reduction target r with respect to the starting year (normally 
1990) according to the following formula: 
F3: g = 1 - (1-r)/(1+e)t, 
where t is the relative target year, i.e. the difference between the target year and 
the starting year (for the target year being 2050 t would be 60), and e is the 
assumed annual increase in CO2 emissions taking place under baseline 
conditions. (Assuming e.g. an annual increase in CO2-emissions under baseline 
of 1.5% a reduction aim of 25% with respect to 1990 in 2050 translates into an 
abatement target of 1-(1-0.25)/1.01560 = 69% with respect to baseline.) 
The interesting variables of the various models then are e, the annual 
increase in CO2-emissions assumed for BAU, and f, the fractional abatement 
costs. Reckoning back from the various results reported in Hourcade et al. to 
these variables, according to the formulas just given, the mean value of all 
models for e is 1.42% (range 0.92-2.18%) and the mean value for f is 
0.0383%GWP/% of reduction (range 0.0045-0.0862%). Inserting these values 
in the above formulas, abatement costs for any reduction target can be 
calculated and have been calculated for the targets of the alternatives a2 to a4. 
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For NOECD with BAU increases in GNP of 2% annually from 5373 billion 
dollars in 1990 are assumed, for OECD increases of 1% annually from 13877 
billion dollars in 1990 are assumed. For calculating the cumulated reduction 
costs the following reduction paths of options a3 and a4 may be reasonable: a3: 
stabilization until 2005, afterwards for ten years reduction of emissions by 
2.5%/year, then freezing this level; a4: stabilization until 2005, subsequently for 
20 years reduction of emissions by 2.5%/year, for the following ten years 
reduction by 1%/year, then freezing this level. In cost-welfare analysis the 
annual costs have to be discounted (because the costs may be paid by today's 
investments which will bear interest until the year of payment). The discount 
rate used here is 3%/year (0.97); and discounting begins in 2000. The resulting 
formula for calculating e.g. the cumulated discounted costs in billion US-
dollars1990 for NOECD by a4 from 2005 to 2025 is:  
 100∙(1-(1-(t-15)∙0.025)/1.0142t) 
F4: t=15Σ
35 [0.97(t-10)∙5373∙1.02t∙(-1+1.000383 )].  
 
According to these averaged and extrapolated assumptions, 
cumulated abatement costs amount to the sums shown in table 4.1. 
Altogether stabilization (a2) in the three periods considered without 
discounting will cost about 57 (US) trillion (= 1012) US-dollars1990 and 
with discounting still 15 trillion dollars; the figures for the 25% 
reduction (a3) are 69 trillion dollars and 18 trillion dollars 
 
Table 4.1    
a2-a4: 2000-2075: Cumulated economic costs for OECD, NOECD and 
the world due to CO2-reductions, undiscounted and discounted (with 
3%/year) in billion US-dollars1990: 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
option & period NOECD OECD world NOECD OECD world 
     disc. disc. disc. 
a2: 2000-2025: 2371 4768 7139 1506 3075 4581 
 2025-2050: 6739 10680 17419 2054 3307 5361 
 2050-2075: 14430 17940 32370 2076 2622 4698 
sum a2  23540 33388 56928 5636 9004 14640 
 
a3: 2000-2025: 3318 6634 9952 2066 4186 6252 
 2025-2050: 8476 13470 21946 2606 4208 6814 
 2050-2075: 16430 20460 36890 2374 3003 5377 
sum a3  28224 40564 68788 7046 11397 18443 
 
a4: 2000-2025: 3665 7288 10953 2244 4522 6766 
 2025-2050: 10783 17170 27953 3333 5389 8722 
 2050-2075: 19250 24000 43250 2794 3539 6333 
sum a4  33698 48458 82156 8371 13450 21821   
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Table 4.2    
a1-a4: Annual GNP-losses by CO2 abatement in the year 2050: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 loss of loss of GNP GNP GNP GNP 
option GWP GWP NOECD OECD NOECD OECD 
 in BD in % ∙1990 ∙1990 in BD in BD 
a1: BAU 0 0.00 3.2810 1.8167 17629 25210 
a2: stabilization 946 2.21 3.2085 1.7766 17239 24654 
a3: 25% reduction 1127 2.63 3.1947 1.7689 17165 24547 
a4: 60% reduction 1379 3.22 3.1754 1.7582 17061 24399 
 
Explanations: Because this table only deals with abatement costs the figures, in 
particular for BAU, only represent theoretical baselines from which the losses 
due to 2xCO2 still have to be subtracted. - "BD" means: billion US-dollars1990. - 
Columns 2 and 3 represent worldwide abatement costs in comparison to BAU, 
absolute in billion US-dollars1990 and relative. - Columns 4 and 5 represent how 
much higher GNP (of NOECD and OECD) will be in 2050 than in 1990. - 
Columns 6 and 7 show the absolute GNPs (of NOECD and OECD) in 2050 in 
billion US-dollars1990.   
 
(discounted), respectively; and for the 60% reduction (a4) they are 82 
trillion dollars and 22 trillion dollars (discounted), respectively. What is 
clearly to be seen is that much sharper abatement options (a3 and a4) do 
not cost that much more than stabilization (a3), which might lead to a 
higher efficiency of the stricter options. Annual costs of the considered 
options in 2050 are shown in table 4.2. For the strictest option, i.e. 
sustainable reduction (a4), costs for the whole world amount to 1379 
billion US-dollars/year, and for a3 and a2 to 1127 and 946 billion 
dollars respectively. At first sight these figures look really frightening; 
but we have to examine them more closely. 
The morally crucial question is how these costs should be 
distributed. This question of the allocation of payments is completely 
independent of the problem of allocation of emissions (cf. Kverndokk 
1995, 130-132):1 The problem of allocating emissions usually is 
thought to be optimally resolved by introducing tradeable emission 
permits. (If reduction of emission in our own country is more expensive 
than the global mean then we will buy emission rights for the price of 
the global mean from other countries where reduction of emission is 
cheaper,; and both countries will gain.) The problem of allocating 
payments then can be reformulated as the question of the initial 
distribution of emission permits in each emission period. Giving one 
country only relatively few emission permits leads to making this 
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country pay more for the abatement. Knowing the various abatement 
costs, an initial distribution of emission permits can be arranged exactly 
in such a way that abatement costs are distributed according to a desired 
pattern. Various distributions of emission permits have been discussed. 
The two extremes are the grandfather principle, that emission rights are 
distributed proportionally to current emissions, and the principle 'no 
harm to developing countries', that developing countries should pay 
nothing for CO2-reduction.
2 The grandfather principle obviously 
discriminates against developing countries from several points of view. 
They get much fewer rights per person, which contradicts egalitarian 
considerations; they need many more rights for their further 
development, which is important for a welfarist conception of justice; 
and they have contributed only little if anything at all 3 to the high 
concentration of greenhouse gases, which is important for a liberal 
polluter-pays principle.4 Independently of such moral considerations, 
developing countries and even countries with economies in transition 
simply will not participate in global abatement agreements if they have 
to carry a heavy burden regarding it as unfair. Whatsoever, from a 
welfarist point of view the best distribution is that the OECD-countries 
pay the abatement costs completely because they will have the smallest 
utility loss from this. And for the strategy of the present comparison this 
assumption seems to be adequate too for the following reasons. If then 
severe abatement options are obligatory for people in the OECD even 
under this worst case condition (worst case for the OECD) this would 
be a stronger argument for such an obligation. If the OECD pays for all, 
abatement costs will be 3.75% of its GNP for a2 (stabilization), 4.47% 
of its GNP for a3 (25% reduction), and 5.47% of its GNP for a4 (60% 
reduction) annually in 2050 (cf. table 4.3). 
 
 
Table 4.3    
a1-a4: Annual GNP-losses by CO2 abatement in the year 2050 if OECD 
pays for all: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 GWP GNP GNP GNP GNP loss GNP loss 
option in BD NOECD OECD OECD OECD OECD 
  in BD in BD ∙1990 in % in BD 
a1: BAU 42839 17629 25210 1.8167 0.00 0 
a2: stabilization 41893 17629 24264 1.7485 3.75 946 
a3: 25% reduction 41712 17629 24083 1.7355 4.47 1127 
a4: 60% reduction 41460 17629 23831 1.7173 5.47 1379 
 
Explanations: "BD" means: billion US-dollars1990. - Column 5 shows the 
relation of OECD GNP in 2050 to OECD GNP in 1990. - Columns 6 and 7 list 
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GNP losses relative to BAU. The figures of column 7 must be identical with 
those of column 2 of table 4.2 because OECD pays for all. 
  
 
So, in the worst case, namely taking a 60% reduction, the OECD 
pays 5.5% of its GNP, i.e. 1379 billion dollars (25210-23831 billion 
dollars) for reducing greenhouse gases - due to directly taking over 
costs of NOECD-countries, higher expenses for energy per unit and 
reduced growth. These figures look gigantic. But (as shown in column 5 
of table 4.3) that does not imply anyone being poorer than today. On the 
contrary, the GNP will be 71% above that of 1990. It just means that 
the economic growth that otherwise would be reached in 2050 will only 
be reached in 2056. 
Nonetheless the money would be there and could be spent for 
increasing well-being.5 In the following cost-welfare analysis all these 
costs will be treated as social economic costs of the decider OECD.6 
(They count as monetary gross costs of the relevant options (minuend 
of the numerator in formula F1); cf. below.) In a pure welfare analysis, 
on the other hand, these losses have to be welfarized. But this can easily 
be done following the assumptions of section 3.5.3, i.e. treating the 
losses as money that otherwise, in the best case, could have been spent 
for lifting people from below the poverty line to an income level near 
poverty, namely raising people from a grand mean of well-being of 
0.1145wi by 0.0163wi with 3707 dollars/year∙person. Because we are 
now dealing with losses distributed over 75 years we must decide for 
how long single individuals will profit from this possibility. Again 25 
years are assumed here, as a mean between aid lasting for half the 
lifetime of these persons and a much shorter duration, which is 
politically desired for not making people depend too much on public 
assistance. A further difference to welfarizing damages from the 
greenhouse effect is that the costs due to abatement and the number of 
possible beneficiaries are so high (higher than 125 million) that even 
people from the second lowest income octile could have profited from 
the lost public assistance. The original level of well-being of these 
people is assumed to be in the middle of the grand means of the two 
lowest income quartiles (i.e. 0.1249wi) (cf. sect. 3.3 and fn. 13 in ch. 3). 
The gradient of the well-being melioration is taken to be unchanged 
(i.e. 3707 dollars/0.0163wi). According to these guidelines, the most 
extreme welfare loss, i.e. by sustainable reduction (a4) in the third 
period, would amount to 125 million reductions over 25 years from 
0.1308wi by 0.0163wi and further 108 million reductions over 25 years 
from 0.1412wi by 0.0163wi (cf. complete lists in tables 4.4-4.6). 
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4.3. Non-Monetary Abatement Costs 
 
In the last section (4.2) only monetary abatement costs have been 
considered. But there are some non-monetary reductions of well-being 
due to abatement as well. As already intimated, the people of the OECD 
people will not directly feel the economic losses during the third period. 
(That the economic growth otherwise reached in 2050 will only be 
reached in 2056 is merely a calculated loss.) Probably, the main loss of 
well-being felt by OECD-inhabitants during the third period will be 
their upset about the high contributions to the Second and Third World, 
many people will be angry and complain about it. At most half of the 
politically thinking (50%) adults and adolescents (altogether 200 
million people) might be upset about that for half an hour per month (= 
0.026 years during 25 years) and thereby reduce their well-being from 
the ordinary level by a small value (perhaps equal to the mean 
difference in well-being between two adjacent income quartiles: 
0.0170wi) in all three periods. I assume these costs to mount up in all 
three periods and to be equal for the three abatement options considered 
here. 
Economic losses in 50 years will not be felt; but what will be felt 
intensely are decreases in well-being due to difficulties of adaptation of 
economy and people in the first period. People working in energy-
intensive industries will lose their jobs, however, later on they will find 
new jobs at lower pay, when the revenue from the C-tax is used for the 
reduction of labour-taxes, social security costs etc. Consumers must get 
used to considerably increased energy-prices etc. The monetary costs 
(like lower pay and higher prices) among these losses have already been 
dealt with, though in the form of welfarized social economic losses. But 
unemployment leads to reductions in well-being independently of the 
monetary losses (Campbell 1981, 120-122; cf. above, sect. 3.3). 
Therefore these losses have to be estimated separately. In the worst 
case, i.e. due to sustainable reduction, 300 million people in the OECD 
are assumed to be unemployed during the first period in the mean for 1 
year each, which leads to reductions of well-being from 0.1420wi by 
0.0777wi. 
a2: stabilization: Restructuring the economy to stabilization may cause, 
during the 25 years of the first period, 10% of the OECD population (= 100 
million people) to be unemployed for 1/2 year on the mean. Their well-being 
during this time will be reduced from 0.1420wi by 0.0777wi (cf. above, sect. 
3.3) (These figures are inserted in table 4.4). Though economic losses (in 
comparison to BAU) will continue after the first period, the process of 
restructuring the economy for all three abatement options is assumed to be 
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completed during the first period. Therefore, in the second and third period no 
unemployment due to greenhouse gas abatement will occur. 
a3: 25%-reduction: With a 25%-reduction of CO2-emissions the problems for 
national economies in the OECD will be much bigger in the following respects. 
The importance of creating new jobs and of re-investing revenue from the C-tax 
decreases with increasing abatement costs; national economy is approaching 
full employment, and the marginal productivity of new jobs decreases (Mabey 
et al. 1997, 406). Many more people will be ruined economically or 
intermittently unemployed, some of them repeatedly. Perhaps twice as many 
people (200 million) as with stabilization may be affected and their mean time 
of unemployment (perhaps distributed over several periods) may be a bit 
longer, namely 9 months. 
a4: 60%-reduction: A reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 60% with 
respect to 1990 is possible but only by a very radical change of technologies: 
exploiting atomic, solar and wind-energy for electricity production and creating 
non-fossil fuels like hydrogen and using them for vehicle traffic, heating mainly 
with solar energy, and especially radically more efficiency in energy utilization, 
and similar actions. As shown with passive-energy-houses, low-energy-cars and 
other examples (cf. e.g. Weizsäcker / Lovins / Lovins 1996) this aim of 
economization can definitely be reached - but only at very high costs. Because 
of a lack of more information I simply assume, again very pessimistically, that 
perhaps 300 million people may be affected with a mean time of unemployment 
of 1 year. 
 
 
4.4. Costs Due to a Moderated Greenhouse Effect 
 
The use of alternatives a2, a3 and a4, of course, lies in slowing-down 
the greenhouse effect. Complete prevention of projected damages due 
to the greenhouse effect in the third period, however, necessitates a 
reduction of emissions by 50-70% (Mabey et al. 1997, 380), hence 
alternative a4, which for this reason has been called "sustainable 
reduction". Unfortunately, again there are no precise estimates of the 
successes of reducing damages by given abatement options. But a good 
guess may be that stabilization (a2) halves the damages of 2xCO2 and 
that the 25% reduction (a3) quarters the damages of 2xCO2. 
 
 
4.5. Integration of Damages 
 
The various estimates of damages by a2, a3 and a4 are summed up in 
tables 4.4-4.6. 
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Table 4.4    
a2: 2000-2075: Integration of damages due to greenhouse gas stabilization: 
Reductions of well-being (in wi) for specified periods from specified initial 
levels by various causes: 
1 2    3³ 4    5³ 6 
cause init. position ³ reduction    ³ persons 
 LE³  WB³ durat.³ WB³  
 years³ in wi³ years³ in wi³ in 1000 
a2: 2000-2025:      
a ■OECD missed publ. assist. ■76.31 0.1308 25.000 0.0163 38516 
b political upset 76.31 0.1420 0.026 0.0170 200000 
c unemployment 76.31 0.1420 0.500 0.0777 100000 
 
a2: 2025-2050:      
d ■OECD missed publ. assist. ■76.31 0.1308 25.000 0.0163 93979 
e political upset 76.31 0.1420 0.026 0.0170 200000 
 
a2: 2050-2075:      
f ■OECD missed publ. assist. ■76.31 0.1308 25.000 0.0163 125000 
g ■OECD missed publ. assist. ■76.31 0.1412 25.000 0.0163 49643 
h political upset 76.31 0.1420 0.026 0.0170 200000 
i halved greenhouse effect: cf. table 3.5    
 
Social economic costs for the OECD countries in billion US-dollars1990: 
a2: undisc. BD discounted BD    
2000-2025: abatement costs 7,139 4,581 
2025-2050: abatement costs 17,419 5,361 
2050-2075: abatement costs 32,370 4,698 
                 halved greenhouse effect 727 107 
sum 57,655 14,747 




Table 4.5    
a3: 2000-2075: Integration of damages due to strong (25%) greenhouse gas 
reduction: Reductions of well-being (in wi) for specified periods from specified 
initial levels by various causes: 
1 2    3³ 4    5³ 6 
cause init. position ³ reduction    ³ persons 
 LE³  WB³ durat.³ WB³  
 years³ in wi³ years³ in wi³ in 1000 
a3: 2000-2025:      
a ■OECD missed publ. assist. ■76.31 0.1308 25.000 0.0163 53693 
b political upset 76.31 0.1420 0.026 0.0170 200000 
c unemployment 76.31 0.1420 0.750 0.0777 200000 
      
a3: 2025-2050:      
d ■OECD missed publ. assist. ■76.31 0.1308 25.000 0.0163 118403 
e political upset 76.31 0.1420 0.026 0.0170 200000 
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a3: 2050-2075:      
f ■OECD missed publ. assist. ■76.31 0.1308 25.000 0.0163 125000 
g ■OECD missed publ. assist. ■76.31 0.1412 25.000 0.0163 74029 
h political upset 76.31 0.1420 0.026 0.0170 200000 
i quartered greenhouse effect: cf. table 3.5    
 
Social economic costs for the OECD countries in billion US-dollars1990: 
a3: undisc. BD discounted BD    
2000-2025: abatement costs 9,952 6,252 
2025-2050: abatement costs 21,946 6,814 
2050-2075: abatement costs 36,890 5,377 
                 quartered greenhouse effect 364 53 




Table 4.6   
 
a4: 2000-2075: Integration of damages due to sustainable (60%) greenhouse 
gas reduction: Reductions of well-being (in wi) for specified periods from 
specified initial levels by various causes: 
1 2    3³ 4    5³ 6 
cause init. position ³ reduction    ³ persons 
 LE³  WB³ durat.³ WB³  
 years³ in wi³ years³ in wi³ in 1000 
a4: 2000-2025:      
a ■OECD missed publ. assist. ■76.31 0.1308 25.000 0.0163 59094 
b political upset 76.31 0.1420 0.026 0.0170 200000 
c unemployment 76.31 0.1420 1.000 0.0777 300000 
      
a4: 2025-2050:      
d ■OECD missed publ. assist. ■76.31 0.1308 25.000 0.0163 125000 
e ■OECD missed publ. assist. ■76.31 0.1412 25.000 0.0163 25812 
f political upset 76.31 0.1420 0.026 0.0170 200000 
      
a4: 2050-2075:      
g ■OECD missed publ. assist. ■76.31 0.1308 25.000 0.0163 125000 
h ■OECD missed publ. assist. ■76.31 0.1412 25.000 0.0163 108342 
i political upset 76.31 0.1420 0.026 0.0170 200000 
 
Social economic costs for the OECD countries in billion US-dollars1990: 
a4: undisc. BD discounted BD    
2000-2025: abatement costs 10,953 6,766 
2025-2050: abatement costs 27,953 8,722 
2050-2075: abatement costs 43,250 6,333 
sum 82,156 21,821 
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Notes to Chapter 4 
 
                                                 
1 This a priori consideration has been confirmed by economic 
modelling: the distribution of emission rights does not affect global abatement 
costs significantly (Hourcade et al. 1996, 339). 
2 Hourcade et al. (1996, 340-343) have calculated the effects of several 
permit allocation principles, including costs of emission reductions and net 
wealth transfers from sales of emission rights. See also: Kverndokk 1995, 133. 
3 Many of them have contributed nothing if one assumes an upper limit 
for sustainable emissions up to which emissions can be absorbed sufficiently by 
plants and oceans so that the global concentration of greenhouse gases remains 
stable. 
4 For an overview of such discussions see: Banuri et al. 1996, 91-112. 
5 Some people may argue that even today in the OECD too much 
money is spent on rubbish. Therefore, braking economic growth would only 
confine further expenditures on rubbish, and some eventually real reductions in 
well-being could easily be compensated by politically redirecting expenditures 
for rubbish to sensible goods. ― The latter idea in principle is right but it holds 
for all the other options as well so that the monetary differences still have to be 
considered. When (theoretical) economic losses have to be welfarized it does 
not count what could be done at worst (or at best) with the lost money but what 
probably would be done with it. And that in the OECD much money is spent on 
rubbish does not exclude that there are still lots of possibilities for spending 
money to increase welfare. That all the additionaly disposable money would be 
spent on rubbish seems to be a too pessimistic prognosis. The method adopted 
above (sect. 3.5.3), i.e. assuming a development half-way between the 
pessimistic and the optimistic scenario, seems to be much more realistic. 
6 This is not completely correct because a part of them are borne by the 
individuals of the OECD countries. But this part is not that big, and could be 
reduced to zero if the states would decide to assume these costs (which, surely, 
would only be a redistribution of losses in well-being), and hardly can be 
individuated because our method of calculation does not give any hint about the 
particular sources of these damages. Therefore, the procedure adopted here 
seems to be a good pragmatic solution. The error of this procedure is not as big 
as may appear at first glance: the damages, of course, are not ignored they are 
only welfarized in a false way leading, perhaps, to some minor faults in the 
numerical values of the welfare calculation. 



























5. The Moral Point(s) of View 
5.1. Moral Evaluation of the Alternatives 
 
The above assumptions are highly speculative in part; but some 
ethical systems require such assumptions for the moral evaluation of a 
situation - if, as is the case with the greenhouse effect, the various 
advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives in question are so 
tangled that there is no alternative which clearly dominates the others. 
The gain of the work done so far is, of course, that prescriptions of 
single ethics can be easily calculated from these assumptions. First I 
will calculate the hedonistic-utilitarian value of the options and then the 
value according to the welfare-ethics utilex, developed by the author 
(Lumer 2000, ch. 7; Lumer 1997a). 
Utilex is similar to utilitarianism: it aggregates personal desirabilities 
or utilities and these personal desirabilities themselves are conceived 
hedonistically, i.e. as integrals of subjective well-being. But instead of 
simply summing up personal utilities of all sentient beings or persons 
for obtaining the moral value of an alternative, as is done by 
utilitarianism, utilex first weights the personal utilities morally, before 
summing up. These moral weights of personal desirabilities are 
arranged in such a way that higher personal desirability always has a 
higher moral value, but the increments of the weights decrease with 
increasing well-being (cf. the graph of the utilex weighting function in 
figure 5.1). (The weighting function increases strictly and is concave.) 
As a consequence, improvements in well-being for unhappy people are 
treated as being morally much more important than improvements 
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Figure 5.1: The moral weighting function of utilex: 
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Explanation: x represents the personal desirability of a person's life measured in 
life-utils, i.e. a normalized way of measuring (cf. below), according to which 
e.g. a life 80 years long with a (extremely high) mean well-being of 0.3308wi 
has a personal desirability of 1 life-util. Uul(x) is the moral value of x according 
to utilex. 
 
of the same degree for people already well off.1 Two examples may 
explain this. If by medical treatment an additional year with a mean 
well-being of 0.1420wi can be given to two persons who otherwise 
would die at 40 and 80 years of age respectively (during which they had 
the same mean well-being of 0.1420wi) the additional year for the 
younger person would be valuated 88% higher than that of the older. Or 
if two people with the same life expectancy of 76 years but (apart from 
one particular year) different mean well-being, namely 0.1145wi and 
0.1655wi (i.e. the mean of the lowest and of the highest income 
quartile), during one particular year would suffer from a reduction to a 
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mean well-being of 0.0643wi (e.g. by unemployment) but which could 
be prevented by some measure which to both would secure a mean 
well-being of 0.1420wi during this year, this possible melioration for 
the first person would be valued 53% higher than that for the second 
person. - Utilex is a synthesis of utilitarianism and leximin 2 (which has 
lead to the name "utilex"). Like utilitarianism it considers 
improvements in well-being of all people and not, like leximin (or 
maximin), only improvements for the people worst off; in this respect 
utilex is economically efficient, allowing expenses for improvements 
even for people already well off if these improvements are easily 
attainable. But like leximin it gives much more weight to improvements 
for unhappy people, though not indefinitely more weight, as leximin 
does; in this respect utilex is fair and equitable, trying to compensate for 
natural disadvantages. 
The general idea of Utilex of giving a more or less though not 
indefinitely high priority to people worse off, which Parfit has called 
the "priority view" (Parfit, 1997, 213), seems to be shared by many 
people, though in philosophy only exceptionally it has been clearly 
formulated and it never has been substantiated with strong reasons.3 
The novelty of Utilex consists in giving a clear justification for this idea 
and in developing a precise quantitative criterion which can be applied 
in welfare ethics. Utilex justifies this criterion on the basis of our 
sympathetic desires and the specific qualities of our sympathy. 
The weighting function of utilex is: 
Uul(x) := (19/18)∙(1-19 
-x), with x being the (normalized, cf. below) personal 
desirability of a life.4 
Some values of this function are: 
x: 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
Uul(x): 0.000 0.269 0.470 0.619 0.730 0.813 0.875 0.921 0.955 0.981 1.000 
Utilex is designed for people who want to optimize their impersonal 
sympathetic feelings, i.e. maximize the integral of their (negative (= pity) and 
positive) sympathy for such people with whom they do not have a particular 
personal relationship. If people always did the, according to utilex, best action 
(under certain idealizing conditions) they would optimize their unpersonal 
sympathy. The priority for people worse off in the resulting utilex weighting 
function is due to the fact that our negative sympathy (= pity) is stronger than 
our positive sympathy. (The exact utilex criterion relies on a specific empirical 
sympathy function over the feelings of other people (how strong is our 
sympathy resulting from confrontation with different levels of momentary well-
being of other people?) and assumptions about the long-term frequency density 
of such feelings for people with different mean levels of well-being. The 
weighting function then results from integrating over the product of these two 
curves for different long-term mean values of well-being. (Cf. Lumer 2000, ch. 
7; Lumer 1997a.) In addition to this practical justification of utilex, it has been 
shown that the utilex criterion expresses the moral intuition of some people 
(Lumer 2000, 616-625; Lumer 1997a, sect. 1). 
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But utilex originally was only developed for the moral evaluation of lives 
which are different with respect to their mean well-being but not to length. 
Therefore, utilex's range of application has been extended to what is needed 
here in the following way: 1. Lives with the same personal desirability also 
have the same utilex desirability. This holds e.g. for a life 40 years long with a 
mean well-being of 0.2000wi and a life 80 years long with a mean well-being 
of 0.1000wi because these lives have the same (hedonistic) personal 
desirability, which is equal to the integral of well-being over time. 2. Then the 
above mentioned utilex weighting function may be applied to whatever 
personal desirabilities of lives provided that these desirabilities are normalized 
for the specific aims of utilex. Because personal desirabilities have a natural 
zero point (a life which lasts zero years or a life with a mean well-being of zero) 
which should have an utilex desirability of zero, too, only the positive constant 
for converting natural personal desirabilities into normalized ones has to be 
fixed. This has been done intuitionistically, i.e. following intuitive moral 
judgments of subjects. Subjects were asked to answer the following question: 
"One person 40 years old and another one 80 years old both with the same and 
ordinary mean level of well-being are suffering from a malignant disease from 
which they both will die after one week if they are not operated immediately. 
With the operation the death of the 40 year old person can be postponed by 8 (= 
y; variants: y = 4, 1) years during which (s)he will have an ordinary well-being 
but after that (s)he will die irrevocably. Similar things hold for the 80 year old 
person; death of this person can be postponed by x years. Unfortunately, only 
one person can be operated. For what value of x are you morally indifferent 
between the two possible operations?" Answers of those subjects who seemed 
to use criteria completely different from utilex (x≤y or x=∞) were excluded 
from further consideration because a variable in the framework of utilex was 
looked for; if some people adhere to rival moral criteria their intuitions will be 
represented by these criteria and must not be represented (in a distorted form) 
by utilex. The medium of the remaining answers, namely x=2y, was taken as the 
utilex answer, from which the properties of the normalized desirability function 
can be calculated (for the method of calculation cf. the next footnote): A life of 
80 years with a mean well-being of 0.3308wi (and all the personal equivalents 
like 90 years with a mean level of well-being of 0.2941wi etc.) has the 
normalized personal desirability 1 (and the utilex desirability of 1, too). 
One important technical difference of utilex with respect to utilitarianism is 
that utilex weightings apply only to personal desirabilities of whole lives. Thus, 
for morally evaluating a single event or action the expected personal 
desirabilities of the whole life with and without this event must be estimated; 
the difference of the two utilex desirabilities of these lives then is the utilex 
desirability of the event. 
For facilitating the further calculations and comparisons some 
measuring units have to be introduced. The personal desirability of one 
year with a well-being of 1wi is called "1 util" or "1u". (So 100 years 
with a mean well being of 0.142wi have a personal desirability of 
14.2u.) Utilex evaluations are applied to personal desirabilities only if 
measured in a certain normalized measure. The normalized personal 
desirability which has the utilex value 1 is called "1 life-util" or "1 lu". 
1 lu := 26.464828u (or 1u = 0.037786 lu).5 (Apart from very extreme 
cases the range of personal desirabilities of a whole life is [0 lu;1 lu].) 
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For comparison with QALYs (which are used in health economy and 
medical ethics, cf. the explanation in sect. 2.2) a further unit is useful: 1 
qaly-util, or 1qu for short, is defined as the personal desirability of one 
year with an ordinary well-being, i.e. 0.1420wi; so 1qu := 0.142u. 
Because utilitarianism simply sums up personal desirabilities the just 
mentioned units for personal desirabilities can also be used to express 
utilitarian desirabilities. The analogue does not hold for utilex; for 
utilex additional units of moral desirabilities have to be introduced. 1 
life-lexi, or 1 ll for short, is defined as the utilex desirability of a life 
with the personal desirability of 1lu; other values of utilex desirabilities 
of whole lives are defined as the result of applying the above introduced 
utilex weighting function (Uul(x)) to the personal desirability of this life 
measured in life-utils. 1 qaly-lexi, or 1ql, finally, is defined as: 1ql := 
0.005925 ll; this value was chosen so that if utilex desirabilities are 
expressed in ql the addition of one further year with an ordinary well-
being (of 0.1420wi) to a life with the world mean life expectancy of 65 
years and an ordinary well-being would have the moral desirability of 
1ql. But please note: utilex desirabilities can be determined directly for 
whole lives only; and because utilex desirabilities are not proportional 
to personal desirabilities the addition of one year with a mean well-
being of 0.1420wi to a life of 65 years (with a mean well-being of 
0.1420wi) has a different moral desirability than the addition of such a 
year to a life with different length or different mean well-being. (Or 
taken differently: The utilex desirability of a life of 65 years with a 
mean well-being of 0.1420wi, i.e. of a life with a personal desirability 
of 65qu, is 114.35ql and not 65ql, because younger years count more.) 
 
Thus we have the following units: 
1. Utils: 
1 u := 1year∙1wi (= 0.037786 lu = 7.042qu). 
1 lu := 26.464828u (= 186.365319qu; Uul(1 lu) = 1 ll). 
1 qu := 0.142u (= 0.00536561 lu). 
2. Lexis: 
1 ll := Uul(1 lu) (= 168.774733ql). 
1 ql := 0.005925 ll (= Uul(66qu) - Uul(65qu)). 
With all these assumptions the moral desirabilities (according to 
utilitarianism and to utilex) of the four options with respect to the 
greenhouse effect can be calculated as done in tables 5.1-5.8. 
The mean utilitarian and utilex desirabilities of the undamaged lives 
(columns 2 of tables 5.1-5.8) have been calculated as follows: The social well-
being distribution, i.e. the probability density PDW of a certain personal mean 
value of well-being w (measured in wi), assumed in section 3.3 was: 
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                                    (w-µ)2                                 - _______  
                      1               2σ2  PDW(w) =——— e 
                  σ∙√2π 
with Σ=0.109 and µ being the social mean of well-being of the respective group 
(specified in columns 3 of tables 3.5 and 4.4-4.6). The discontinuance 
hypothesis (cf. sect. 3.3) was not incorporated in this formula but in the 
formulas for the moral desirabilities. So the formula for the utilitarian 
desirability changed to:  
Uut(x) = x∙Φ(x), with Φ(x) being the function: Φ(x)=1 for x=0, Φ(x)=0 for x<0. 
And the formula for the utilex desirability changed to:  
Uul(x) = (19/18)∙(1-19
-x∙Φ(x)).  
The mean moral desirability of the lives of a given group then is equal to:  
-1∫
1[PDW(w)∙U(c∙m∙w)]dw,  
with U being Uut or Uul, c (=0.037786) being the constant for transforming utils 
in life-utils, and m being the mean life expectancy of this group in years (i.e. the 
values of columns 2 of tables 3.5 and 4.4-4.6). For calculating the total moral 
desirability of the lives of the whole group the results obtained by this formula 
simply has to be multiplied by the quantity of that group. 
The formula for calculating the mean moral desirabilities of the damaged lives 
(columns 3 of tables 5.1-5.8) is:  
-1∫
1[PDW(w)∙U(c∙((m-t)∙w+t(w-r)))]dw,  
with t being the time of reduced well-being and r being the amount of reduction 
in wi. 
The resulting formula for calculating e.g. the mean utilex desirability of lives 
of 65.01 years length and with a grand mean of well-being of 0.1420wi (cf. e.g. 
rows a in tables 3.5 and 5.5) is: 
 
ØUul(65.01y;0.1420wi) = 
                             -(w-0.142)2                             __________  
 ⌠1        1             2·0.109 2      19 
  │———— · e                   · —— · (1-19  -(0.037786·[65.01·w])·Φ(0.037786·[65.01·w]) )dw  




Explanations for tables 5.1-5.8: Columns 1 list the abbreviations of the types 
of damages as they were introduced in tables 3.5 and 4.4-4.6. - Columns 2 list 
the mean utilitarian respectively utilex desirabilities of the undamaged lives 
(initial position) of the persons whom the respective type of damage befalls, i.e. 
of the lives people would have expected in a fictitious world without the 
artificial greenhouse effect and without the abatement exertions. The units are 
millionths of life-utils respectively life-lexis. These mean desirabilities have 
been calculated considering that the well-being information of columns 3 in the 
tables 3.5 and 4.4-4.6 are only the means of the social well-being distribution. - 
Columns 3 give the mean moral desirabilities of the damaged lives, calculated 
according to the assumptions in columns 2-5 in tables 3.5 and 4.4-4.6, again in 
millionths of life-utils respectively life-lexis. - Columns 4 are the differences of 
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columns 2 and 3, i.e. they represent the mean moral desirabilities of the 
respective damages (again in millionths of life-utils respectively life-lexis). - 
Columns 5 report the numbers (taken from columns 6 of tables 3.5 and 4.4-4.6) 
of people affected (in 1000 persons). - Columns 6 contain the products of 
columns 4 and 5 and thus represent the (negative) moral desirabilities of the 
total damage (of the respective damage category) in life-utils respectively life-
lexis. - Columns 7, finally, give the percentages of the respective damage class 
from the overall damage by the respective option. - "■" again indicates welfare 
losses which are welfarizations of the economic losses of the decider (which in 
the cost-welfare analysis have to be treated differently). 
 
Table 5.1    
a1: utilitarian evaluation of welfare losses from BAU (2050-2075): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
type of damage ØUutinit. ØUutda- ØUutda- persons total portion 
 position maged mage  damage of all 
  life    damages 
 in µlu in µlu in µlu in 1000 in lu in % 
1.1a floods, storms 360934 180467 180467 441 79586 0.403 
1.1b famines 349330 174665 174665 37500 6549938 33.186 
1.1c migrants dur. migration 349330 174665 174665 1046 182700 0.926 
1.1d absolute poverty 291817 145909 145908 52500 7660170 38.811 
1.1e malaria 349330 174665 174665 1250 218331 1.106 
1.1f hot spells 360934 180467 180467 5927 1069627 5.419 
(subtotal direct casualties 98664  15760352 79.851) 
1.2a nat. disasters 360934 360805 129 4410 569 0.003 
1.2b famines, suffering 349330 349202 128 375000 48000 0.243 
1.2c malaria 349330 349206 124 248750 30845 0.156 
1.2d air pollution 360934 360872 62 447179 27725 0.140 
1.2e hot spells 360934 360805 129 59272 7646 0.039 
1.2f chron. hunger pangs 291817 226900 64917 6400 415469 2.105 
1.2g deficiency diseases 291817 264725 27092 25600 693555 3.514 
(subtotal direct phys. suffering     1223809 6.200) 
1.3a stronger grief 360934 360741 193 303528 58581 0.297 
1.3b stronger grief & psy. gaps 360934 358394 2540 75882 192740 0.977 
1.3c migration & diseases 349330 335135 14195 10460 148480 0.752 
1.3d misery of migrants 349330 335263 14067 93090 1309497 6.635 
1.3e worse social climate 360934 360870 64 1500000 96000 0.486 
(subtotal direct psych. suffering     1805298 9.147) 
2a NOECD ec. ruin, starving 349330 174665 174665 59 10305 0.052 
2b NOECD ec. ruin, hunger pa. 349330 233257 116073 180 20893 0.106 
2c NOECD ec. ruin, def. diseas. 349330 285039 64291 722 46418 0.235 
2d NOECD ec. ruin, pauperiz. 349330 320322 29008 843 24454 0.124 
2e NOECD ec. r., return or. lev. 349330 348251 1079 6148 6634 0.034 
2f NOECD ec. ruin, soc. degr. 349330 319480 29850 6148 183518 0.930 
2g NOECD harder daily life 291817 291400 417 1000000 417000 2.113 
2h OECD ec. ru., return or. lev. 423671 422592 1079 250 270 0.001 
2i OECD ec. ruin, soc. degrad. 423671 401414 22257 250 2223 0.011 
2j OECD ec. ruin, reimbursem. 423671 422592 1079 2250 2428 0.012 
2k NOECD social ec. losses 295477 282612 12865 8915 114691 0.581 
2l ■OECD social ec. losses 394704 381444 13260 7843 ■103998 0.527 
(subtotal damages via economic losses     932832 4.726) 
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3a grief about ecological losses 360934 360924 10 1500000 15000 0.076 
sum without welf. of soc. ec. losses 19633293 99.473 
■sum welfarized soc. ec. losses     ■103998 0.527 




Table 5.2    
a2: utilitarian evaluation of welfare losses from stabilization: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
a2: 2000-2025: 
a ■OECD missed publ. assist. 394704 381444 13260 38516 ■510722 3.622 
b political upset 423671 423656 15 200000 3000 0.021 
c unemployment 423671 422368 1303 100000 130300 0.924 
a2: 2025-2050: 
d ■OECD missed publ. assist. 394704 381444 13260 93979 ■1246162 8.838 
e political upset 423671 423656 15 200000 3000 0.021 
a2: 2050-2075: 
f ■OECD missed publ. assist. 394704 381444 13260 125000 ■1657500 11.756 
g ■OECD missed publ. assist. 421588 407946 13642 49643 ■677230 4.803 
h political upset 423671 423656 15 200000 3000 0.021 
i1 halved greenh. ef. without welf. of soc. ec. loss 9816647 69.624 
i2 ■halved greenh. ef. welf. soc. ec. loss ■51999 0.369 
sum without welf. of soc. ec. losses 9955947 70.612 
■sum welf. of soc. ec. losses 4143613 29.388 




Table 5.3    
a3: utilitarian evaluation of welfare losses from strong reduction: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
a3: 2000-2025: 
a ■OECD missed publ. assist. 394704 381444 13260 53693 ■711969 6.923 
b political upset 423671 423656 15 200000 3000 0.029 
c unemployment 423671 421717 1954 200000 390800 3.800 
a3: 2025-2050: 
d ■OECD missed publ. assist. 394704 381444 13260 118403 ■1570024 15.267 
e political upset 423671 423656 15 200000 3000 0.029 
a3: 2050-2075: 
f ■OECD missed publ. assist. 394704 381444 13260 125000 ■1657500 16.118 
g ■OECD missed publ. assist. 421588 407946 13642 74029 ■1009904 9.821 
h political upset 423671 423656 15 200000 3000 0.029 
i1 quart. greenh. ef. without welf. of soc. ec. loss 4908323 47.730 
i2 ■quart. greenh. ef. welf. soc. ec. loss ■26000 0.253 
sum without welf. of soc. ec. losses 5308123 51.618 
■sum welf. of soc. ec. losses ■4975396 48.382 
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Table 5.4    
a4: utilitarian evaluation of welfare losses from sustainable reduction: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
a4: 2000-2025: 
a ■OECD missed publ. assist. 394704 381444 13260 59094 ■783586 11.662 
b political upset 423671 423656 15 200000 3000 0.045 
c unemployment 423671 421066 2605 300000 781500 11.631 
a4: 2025-2050: 
d ■OECD missed publ. assist. 394704 381444 13260 125000 ■1657500 24.668 
e ■OECD missed publ. assist. 421588 407946 13642 25812 ■352127 5.241 
f political upset 423671 423656 15 200000 3000 0.045 
a4: 2050-2075: 
g ■OECD missed publ. assist. 394704 381444 13260 125000 ■1657500 24.668 
h ■OECD missed publ. assist. 421588 407946 13642 108342 ■1478002 21.997 
i political upset 423671 423656 15 200000 3000 0.045 
sum without welf. of soc. ec. losses 790500 11.765 
■sum welf. of soc. ec. losses ■5928715 88.235 




Table 5.5    
a1: utilex evaluation of welfare losses from BAU (2050-2075): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
type of damage ØUulinit. ØUulda- ØUulda- persons total portion 
 position maged mage  damage of all 
  life    damages 
 in µll in µll in µll in 1000 in ll in % 
1.1a floods, storms 594690 395324 199366 441 87920 0.371 
1.1b famines 585260 386512 198748 37500 7453050 31.482 
1.1c migrants dur.migration 585260 386512 198748 1046 207890 0.878 
1.1d absolute poverty 512207 331704 180503 52500 9476408 40.028 
1.1e malaria 585260 386512 198748 1250 248435 1.049 
1.1f hot spells 594690 395324 199366 5927 1181642 4.991 
(subtotal direct casualties 98664  18655346 78.799) 
1.2a nat. disasters 594690 594544 146 4410 644 0.003 
1.2b famines, suffering 585260 585110 150 375000 56250 0.238 
1.2c malaria 585260 585116 144 248750 35820 0.151 
1.2d air pollution 594690 594620 70 447179 31303 0.132 
1.2e hot spells 594690 594544 146 59272 8654 0.037 
1.2f chron. hunger pangs 512207 419856 92351 6400 591046 2.497 
1.2g deficiency diseases 512207 474706 37501 25600 960026 4.055 
(subtotal direct phys. suffering 1683742 7.113) 
1.3a stronger grief 594690 594472 218 303528 66169 0.279 
1.3b stronger grief & psy. gaps 594690 591796 2894 75882 219603 0.928 
1.3c migration & diseases 585260 568312 16948 10460 177276 0.749 
1.3d misery of migrants 585260 568469 16791 93090 1563074 6.602 
1.3e worse social climate 594690 594618 72 1500000 108000 0.456 
(subtotal direct psych. suffering     2134122 9.014) 
2a NOECD ec. ruin, starving 585260 386512 198748 59 11726 0.050 
2b NOECD ec. ruin, hunger pa. 585260 434063 151197 180 27215 0.115 
2c NOECD ec. ruin, def. diseas. 585260 502668 82592 722 59631 0.252 
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2d NOECD ec. ruin, pauperiz. 585260 548884 36376 843 30665 0.130 
2e NOECD ec. r., return or. lev. 585260 584000 1260 6148 7746 0.033 
2f NOECD ec. ruin, soc. degr. 585260 547776 37484 6148 230452 0.973 
2g NOECD harder daily life 512207 511667 540 1000000 540000 2.281 
2h OECD ec. ru., return or. lev. 639979 638915 1064 250 266 0.001 
2i OECD ec. ruin, soc. degrad. 639979 616575 23404 250 5851 0.025 
2j OECD ec. ruin, reimbursem. 639979 638915 1064 2250 938 0.004 
2k NOECD social ec. losses 517095 499639 17456 8915 155620 0.657 
2l ■OECD social ec. losses 609619 595016 14603 7843 ■114531 0.484 
(subtotal damages via economic losses     1184642 5.005) 
3a grief about ecological losses 594690 594679 11 1500000 16500 0.070 
sum without welf. of soc. ec. losses     23559821 99.516 
■sum welfarized soc. ec. losses     ■114531 0.484 




Table 5.6    
a2: utilex evaluation of welfare losses from stabilization: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
a2: 2000-2025: 
a ■OECD missed publ. assist. 609619 595016 14603 38516 ■562449 3.426 
b political upset 639979 639964 15 200000 3000 0.018 
c unemployment 639979 638694 1285 100000 128500 0.783 
a2: 2025-2050: 
d ■OECD missed publ. assist. 609619 595016 14603 93979 ■1372375 8.358 
e political upset 639979 639964 15 200000 3000 0.018 
a2: 2050-2075: 
f ■OECD missed publ. assist. 609619 595016 14603 125000 ■1825375 11.117 
g ■OECD missed publ. assist. 637844 624054 13790 49643 ■684577 4.169 
h political upset 639979 639964 15 200000 3000 0.018 
i1 halved greenh. ef. without welf. of soc. ec. loss 11779910 71.744 
i2 ■halved greenh. ef. welf. soc. ec. loss     ■57266 0.349 
sum without welf. of soc. ec. losses     11917410 72.581 
■sum welf. of soc. ec. losses     ■4502042 27.419 




Table 5.7    
a3: utilex evaluation of welfare losses from strong reduction: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
a3: 2000-2025: 
a ■OECD missed publ. assist. 609619 595016 14603 53693 ■784079 6.717 
b political upset 639979 639964 15 200000 3000 0.026 
c unemployment 639979 638049 1930 200000 386000 3.307 
a3: 2025-2050: 
d ■OECD missed publ. assist. 609619 595016 14603 118403 ■1729039 14.812 
e political upset 639979 639964 15 200000 3000 0.026 
a3: 2050-2075: 
f ■OECD missed publ. assist. 609619 595016 14603 125000 ■1825375 15.638 
g ■OECD missed publ. assist. 637844 624054 13790 74029 ■1020860 8.746 
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h political upset 639979 639964 15 200000 3000 0.026 
i1 quart. greenh. ef. without welf. of soc. ec. loss 5889955 50.458 
i2 ■quart. greenh. ef. welf. soc. ec. loss     ■28633 0.245 
sum without welf. of soc. ec. losses     6284955 53.842 
■sum welf. of soc. ec. losses     ■5387986 46.158 




Table 5.8    
a4: utilex evaluation of welfare losses from sustainable reduction: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
a4: 2000-2025: 
a ■OECD missed publ. assist. 609619 595016 14603 59094 ■862950 12.077 
b political upset 639979 639964 15 200000 3000 0.042 
c unemployment 639979 637403 2576 300000 772800 10.815 
a4: 2025-2050: 
d ■OECD missed publ. assist. 609619 595016 14603 125000 ■1825375 25.546 
e ■OECD missed publ. assist. 637844 624054 13790 25812 ■355947 4.981 
f political upset 639979 639964 15 200000 3000 0.042 
a4: 2050-2075: 
g ■OECD missed publ. assist. 609619 595016 14603 125000 ■1825375 25.546 
h ■OECD missed publ. assist. 637844 624054 13790 108342 ■1494036 20.909 
i political upset 639979 639964 15 200000 3000 0.042 
sum without welf. of soc. ec. losses     781800 10.941 
■sum welf. of soc. ec. losses     ■6363683 89.059 
ΣΣ     7145483 100.000 
  
 
According to these calculations, the resulting total utilitarian 
desirability losses (i.e. the differences with respect to a fictitious 
ordinary distribution of well-being) are as follows: ∆Uut(a1) = 
19,737,291 lu; ∆Uut(a2) = 14,099,559 lu; ∆Uut(a3) = 10,283,519 lu; 
∆Uut(a4) = 6,719,215 lu. The resulting utilex desirability losses 
are: ∆Uul(a1) = 23,674,352 ll; ∆Uul(a2) = 16,419,452 ll; ∆Uul(a3) = 
11,672,941 ll; ∆Uul(a4) = 7,145,483 ll. This means that for 
utilitarianism and for utilex sustainable reduction of CO2 (a4) by a wide 
margin is the best option, followed by strong reduction (a3), 
stabilization (a2) and business as usual (a1); the preference order for 
utilitarianism and utilex is: a4 > a3 > a2 > a1. (Note that in tables 5.1-5.8 
damages are counted, i.e. the higher the figures (in columns 6 (and 4)) 
the worse is the respective option.) These preference orders are rather 
stable with respect to possible alterations of the assumptions because 
the distances in desirabilities are rather high. The worst alternative (a1) 
produces 193.75% respectively 231.32% more losses than the best 
alternative (a4), according to utilitarianism respectively utilex. And the 
desirability differences between preferentially adjacent alternatives are 
rather equal for both types of evaluations. For utilitarianism as well as 
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for utilex directly caused deaths (group 1) make up the lion's share of 
all damages from BAU: 79.85% and 78.80% respectively; welfare 
losses caused by economic damages (group 2) make up 4.73%, 
respectively 5.01%. For the reduction options this is different: The 
extreme is a4 where welfarized economic losses for utilitarianism 
respectively utilex make up 88.24% respectively 89.06% of all 
damages. 
Analyzing the peculiarities of utilex against utilitarianism cannot be done by 
simply comparing the different evaluations of the various damages (i.e. 
comparing the values of columns 4 (and 6) of tables 5.1-5.4 with those of tables 
5.5-5.8) because already the absolute figures of utilex are always higher. 1. A 
first useful way of analysis instead is to compare the percentages of the various 
types of damages with respect to the total damage (cf. columns 7 of the tables). 
At first glance a very astonishing result of this comparison is that direct 
casualties in the utilex calculation are valued lower (78.799% of all damages), 
though only very slightly, than in the utilitarian calculus (79.851%) - which is 
exactly the contrary of what one would have expected from an ethical criterion 
favouring the people worst off (and surely the people killed by the greenhouse 
effect are those worst off in our context (cf. columns 3 of tables 5.1 and 5.5)). 
The explanation is that death reduces all the people to a welfare level of zero 
(exactly), whereas nonlethal damages always reduce a part of the respective 
group temporarily to a level below zero. (Remember that the levels of well-
being specified in column 3 of table 3.5 are means of a social distribution; the 
part of this distribution below 0wi is cut off via the discontinuance hypothesis. 
If those originally only slightly above 0wi due to greenhouse damages are 
temporarily reduced to a well-being below 0wi these negative parts of the well-
being integral will not be cut off by the discontinuance hypothesis as long as the 
total life balance is still positive.) And in utilex such relatively bigger losses are 
weighted higher. So utilex in the end behaves as it should: considering 
unhappiness more. 
2. Another and more exact way of comparing utilex to utilitarianism is to 
choose one outstanding type of damage, e.g. the morally biggest, to calculate 
the relation of the mean moral desirability (according to both, utilitarianism and 
utilex) of the other types of damages to the mean moral desirability of the 
outstanding damage and to compare which moral criterion gives more weight to 
this type of damage; the latter can be done by dividing the percentage obtained 
for utilex by the percentage obtained for utilitarianism. The most important 
damage considered here according to utilitarianism as well as according to 
utilex are casualties in a worldwide average group (i.e. with 65 years life 
expectancy and a mean well-being of 0.1420wi, cf. lines 1.1a and 1.1f of tables 
3.5, 5.1 and 5.5). A first big difference between utilitarianism and utilex is that 
death by bringing people from poverty to absolute poverty (cf. line 1.1d of 
tables 3.5, 5.1 and 5.5) for utilitarianism in the mean has 80.85% desirability of 
the maximum damage, whereas for utilex it has 90.54% desirability of the 
maximum damage, so that utilex gives 12.00% more weight (in the sense just 
explained) to this type of damage. This means that utilex, as opposed to 
utilitarianism, does not take the death of a person with an already bad life 
prospect much more lightly. Other damages which by utilex in the mean are 
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valued much higher than by utilitarianism are the following - only the most 
extreme cases are listed: 
- chronic hunger pangs (lines 1.2f of tables 3.5, 5.1, 5.5): 28.77% more 
weight; 
- deficiency diseases etc. by aggravated poverty (lines 1.2g): 25.30%more 
weight; 
- missed public assistance / social economic losses in NOECD countries (lines 
2k): 22.82% more weight; 
- economic ruin in the NOECD leading to absolute poverty with hunger pangs 
(lines 2b): 17.91% more weight; 
- harder daily life (lines 2g): 17.32% more weight; 
- economic ruin in the NOECD leading to absolute poverty with deficiency 
diseases (lines 2c): 16.29% more weight; etc. 
On the other hand utilex in the mean gives less weight to several other types of 
damages than utilitarianism does. The most extreme cases are: 
- half year unemployment in the OECD (lines c of tables 4.4, 5.2 and 5.6): 
10.73% less weight; 
- economic ruin in the OECD with reimbursement (lines 2j of tables 3.5, 5.1, 
5.5): 10.70% less weight; 
- nine months unemployment in the OECD (lines c of tables 4.5, 5.3 and 5.7): 
10.58% less weight; 
- one year unemployment in the OECD (lines c of tables 4.6, 5.4, 5.8): 
10.49% less weight; 
- political upset (lines b, e, h of tables 4.4, 5.2, 5.6 etc.): 9.64% less weight; 
- missed public assistance in the OECD for people above the poverty line (e.g. 
lines g of tables 4.4, 5.2, 5.6): 8.49% less weight. 
The main reason for these differences between utilitarianism and utilex is that 
utilex gives more weight to the damages besetting people with a comparatively 
low initial position - in our case in particular, to losses for poor people of the 
NOECD countries, i.e. people with a comparatively low life expectancy and 
low well-being, compared to average people of the OECD countries. A much 
smaller contribution to these differences stems from the fact that utilex as 
compared to utilitarianism gives proportionally more weight to bigger damages 
than to smaller damages. And this is exactly what one expects from a moral 
criterion like utilex.These peculiarities explain why the difference in moral 
desirability losses between the worst (a1) and the best (a4) of our alternatives is 
bigger for utilex (231.32% worse) than for utilitarianism (193.75% worse); 
utilex makes the difference 10.10% greater: Most of the bigger damages of a1 
(BAU) beset people in NOECD countries, in particular poor people, i.e. people 
with a comparatively low life expectancy and low well-being and consequently 
low personal desirability of life; all damages from a4 (sustainable reduction) 
instead beset people in the OECD countries with a higher life expectancy 
(though to a large part slightly less than ordinary well-being (0.1308wi)) and 
thus a higher desirability of life. 
But the differences between utilitarianism and utilex, at least at first glance, 
are not overwhelming. Among the types of damages considered here, the 
damages which in the mean are weighted maximally stronger by utilex than by 
utilitarianism (i.e. chronic hunger pangs due to absolute poverty (line 1.2f of 
tables 3.5, 5.1, 5.5): 28.77% more weight) are weighted only 44.25% higher 
than the damages which in the mean are weighted maximally lower by utilex 
than by utilitarianism (i.e. half a year of unemployment (line c of tables 4.4, 5.2, 
5.6): 10.73% less weight).6 In short, utilex and utilitarianism differ only 
maximally by 44.25% in their mean weighting of different types of damages. 
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But firstly, this holds only for the means of the damage groups; the extremes of 
these groups are treated much more differently by the two moral criteria. And 
secondly, the maximal weighting difference of 44.25% results only from the 
group of damages considered here: As already reported, the main contribution 
to the differences between utilitarianism and utilex in weighting damages stems 
from the fact that utilex gives more weight to damages besetting people with an 
already low initial position. But the means of the best and the worst initial 
positions considered here (the mean of the OECD countries with a mean life 
expectancy of 76.31 years and a mean well-being of 0.1420wi, i.e. 10.8360u = 
0.4094 lu = 76.31qu, versus the poor of the NOECD countries with a mean life 
expectancy of 62.92 years and a mean well-being of 0.1145wi, i.e. 7.2043u = 
0.2722 lu = 50.73qu) differ "only" by 50.41% in their personal desirabilities. 
And, obviously, this may be quite different with other social problems, e.g. 
when comparing the moral desirability of programs intended to rescue children 
from starvation with the moral desirability of lowering property taxes in OECD 
countries. 
 According to the classical interpretation of utilitarianism, because a4 
is the morally best option we have the moral obligation to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions to a sustainable level (i.e. to do a4). But 
according to some recent interpretations and according to utilex, the 
moral optimum does not directly imply a moral obligation. I will return 
to this question in chapters 6 and 7. 
The preference order a4 > a3 > a2 > a1 is not changed if the values of 
future events are discounted by 3%/year, taking the year 2000 as the 
year of decision; this holds for discounting on a utilitarian as well as on 
an utilex basis. But due to the fact that the damages from the 
anthropogenous greenhouse effect make a big difference only in the 
third period, whereas the damages by abatement mainly occur in the 
first period, the desirability difference between the worst and the best 
option is diminished as follows. The discounted damages due to the 
worst option (a1) according to utilitarianism and utilex are 35.03% and 
52.83% respectively worse than those due to the best option (a4). 
However, one may be surprised that nonetheless sustainable reduction 
still is the best and BAU the worst option. But as shown in table 5.9, 
welfare losses due to the full anthropogenous greenhouse effect in the 
third period, even if discounted, are still much more important than the 
highest (discounted) abatement costs in the first period, i.e. those of 
sustainable reduction, for both utilitarianism (2,901,382 lu / 1,055,322 
lu = 2.749) and utilex (3,480,130 ll / 1,102,879 ll = 3.155). 
Even very different ethical criteria result in preferring or demanding 
sustainable CO2-reduction (a4). An (intermediately strong) criterion of 
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Table 5.9    
a1-a4: welfare losses according to utilitarianism and utilex differentiated for 
periods, undiscounted and discounted by 3%/year: 
1 2 3 4 5 
option &  undisc. utili- disc. utili- undisc. utilex disc. utilex 
period tarian losses tarian losses losses losses 
 in lu in lu in ll in ll 
a1: BAU     
2000-2025 0 0 0 0 
2025-2050 0 0 0 0 
2050-2075 19,737,291 2,901,382 23,674,352 3,480,130 
sum a1 19,737,291 2,901,382 23,674,352 3,480,130 
     
a2: stabilization     
2000-2025 644,022 433,427 693,949 467,028 
2025-2050 1,249,162 392,237 1,375,375 431,868 
2050-2075 12,206,376 1,794,337 14,350,128 2,109,469 
sum a2 14,099,559 2,620,001 16,419,452 3,008,364 
     
a3: strong reduction     
2000-2025 1,105,769 744,183 1,173,079 789,482 
2025-2050 1,573,024 493,929 1,732,039 543,860 
2050-2075 7,604,726 1,117,895 8,767,823 1,288,870 
sum a3 10,283,519 2,356,007 11,672,941 2,622,212 
     
a4: sustainable reduction     
2000-2025 1,568,086 1,055,322 1,638,750 1,102,879 
2025-2050 2,012,627 631,965 2,184,322 685,877 
2050-2075 3,138,502 461,360 3,322,411 488,394 
sum a4 6,719,215 2,148,647 7,145,483 2,277,150 
 
Explanation: Because timing of the damages here consisted only in grouping 
them into periods of 25 years all the damages of one period were discounted 
with the discount factor of the middle year of the respective periods (i.e. 2013, 
2038 and 2063). 2000 was taken as the year of decision. So the discount factors 
used here were: (1-0.03)13 = 0.673, (1-0.03)38 = 0.314, and (1-0.03)63 = 0.147 
for the third, second, and third period. 
  
 
(e.g. Barry (1983, 17; 20; 24), Birnbacher (1988, 218-221), Höffe 
(1993, 186-188), Kavka (1978), Koller (1995, 134), Leist (1996, 436)), 
demands from all generations that they leave as many resources to the 
following generation as they have found themselves; substitution of 
existing resources is permitted, though only by resources with the same 
commodity value (and not just by things with equal utility). According 
to this criterion, in particular we have to leave an equal amount of 
resources of arable and inhabitable ground - if we do not provide for 
substitutes, which is hardly possible to the required extent in the case of 
lost ground etc. Thus, this criterion also demands sustainable CO2-
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reduction: a4. - In spite of all the unclearness of Kantian moral criteria, 
presumably already from the Categorical Imperative in the narrow 
sense (GMS, BA 17; 52; 81) it follows that I cannot will that other 
people, specifically that our ancestors of three generations ago, had 
emitted CO2 in a similarly excessive manner leading today to the 
consequences of the greenhouse effect described in a1, a2 and a3. Thus, 
in our situation with the four options, sustainable CO2-reduction would 
be our duty. - Also according to the (partial) criterion 'neminem 
laedere', 'do not harm anybody!', as supported by Schopenhauer and 
contemporaries like Lenzen and Leist (Schopenhauer 1840, 177; 199; 
251; Lenzen 1999, 16-23; Leist 1996b, 64 f.; 76) sustainable CO2-
reduction would be demanded of the First World, as with the 
alternatives a1 to a3 the present generation of the First and Second 
World 7 impair mainly the generation after the next in all coastal and 
arid areas. 
The unanimity of these very different moral criteria in their 
judgement of the greenhouse effect derives from two characteristics 
common to all the alternatives leading to the greenhouse effect: 1. the 
very unfavourable cost-welfare-ratio and 2. the externalization of costs 
from the profiteers to other persons. The first is relevant for ethics 
aggregating utilities like utilitarianism and utilex, the latter for ethics 
thinking in terms of rights and causation of harm. The unanimity of all 
these ethics is frightening for the inhabitants of the First World 




5.2. Cost-Welfare Analysis of the Abatement Options 
 
As announced above, to prevent the welfarization of social economic 
costs (of OECD countries) and to be able to compare the greenhouse 
gas abatement with completely different measures, cost-welfare 
analyses of the abatement options will now be undertaken, according to 
formula F1 (cf. above, sect. 3.5.4). The moral desirabilities have been 
calculated as in the last subsection in tables 5.1-5.8 but without the 
welfarizations of social economic costs indicated by "■". (In addition 
the desirabilities have been converted from life-utils and life-lexis to 
qaly-utils and qaly-lexis respectively.) The figures of the social 
economic costs (of OECD countries) themselves were taken from the 
annex of table 3.5 (for a1) and from the annexes of tables 4.4-4.6 (for 
a2-a4). The results of these calculations are documented in table 5.10. 
The first two lines represent cost-welfare relations for undiscounted 
costs and undiscounted utilitarian and utilex desirabilities. The two 
 5. The Moral Point(s) of View 81 
  
lines in the middle describe cost-welfare relations for costs discounted 
by 3%/year and undiscounted moral desirabilities. The last two lines, 
finally, represent cost-welfare relations based on discounted costs (by 
3%/year) and discounted (by 3%/year) moral desirabilities. The 
amounts in lines 5 and 6 are much higher than in the first two lines 
because the moral yields (prevented damages due to the greenhouse 
effect) will turn up only late, whereas moral damages (unemployment) 
will appear early. The calculations in the first two lines are conceptually 
wrong and are given here only for information. They are wrong because 
future costs cannot be treated like present costs since they can be paid 
with money invested currently which will bear interest until the day of 
payment. Whether the two lines in the middle or the last two lines 
represent the right cost-welfare relations depends on the question if 
temporal universalism is right or not (which will be discussed below). - 
In any of the six considered ways of calculating the cost-welfare 
relation the moral preference order is: a4 > a3 > a2. That means that 
sustainable reduction (among the abatement options) is the most 
efficient alternative. 
 
Table 5.10    
Cost-welfare relations of the abatement options a2, a3, a4 according to different 
criteria (costs are always given in US-dollars1990): 
criterion unit a2 a3 a4 
     
simple utilitarianism, undisc. costs Doll/qu 31,162 25,358 22,981 
simple utilex, undisc. costs Doll/ql 28,602 23,220 20,992 
simple utilitarianism, costs 3% disc. Doll/qu 8,059 6,848 6,153 
simple utilex, costs 3% disc. Doll/ql 7,397 6,271 5,621 
utilitarianism 3% disc., costs 3% disc. Doll/qu 57,684 51,683 49,197 
utilex 3% disc., costs 3% disc. Doll/ql 52,453 46,407 43,550 
  
 
Cost-welfare relations make it possible to compare the abatement 
options to completely different possibilities of spending, in this case 
public, money. In health economics cost-welfare relations on the basis 
of QALYs (quality adjusted life years) are calculated. The methods 
used for measuring the quality of life differ very much from each other 
and are, in part, highly problematic (cf. the discussion in sect. 2.2). But 
the basic idea of QALYs is to measure something similar as is done by 
qaly-utils; therefore information about QALYs and about qaly-utils 
may be roughly comparable. QALYs are comparable to qaly-lexis only 
under the condition that the examined melioration of health state 
prolongs the life of a 65 year old person with ordinary well-being (or 
personal equivalents of such a life); this may often be the case 
approximately, but very often it is not. Now in health economy, 
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measures which cost up to 20,000 dollars[1982]/QALY (= 27,023 
dollars1990/QALY 
8) are held to be efficient in any case; measures 
costing more than 100,000 dollars[1982]/QALY (= 135,117 
dollars1990/QALY) are considered to tend to be questionable from an 
economic point of view as compared to other measures, but are not to 
be to rejected in any case (Kaplan / Bush 1982, 74). Cost-utility 
relations of some medical measures are listed in table 5.11. The 
 
Table 5.11    
Cost-welfare relations of some measures (prices in in US-dollars1990): 
measure cost/welfare cost/welfare 
 utilitarian utilex 
rhesus prophylaxis after delivery < 0 D/QALY a  
rhesus prophylaxis before delivery 1,597 D/QALY a  
left coronary artery bypass surgery 5,498 D/QALY a b 
newborn intensive care, 1000-1499 g 5,891 D/QALY a  
treatment of mild hypertension (diastolic 25,002 D/QALY a b 
      95-104 mm Hg) in males above 40 
newborn intensive care, 500-999 g 41,626 D/QALY a  
coronary artery bypass surgery for single 47,517 D/QALY a b 
      vessel disease in intermediate angina  
      pectoris 
tuberculin test program in schools 57,203 D/QALY a  
inpatient hemodialysis 70,686 D/QALY a b 
 
allowance against starvation c 470 D/qu 237 D/ql d 
social assistance in NOECD countries e 3,659 D/qu 2,627 D/ql f 
social assistance in the USA (raising income 32,324 D/qu 30,988 D/ql g 
      of people slightly below poverty line) 
 
Explanations: a) These data are based on: Torrance / Zipursky (1984, 278). 
Torrance and Zipursky have gathered prices from the literature, mainly from the 
period up to ten years before publication of their paper, and have converted 
these prices into prices of 1983. Here the latter prices have been converted into 
1990 prices, according to the consumer price index (Statistical Abstract US 
1998, 487). - b) Utilex cost-welfare relations can be equated with the utilitarian 
ones if the measures serve for prolonging a life of 65 years with ordinary well-
being. - c) "Allowance against starvation" shall mean that for the period of the 
allowance people are rescued from starvation but without opening a long-term 
perspective for survival for them. Aid in case of disasters which helps over 
short-term life threatening bottle-necks of different kinds is much more 
efficient. - d) For calculating the utilex desirability a life expectancy of 31.25 
years and an original mean well-being of 0.1000wi were assumed. - e) 
Differences to the USA derive from lower original well-being and greater 
purchasing power. - f) For calculating the utilex desirability a life expectancy of 
62.5 years and an original well-being of 0.1000wi were assumed. - g) A life 
expectancy of 75 years and an original well-being of 0.1145wi were assumed. 
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welfarizations of the social economic costs undertaken above contain 
the material for some further estimated cost-welfare relations, which are 
listed in the lower part of table 5.11. 
At least sustainable reduction is clearly efficient according to the 
criteria of health economics if the welfare gains are not discounted 
(even if the costs are not discounted). After discounting welfare gains 
the efficiency of a4 (49,197 dollars/qu for utilitarianism and 43,550 
dollars/ql for utilex) declines to the level of rather expensive though far 
from inefficient medical measures. Efficiency of the abatement options 
is even quite good as compared to that of social assistance in OECD 
countries. But the efficiency of developmental aid to NOECD countries 
may still be much higher. The consequences of this comparison will be 
discussed below. 
 
Notes to Chapter 5 
 
                                                 
1 According to utilitarianism too, melioration for people worse off often 
is preferred to melioration (of the same size) for people better off ― but for 
economic reasons, i.e. because the latter melioration is more expensive, so with 
the same money one could help more people worse off. Surely, utilex would 
generate the same preference in such a case. But this is not meant by "giving 
more moral weight to melioration for people worse off". Rather, utilex would 
prefer the melioration for a person worse off to a melioration (of the same 
degree) for a person better off even if the two meliorations cost the same and 
even if the melioration for the person (much) worse off costs (moderately) more 
because this melioration is treated as being morally better. This cannot happen 
in utilitarianism because the two meliorations are treated as being equally 
desirable from a moral point of view. Φ The same can be explained in a more 
technical way: What utilitarians are insisting on is that the personal utility 
function of money and some other goods is concave, i.e. the gradient of the 
desirability or well-being curve decreases as income increases. (This above, in 
sects. 3.3 and 3.5.3, has been empirically confirmed by the fact that mean well-
being statistically increases underproportionally with increasing income.) In 
this case the x-axis represents monetary income and the y-axis personal utilities, 
which in utilitarianism are taken to be identical with moral desirabilities. This 
concave personal desirability function, surely, is also important for utilex. But 
in utilex there exists another concave function: the moral weighting function for 
personal desirabilities. In this case the x-axis represents personal desirabilities, 
and the y-axis represents moral desirabilities. For utilitarianism such a moral 
weighting function would be the identity function (Uut(x) = x, where x is a 
personal desirability) instead, which means that it is superfluous. 
2 Maximin is a moral criterion according to which the following holds: 
of two options that one is the morally better with which the person worst off is 
better off than the person worst off with the alternative; if the persons worst off 
with the respective options are equally badly off maximin is indifferent with 
respect to the two options. Leximin is a more sophisticated criterion: the 
beginning of the evaluation equals maximin but in the described case that the 
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persons worst off are equally badly off it continues the comparison with 
considering the persons second worst off. If one alternative is better for these 
persons then it is morally better. And the comparison continues with the 
persons third worst off if even the second worst off are equally badly off etc. 
3 An informal exposition of the idea of this criterion can be found in: 
Nagel 1991, ch. 7. Parfit lists some further adherents (Parfit 1997, 213) and 
seems to subscribe to it himself. Gaertner (1992; 1995) in several experiments 
with samples up to 300 persons has observed empirically that in intuitive 
judgements about distributive morality the priority view is often applied. 
4 Harsanyi and Broome criticize the application of such nonlinear 
weighting functions to personal desirabilities saying that the resulting value 
does not make sense because it distinguishes between desirability and how 
much this desirability should count (Harsanyi 1975; Broome 1989, 246). This 
perhaps may be true if the result of such application should reflect equality 
considerations ― which was the target of Broomes critique (ibid. 248). But it is 
false if the weighting function shall reflect priority. In this case the result of 
applying the weighting function is the moral value of the person's well-being. 
5 This value has been calculated according to the answers given by the 
subjects during the interviews above (comparison of life prolongation of 
persons of 40 respectively 80 years of age). Because of the moral indifference 
of subjects between the two alternatives the following equation holds: 
Uul(c ∙ ((80+x)years ∙ 0.142wi)) – Uul(c ∙ (80years ∙ 0.142wi)) = 
Uul(c ∙ ((40+y)years ∙ 0.142wi)) – Uul(c ∙ (40years ∙ 0.142wi)), 
with x being the subjects' answers to the question (e.g. x=16), y being the life 
prolongation of the 40 year old person mentioned in the question (e.g. y=8), and 
c being a constant translating utils in life-utils (years multiplied by mean well-
being in wi are identical to utils). c is the interesting value which can be 
calculated by solving this equation for c. The result is: c=0.037786, which then 
was used to define life-utils with respect to utils. 
6 128.77/89.27 = 1.4425. This value does not change if we take another 
damage as the reference point for calculating the weight given to a particular 
type of damage. (The reference damage here was the greatest damage.) 
Whereas taking another reference damage would change the other values 
reported above. 
7 "Altogether in 1993 the OECD countries accounted for about 50.5% 
of global fossil carbon emissions, with about half of this being from the U.S. 
The former USSR and Eastern European countries accounted for 17% [...], and 
the developing countries contributed just under a third of gross fossil carbon 
emissions." (Banuri et al. 1996, 95.) If the OECD, the former SU and Eastern 
European countries had per capita emissions only at the level of the developing 
countries global emissions would be roughly on a just still sustainable level. 
However, this is only the present situation; projections say that greenhouse gas 
emissions of developing countries, in particular China, will increase drastically 
in the periods under consideration. 
8 Corrections for consumer prices were done according to: Statistical 













6. From Moral Valuation to Moral 
Obligation - 1. The Conception of a 
Historical Morality 
6.1. Problems of Conventional Ethics and of Rigorous Moral 
Postulates 
 
All the conventional ethics considered above (utilitarianism, ethics 
of (intermediately strong) sustainable development, Kantian ethics, 
neminem laedere) demand sustainable CO2-reduction. Do we have this 
obligation? 
Even if ethicists would postulate such an obligation this would not 
have remarkable consequences. A first excuse for denying an obligation 
to sustainable reduction is that the forecasts are too insecure, that until 
now nothing has been proved. But even if nothing has been proved the 
sketched scenarios are probable; and obligations follow from probable 
consequences too. A second excuse is that in the abatement scenarios a 
collective subject is presumed; individually one cannot do anything. 
But of course individuals can contribute their share to greenhouse gas 
reduction, as home-owners, as drivers and road users, as consumers and 
as political subjects. 
But even after accepting the just given replies resistance against an 
(hypothetic) obligation to a4 will remain because for several reasons it 
is seen as an unreasonable exaction: 1. The requirements resulting from 
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this obligation are rather high. 2. Hardly anyone else would keep to this 
obligation, thus one would be isolated with all accompanying 
insecurities and with no one for support. 3. Instead of finding 
appreciation one would rather be suspected of being a moralist, 
fundamentalist, or eco-nut. 4. It would be frustrating to see that alone or 
together with a small minority of like-minded people only little can be 
done against the greenhouse effect; their own efforts would only have a 
marginal effect. 5. It would be outrageous to see hardly anyone else 
doing his duty but everybody taking profit from the positive 
achievements. 6. Maybe the declaration of such an obligation would 
even have a contra-intuitive effect, in that it would deter people only 
ready for lesser engagement. 
Behind the just mentioned difficulties I see the following basic 
problems of traditional ethics: 
1. Binding force of norms: What does it mean, when ethicists state: 
'Doing A is morally obligatory'? This statement usually implies doing A 
to be in some way impersonally binding. The easiest conception of this 
binding force is that it stems from sanctions, from internal sanctions 
like conscience or from external ones, be they formal, i.e. legal 
sanctions, or informal ones, with a range from frowning up to lynch 
law. This kind of commitment is missing at least in the severest ethical 
demands regarding the greenhouse effect, i.e. a4. And again, without 
this binding force there is not sufficient pressure to follow the severe 
norms, and that is one of the reasons why they have not been followed 
yet. For those obeying the norm, it has the (unjust and at least 
annoying) consequence of doing the moral work for all the others. 
2. Coordination of obligations: Many proposals of norms in ethical 
literature do not name a clear subject for the proposed norms, but they 
refer to, for example, a whole generation as carrier of the alleged 
obligations and only name a general aim, like conservation of 
resources, but not actions. An economically effective limitation of the 
anthropogenous greenhouse effect is only possible with coordinated 
individual and collective actions (by organizations, firms, nations, 
communities of nations). And for such complex coordination very 
detailed, partly highly technical, and above all legally valid standards 
are necessary. Without this coordination and embedding, in a well-
directed social practice, lump-sum ethical norms remain only 
appellative: individuals do not know what to do, and negligible 
efficiency and lack of perspective of their actions are discouraging. 
3. Overtaxing: motivation, moral ideals versus moral obligations and 
the limits of morality: Most ethics, at least occasionally, seem to ask too 
much of the subjects motivationally. Moral norms can only be justified 
considering such motivational limitations. This consideration is lacking 
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in most ethics. The most prominent form of overstraining is the 
utilitarian (and of some other welfare ethics as well) obligation to 
always do the morally best action. The permanent obligation for 
morally optimal action would ask too much of people, motivationally. 
A theoretical solution of this problem is to differentiate between moral 
ideals (or morally optimal options) and moral obligation; what is 
morally best must by no means be a moral duty. Maybe sustainable 
CO2-reduction is a moral ideal, but no moral obligation.
1 - I think 
another form of overstrain by utilitarianism (and other demanding 
welfare ethics) is what is discussed as the problem of the limits of 
morality (Rawls 1971, 26-30; Scheffler 1994; Kagan 1989).2 Often this 
problem is taken as an evidence that before any obligation to moral 
optimizing there must be protective rights. But this is already a 
suggestion for a concrete solution. I think this problem can be reduced 
to the motivational problem just mentioned and then there may be 
different solutions for it: The difference between the problem of 
demanding optimality and the limitation problem seems to be that the 
first speaks of active limits, i.e. the limits of our obligations to do 
something, whereas the second speaks of passive limits, i.e. the limits 
of other people's rights to invade our rights and to impose 
disadvantages on us. But the passive limitation problem can be 
approximated to the active limitation problem, and then it will turn out 
as a problem of motivation as well: According to the duty to moral 
optimizing, not only other agents are obliged to harm the person in 
question for raising public welfare; strictly speaking even this person is 
obliged to endure the intervention and to help execute it; and he is 
obliged to support a system that requires all this from him. 
4. The sense of universalism: Modern ethics mostly are universalistic - 
and this, surely, is historical progress insofar as universalism tends to 
support efforts for peace. But ethical universalism may be getting 
problematic not only because of an increasing tendency to move away 
from purely negative, prohibitive to positive ethics with positive 
obligations for aid, but also for the ever increasing (possible) spatial 
(among others including the Third World) and temporal (e.g. via the 
greenhouse effect affecting generations in the distant future) reach of 
our actions as well as the increasing sensibility for the ontological 
dimension of universality (that we have to respect (certain) animals as 
well). Such empirically produced extensions of the implications of 
moral universality are not or are hardly calculable, at least not without 
good empirical knowledge, and they may be unbearable. Considering 
this, unlimited universalistic moral obligations cannot be justified a 
priori, independently of the empirical constellations (as nowadays is 
mostly assumed, from discourse ethics to utilitarianism). This holds 
88 The Greenhouse  
  
because the world might be so bad that unlimited universality in 
combination with strong positive obligations as well as in combination 
with "weak" prohibitive ethics (like neminem laedere) would lead to 
unbearable obligations. For example the world could be full of paupers 
whose survival would depend on our permanent and massive aid (in a 
certain way the world actually is like this); or our own survival could 
depend on killing (e.g. eating) other humans. But if universalism does 
not hold absolutely, how can it be justified and what is its sense? And 
how can universalism eventually be restricted legitimately? 
5. Motivational justification of criteria of morality: In ethics there are 
many rivalling criteria of morality together with their efforts and claims 
for justification. For making such a criterion of morality acceptable in a 
practically relevant way, i.e. making someone regard it in his decision 
of actions as his own moral criterion (which has certain influences on 
his actions without therefore always doing the morally best), there must 
be motivating reasons for him to do so. These motivating reasons, then, 
are also the first reasons for following the norms. Most ethics are not 
justified in this motivating way, hence lacking these first reasons for 
following the norms. 
I will tackle these problems now in reverse order. 
 
 
6.2. Motivational Justification of Moral Desirability Functions - 
Sympathy and Its Range 
 
I cannot present in detail here how I think a justification of morals 
has to be made (but cf.: Lumer 1999b; Lumer 1994). But the core of a 
justification of morals is to find i. motives ii. which are resistant to 
information and iii. independent from socially or individually accepted 
norms, iv. which motivate to something similar as moral actions and v. 
which interpersonally are quite similar. From such motives then moral 
standards of valuation can be constructed subject to the condition that 
following these standards will maximize the realization of the aims 
inherent in these motives. Sympathy is the most prominent motive 
satisfying all the mentioned conditions (Lumer 1999a; Lumer 2002). 
From the two forms of sympathy, sharing in joy and feeling pity (i.e. 
positive and negative sympathy), pity is the stronger motive. Therefore, 
if one develops moral valuation standards on the basis of sympathy in 
the way sketched above this leads to a stronger weighting of 
ameliorations for people worse off than for people already well off, i.e. 
it leads exactly to the criterion utilex explained above (Lumer 1997a; 
Lumer 2000, ch. 7). 
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But to be more precise, several ways have to be distinguished as to 
how sympathy can motivate moral actions, which have different 
implications for the universality of morals (cf. Lumer 1999a): 
1. Acting from sympathy: desires induced by sympathy: Sympathy, to 
begin with, is only an emotion: We are pleased because another person 
is well or even happy; we are distressed, sad, dismayed because (s)he is 
in a bad way. Such sympathy secondly has motivational effects. 
Namely, like all emotions sympathy changes our intrinsic desires, 
induces new intrinsic desires; positive sympathy induces the desire that 
the situation of the other person should be consolidated or enhanced, 
negative sympathy induces the desire that the situation should be 
ameliorated. Such desires induced by sympathy are not temporally 
stable however - exactly because they depend on our current sympathy. 
And because of this they are not apt as a basis for rational planning and 
for a rational ethics. 
2. Acting for optimizing sympathy: the motive of sympathy expectancy: 
Secondly, one can optimize sympathy hedonistically. Pity after all is an 
unpleasant emotion, positive sympathy (with people well off) is a 
pleasant one. And one consequence of our general hedonist motivation 
is that we desire to optimize this kind of emotion, i.e. maximize the sum 
of the integrals of positive and negative sympathy over time. We can 
fulfill this desire by contributing to the amelioration of other people's 
situation. This motive of sympathy expectancy is stable over time and it 
is suitable for founding morals. - Sympathy always arises from the fact 
that we are confronted, in a broad sense, with the fate of another person. 
According to the way of this confrontation (i.e. the genesis of 
sympathy), several subtypes of the motive of sympathy expectancy can 
be distinguished. 
2.1. Sympathy expectancy from causal confrontation: "Causal 
confrontation" with the well-being of an object of sympathy shall mean 
that there is a causal chain from this well-being to the sympathy. For 
example the subject directly experiences how well the other person is, 
or the subject is told by other persons about this, or the subject comes 
across circumstantial evidence allowing him to draw conclusions about 
the well-being, or the subject learns about it from the media, or the 
subject remembers one of these types of confrontations (and imagines it 
vividly). Sympathy from causal confrontation can refer to 
contemporaries and to people of the past; but in the latter case it is 
practically irrelevant because we cannot change the fate of these people. 
But it cannot refer to future people. Therefore, sympathy expectancy 
from causal confrontation alone does not lead to an intuitively 
acceptable moral criterion. 
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2.2. Sympathy expectancy from confrontation by inference: 
"Confrontation by inference" here shall mean a confrontation without a 
causal chain from the well-being of the object to the subject's sympathy 
but a confrontation where the fate of the object is inferred in some other 
way and then imagined more or less vividly. For example the subject 
learns of the object's fate via generalizing background reports or 
forecasts, or vividly imagines this fate with the help of such reports, or 
images this fate independently of such external occasion, such as when 
considering the outcomes of his own actions. We may be confronted by 
inference with the fate of beings of all times. Though confrontation by 
inference with the fate of people of the past again is practically 
irrelevant; and, what is more important, the frequency of confrontation 
with the well-being of other beings will decrease with the temporal (and 
spatial) distance from the subject, and perhaps does so exponentially. 
So if the justification of morals is based on sympathy expectancy from 
confrontation by inference ideally the moral criterion utilex with 
temporal discounting results. Thus perhaps any following generation 
(with a presumed duration of 25 years) in this way may receive half as 
much moral consideration as the preceding generation. This 
corresponds to an annual discounting of about 3% (exactly: 2.73%), i.e. 
it is roughly equal to the usual discount rate. The fate of all future 
generations together then gets the same weight as the fate of the present 
generation (since 0.5+0.25+0.125+0.0625+... ≈ 1). 
2.3. Sympathy expectancy from action-induced confrontation by 
inference: Hitherto I have found only one very particular way of 
confrontation with the well-being of others which leads to a temporally 
universal sympathy: action induced confrontation by inference. After 
our decisions (and after their execution) we often reconsider them and 
in doing so we eventually imagine how other people may be affected by 
them. Sympathy expectancy from action-induced confrontation by 
inference then is the motive to optimize the sympathy resulting from 
this reconsideration. Now, ideally, the amount of confrontation with the 
fate of a stranger affected by our actions is proportional to the 
subjectively expected degree of how much our action concerns the 
object. The amount of empathy in this case directly depends only on the 
qualities of the action (how much it will concern other people) and not 
additionally (but only indirectly) on the historical or regional position 
of the subject. Exactly this leads to the universality of the value 
function based on this type of sympathy. - This motive is quite specific. 
But the emerging of the type of sympathy appertaining to it resembles 
the procedure of an ideal observer assumed by many ethics. 
Now which type of sympathy should a moral criterion be based on? 
Already above, desires induced by sympathy have been rejected as a 
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base because of their temporal instability. And the isolated sympathy 
expectancy from causal confrontation has been rejected as well because 
the resulting moral criterion would be intuitively unacceptable. But 
even in combination (i.e. summing up the desirabilities) with sympathy 
expectancy from confrontation by inference, sympathy expectancy by 
causal confrontation leads to intuitively unacceptable results. Namely 
this combination, i.e. the total sympathy expectancy, leads to a moral 
criterion which could be named "utilex with generational discounting": 
the fate of the present generation is weighted with the factor 1, that of 
the following generation much lower, e.g. with the factor 0.2, and the 
fate of the further generations is weighted with a factor half as high as 
that of the preceding generations (i.e. for the third generation the weight 
0.1 applies, for the fourth generation the weight 0.05 applies etc.). (The 
rationale behind this criterion is this. It is taken to apply to the 
politically responsible people who may die in about 25 years. Because 
sympathy from causal confrontation stops at this date and only 
sympathy from confrontation by inference remains, there will be a 
sharp decline in sympathy expectancy with respect to effects occurring 
afterwards. These effects are only the objects of the - much weaker - 
sympathy from confrontation by inference which decreases 
exponentially.) The fate of all future generations together in this case 
has only 40% weight of the fate of the present generation. Applying this 
type of discounting to the above utilex assessments of the greenhouse 
gas options leads to the following preference order: utilex with 
generational discounting: a1 > a3 > a2 > a4. (Utilitarianism with 
generational discounting even leads to an exact reversal of the 
preferences obtained so far: a1 > a2 > a3 > a4.)
3 So it is the first criterion 
with which sustainable reduction is not optimum; and the preference 
order is essentially more hostile to the environment than the official 
political programs, which presently (at least roughly) aim at 
stabilization (a2) or something a bit more incisive. This means that with 
respect to intergenerational justice a big portion of humans is clearly 
more universalistic than utilex (or utilitarianism) with generational 
discounting. Therefore, this criterion and its motivational foundation 
should be morally refuted. Thus only sympathy expectancy from 
confrontation by inference and (a smaller section of it) from action-
induced confrontation by inference seem to be suited as motives for 
basing morals. Utilex with simple discounting or utilex without 
discounting would result from these motives. 
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6.3. Sense and Range of the Universality of Morals 
 
Two fundamental types of universality can be distinguished in ethics. 
"Universality of subjects" here shall mean that all moral subjects have 
the same moral; or more precisely: For all moral subjects exactly one 
moral holds (or is justified) in such a way that (within certain 
boundaries) the same objects for them always have the same moral 
desirability.4 The opposite of universality of subjects is relativism. 
"Universality of beneficiaries" on the other hand shall mean that all 
potential beneficiaries of a moral are treated equally. More precisely: if 
the same states of affair are fulfilled for two beneficiaries and these 
states of affair satisfy certain conditions then these states of affair have 
the same moral desirability.5 The most important forms of non-
universality of beneficiaries are moral egoism and parochialism. - 
Universality of subjects and universality of beneficiaries are 
analytically independent. There may be morals giving the same rights to 
all humans or all living creatures (universality of beneficiaries) but 
which are not rationally acceptable to all subjects (no universality of 
subjects); this for example may hold for some sort of Christian or 
Islamic morals. And conversely it is analytically possible that some 
morals are universal with respect to subjects but not with respect to 
beneficiaries; according to these morals, e.g. the life of slaves could 
have less desirability than that of the freemen, but this would have to be 
rationally acceptable for the freemen as well as for the slaves. 
Empirically though the latter combination is impossible; this means 
universality of subjects empirically implies universality of 
beneficiaries, but the converse does not hold. 
I think the sense of a certain form of moral universality, namely of 
universality of subjects, derives from the prudentially consensualistic 
sense of that morals which are binding by social sanctions. The sense of 
socially binding morals is to provide an intersubjectively uniform and 
binding value system (desirability function) and on this basis to regulate 
cooperation and conflicts between individuals, in particular to regulate 
cooperation dedicated to fulfilling sympathetic inclinations. Or more 
generally: the sense is to cooperatively create - according to this value 
system - a better world.6 Some implications of this determination are: 
the socially binding morals necessarily are a collective project of the 
addressees of those morals; and the moral value system and the moral 
norms must be acceptable for all moral addressees or result from 
something which is homogenously desirable for them. 
Sympathy with strangers to certain limits and under idealizing 
assumptions at least in principle is a motive universal with respect to 
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subjects (and with respect to beneficiaries): different persons in the 
same situations display if not the same, roughly proportionate 
sympathy. Therefore, sympathy in principle is suited for a rational 
justification of morals. Sympathy expectancy from confrontation by 
inference though is only (half-way) universal with respect to subjects if 
the probabilities to be confronted with the fate of the same object of 
sympathy are equal for any subject. But as already discussed above this 
- even with idealizations - holds only for members of the same 
generation and society. So sympathy expectancy from confrontation by 
inference leads to temporal and spatial discounting. This limitation does 
not, in principle, contradict the prudentially consensualistic aim of 
morals: one has only to assume that the society, the "universe", in 
which the peacemaking and cooperation securing effect shall be 
reached is correspondingly restricted. In a time of globalization, 
however, this is a somewhat antiquated and not very ambitious though 
not unacceptable ideal. And in the case of evaluating the greenhouse 
options it would lead at least to different moral assessments (if not 
perhaps different preference orders) of these options already in the 
OECD, because each of the single countries of the OECD have 
different interests and different neighbours whose fate counts more to 
them than that of distant countries. (This consequence could be 
prevented by incorporating only temporal but not spatial discounting in 
one's moral. But from the point of view of a motivational justification 
of morals this step would be unfounded: there is no motive which 
discounts in this way, that is temporally but not spatially.) 
The problem of limiting the universality of subjects does not emerge 
with sympathy expectancy from confrontation by action-induced 
inference. A justification on this basis leads to a real universalism of 
subjects, in particular to simple, undiscounted utilex. However, this 
moral criterion, precisely because of its universality, seems to have the 
disadvantage of asking too much of the subjects and of providing only a 
very weak motive for moral action. 
 
 
6.4. Bindingness and Limits of Morals - Social Implementation and 
Historization of Morals 
 
The first three problems - commitment of norms, coordination of 
obligations and exaction - can be discussed here together. The approach 
for solving these problems is a conception of the social bindingness of 
moral norms which then leads to a historization of morals:7 Norms in 
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the broad sense are only patterns of (typical) behaviour. Norms in the 
strict sense are the (at a certain time) binding norms, i.e. legally, 
socially or individually binding norms. Socially binding norms are ways 
of acting that are largely followed generally and the following of which 
is protected by sanctions, thus creating their binding force  (Lumer 
1990). Moral norms in the strict sense then are those socially binding 
norms - in particular also (legally) valid standards - that can be justified 
by relying on a criterion of moral desirability. With this conception the 
problems of binding force and coordination and to a certain degree also 
that of motivation can be solved. The sanctions belonging to socially 
binding norms are at least one important motive for following these 
norms and thus are binding. And at least legally valid standards can 
resolve the problem of coordination. 
 Social bindingness of norms does not come on its own but it has to 
be implemented. The social implementation of moral norms is a historic 
process in the course of which moral standards of socially binding 
norms are raised in the long term. Or, to put it differently: it is the aim 
of this process of implementation to morally improve the set of binding 
norms. One task of applied ethics in this process is to evaluate new 
actually or possibly binding norms with the help of the criterion of 
moral desirability as to whether they are a moral improvement or not. 
The criterion which should lead applied ethics then is: Social 
bindingness of norm x presently can be implemented and it is morally 
better than the social bindingness of all alternative norms presently 
implementable. According to this conception, there would then be three 
kinds of moral obligation: 1. the formal moral duty, to follow morally 
advanced legal standards; 2. the informal moral duty, to follow morally 
advanced non-legal social norms; and 3. the imperfect moral duty, to 
help keeping up already binding morally good norms and socially 
implementing not yet binding morally better norms by following these 
norms, making propaganda for them, exerting sanctions for their 
violation etc. 
This conception in particular resolves the problem of moral 
overtaxing: Moral obligations are mainly (apart from imperfect moral 
duties) established by socially binding moral norms. These obligations 
in each case are a historical compromise between morally exacting 
ideals and amoral particular interests running counter to these ideals. 
This compromise in particular fixes the amount of moral engagement 
which can be put through in each case and which - as a cause of this - is 
accepted by the subjects as being reasonable. One side of this 
compromise is that the ideal is not reached (which however has the 
positive effect of not overtaxing anybody); the other side is that norms 
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now can be enforced and in particular that there is enough motivation to 
fulfill one's duties: social bindingness creates the motive to avoid 
sanctions and, above all, it creates a certain reciprocity, namely that the 
moral subjects obliged to do their duties have the right to get the same 
moral benefits as the moral beneficiaries if the subjects themselves are 
in the same situation as the beneficiaries. The amount of the morally 
obligatory engagement will always be lower than the possible 
maximum, i.e. the complete devotion to moral tasks, because moral 
motivation is only a part of the total motivation. But social bindingness 
at the same time provides the prerequisites for a continuous approach to 
that ideal: Social bindingness and the just mentioned reciprocity 
constitute a certain stable level of peaceful exchange of give and take of 
moral contributions, which then is the base for an unilateral, and in the 
beginning not "rewarding", extension of one's active contributions 
supported by imperfect moral duties only. And these extensions in turn, 
finally, may lead to a higher level of consolidated (socially binding) 
morals. 
Passive limitation results from this conception of social bindingness 
in the following way: the extent of one's morally obligatory 
contribution is fixed by the moral norms in the strict sense, including 
things one has to endure (like in many western societies deductions 
from one's wages for various reasons, in particular for income taxes). 
Therefore, it is not allowed to increase other persons' contributions by 
individual interventions beyond the obligatory extent (except for cases 
of fulfilling one's imperfect moral duty). (The doctors in the famous 
organ donation example are supposed to do exactly this.) Collective 
raising of moral contributions by initiating more rigid norms instead 
must obviously be permitted. If somebody wants to augment his own 
moral contribution beyond the obligatory extent (in particular by 
authorizing operations which (s)he himself has to endure) this is not 
only morally permitted but also a particularly meritorious 
supererogatory action.8 
 
6.4.1. Applying the Solution of the Overtaxing Problem: Efficiency 
of Moral Action versus Temporal Discounting 
The reduction of moral obligations by temporal (and occasionally 
also spatial) discounting is often proposed as a solution to the problem 
of overtaxing. This solution is practicable in principle but in the case of 
the greenhouse effect it does not lead to a reduction of moral 
obligations. (Remember that even with simple discounting by 3%/year 
utilitarianism and utilex lead to the preference order: a4 > a3 > a2 > a1.) 
However, discounting is not the only possible solution to the overtaxing 
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problem and intuitively is not a morally satisfying one. For example 
going very far into the future it might be the case that, due to temporal 
discounting, the deaths of many in the future must be accepted for a 
tiny advantage in the present. For many people this is intuitively 
unacceptable. In addition, if they had the alternative of preventing a big 
catastrophe in the distant future instead of preventing a small 
catastrophe in the near future (after their death) most people would 
choose the former option (Cowen / Parfit 1992, 149). But above all, this 
solution is nonsensical. If we find that the personal expenditures for 
certain moral actions are too high this, after all, does not change the 
moral desirability of these actions (and of their omissions); e.g. death 
due to consequences of the greenhouse effect does not get any better 
because of the high costs of its prevention. If the aim is to prevent 
overtaxing we should adopt this aim as a principle (ibid.). For our case 
this means: limitation of moral obligations should be effected from the 
side of expenditures, for example by establishing certain upper limits 
for our contribution in certain situations. And the remaining 
commitment should follow maxims of moral efficiency: the 
contribution dedicated to morality should be assigned to those cases 
where intervention is most urgently required and most efficient, or more 
precisely, where cost-welfare relations are lowest. (Cost-welfare 
relations with utilex desirabilities consider both urgency of need as well 
as efficiency; whereas cost-welfare relations with utilitarian 
desirabilities consider efficiency only. This is a disadvantage of 
utilitarianism.) But the welfare calculations themselves should not be 
distorted. If future damages are big (measured in utilex desirabilities) 
and costs for preventing them are small then they should be prevented. 
These considerations reject only the most prominent justification for 
temporal discounting, they do not imply that temporal discounting is 
false; it may be the right method for moral evaluation for other reasons. 
In the previous two sections (6.2, 6.3) whether the total sympathy 
expectancy from confrontation by inference or only sympathy 
expectancy from action-induced confrontation by inference shall be the 
bases of morals and consequently whether utilex with discounting or 
simple utilex is the right moral criterion remained open. Simple utilex 
had a clear advantage in a globalizing society, however and keeps up 
this advantage now that the problem of overtaxation has been shown to 
be resolvable for both criteria. But this advantage does not imply that 
utilex with discounting is clearly false. (The justification for adhering to 
utilex with discounting would be to base morals on a stronger but - in 
its consequences - more parochialist type of sympathy and to identify 
oneself with a more restricted society, so that the fate of extraneous 
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beings is considered as being less important.) So there is no definite 
decision between these two moral criteria. 
 
 
Notes to Chapter 6 
 
                                                 
1 For some utilitarians this problem is a reason for refraining from the 
assumption of a direct duty to do the morally best action. Peter Singer sticks to 
the duty to do the morally best with the restriction that only that moral the 
propagation of which leads to the best results, should be propagated (Singer 
1993, 245 f.). However, this difference between a presently valid (in which 
sense?) and a publicly propagated moral is odd; it would lead to the 
condemnation of people for offending against a moral that cannot even be 
publicly propagated. Birnbacher avoids this problem. According to his 
conception, that way of acting is obligatory, the actual social validity of which 
is [would be?] nearest to the optimum (Birnbacher 1988, 16-20; 147; 199). 
Unfortunately this criterion is not clear. 
2 The paradigm for the problem of the limits of morality is this: A 
stranger without relatives and friends comes into a hospital with a minor 
ailment. Five patients urgently need different new organs, the first a heart, the 
second a liver etc. without which they would die in the next weeks. The 
stranger, as the doctors find out, is the ideal donor for all these five other 
patients (and not much time to live has been left for himself). (Cf. Hare 1981, 
132 (sect. 8.2.).) ― At least at first glance act utilitarianism in this situation 
seems to command that the doctors should take the organs from the stranger. 
3 The discounted desirabilities of the four alternatives are: 
Generationally discounted moral desirabilities of options a1-a4: 
criterion unit a1 a2 a3 a4  
  
utilitarianism gen. disc. lu 1,973,729 2,114,492 2,180,847 2,284,462 
utilex gen. disc. ll 2,367,435 2,404,037 2,396,269 2,407,855 
For utilex the alternatives now have nearly the same desirabilities; the worst 
option only causes 1.7% more damage than the best one. So the preference 
order now no longer is stable against changes in assumptions. 
4 Formalization: Umorp,s := the (justified) moral desirability of the state 
of affair p for the subject s; C shall be a limiting condition. 
Universality of subjects then is: ∀si,sj,p (Cp → Umorp,si = Umorp,sj). 
5 Formalization: C and D again are limiting conditions; A[x] is a 
predicate in the logical sense, i.e. a formula with a free variable. 
Universality of beneficiaries then is: 
∀bi,bj,A (Cbi & Cbj & D(A) → Umor(A[bi]),s = Umor(A[bj]),s). 
6 Justifying this determination of the sense of socially binding morals 
here would lead too far, but cf.: Lumer 1999b, sect. 3. 
7 A more detailed exposition and discussion of the historical conception 
of morals sketched in the following is given in: Lumer 1999b, sect. 5-6. 
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8 If the stranger in the organ donation example sacrifices his life for the 
benefit of the five patients this is morally better than if he does not. And only 
intersubjectively aggregating moral desirability functions are a basis for 
appreciating such a deed as morally particularly meritorious. But such a 














7. From Moral Valuation to Moral 
Obligation - 2. Application to the 
Greenhouse Effect 
7.1. The Problem of Possibly Better Alternatives 
 
In the foregoing chapters we calculated the moral desirabilities of 
BAU and three abatement options as well as the cost-welfare relations 
of the latter three. But according to the sketched solution of the 
overtaxing problem, in order to determine the direction of the further 
moral development and our duties with respect to the greenhouse effect 
it would be necessary to compare the cost-welfare relations of the 
abatement options with the cost-welfare relations in other fields of 
possible moral dedication, e.g. developmental aid, social programs in 
the OECD countries or medical programs for prolonging life. And the 
very high costs of sustainable CO2-reduction are an incentive to double-
check if this alternative really is the most efficient. But apart from the 
very superficial estimates (in section 5.2, table 5.11) of some social 
measures, I have not calculated the cost-welfare relations of other 
measures. It would require as equally intense analyses of other social 
problems as those carried out here for the greenhouse effect. Therefore, 
the following considerations contain only some general assessments of 
some groups of alternatives. - Economists suggest two main types of 
alternatives to the options considered so far: 1. alternative treatments of 
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the greenhouse effect and 2. engagement in fields other than the 
greenhouse effect. 
1. Alternative treatment of the greenhouse effect: Instead of the 
expensive greenhouse gas reduction more measures of mitigation and / 
or of compensation could be financed (Beckerman 1991). One of the 
reasons for the massive damages caused by BAU is that in this scenario 
the Third World is largely left to itself, so that measures for mitigation 
which would be a matter of course in the First World, like increased 
coastal protection in densely populated areas, would be left partly 
untaken there. If, as presumed in alternative a4 with the principle 'rich 
countries pay for all', the First World would sympathize more with the 
developing countries, it could also pay for such inexpensive mitigation 
measures, putting up with a somewhat increased anthropogenous 
greenhouse effect due to higher CO2-emission than in sustainable 
reduction (a4), and thereby lowering total costs. Apart from coastal 
protection, organized and paid relocation and measures against 
aridisation and dying of forests would also be possible. The range of 
these measures is rather limited, however (e.g. deaths by floods and 
storms make up "only" 0.40% (utilitarian calculation) respectively 
0.37% (utilex calculation) of all damages by BAU (cf. tables 5.1 and 
5.5), part of them occurring in the OECD). So with a more exact 
calculation which includes further options, an alternative between 
strong (a3) and sustainable reduction (a4) might be optimal and most 
efficient, but presumably no alternative with a reduction lower than 
25% would be optimal. On the other hand the presumption of very high 
costs for stronger reductions of greenhouse emissions was based on the 
very pessimistic top-down-models. Maybe the truth lies in between the 
presumptions of top-down-models and bottom-up-models which 
estimate alternative energies to be more favourable.1 The results of this 
would be that the morally best alternative would be closer to sustainable 
reduction again and much money would have to be invested into 
research on alternative energies. Beyond that it is quite certain in the 
long run that fossil energies must be replaced by alternative energy-
carriers because of limited stocks. This may additionally make 
sustainable reduction a cheaper alternative in very long-term 
calculations. 
2. Engagement in other fields than the greenhouse effect: 
2.1. Medical treatment and social assistance in OECD countries: The 
cost-welfare relations for sustainable reduction are 6153 dollars/qu 
according to simple utilitarianism and 5621 dollars/ql according to 
simple utilex (both with discounted costs). This is less than the cost-
welfare relations for social assistance in OECD countries (32,324 
dollars/qu respectively 30,988 dollars/ql) and for many types of medical 
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treatment (cf. table 5.11); and those types of medical treatment which 
are more efficient than sustainable reduction in the OECD for the most 
part are undertaken anyway. (And if they are not this probably is due to 
some economic inefficiency of the respective medical system and not to 
moral considerations.) So from the point of view of really universalist 
welfarism (whether utilitarian or utilex) sustainable reduction of 
greenhouse gases has a clear precedence over an increase of 
investments in these sectors. This picture may change however if non-
universalist welfarism is taken as the basis of moral assessment. In this 
case the cost-welfare relations for sustainable reduction increase to 
49197 dollars/qu according to utilitarianism with 3% discounting and 
43550 dollars/ql according to utilex with the same discounting (both 
with additionally discounted costs). For the comparison with hitherto 
not implemented poorly efficient medical measures this may make no 
difference. But sustainable reduction now is less efficient than investing 
in social assistance in the OECD. From a certain parochialist point of 
view it then may be better to give priority to improving the fate of the 
poor of one's own country over greenhouse gas reduction. 
2.2. Developmental aid: The costs of eliminating the CFCs will be in 
the billions of US-dollars per year for some years; the costs of reducing 
sulphuric acid may be in the tens of billions (Schelling 1992, 3). In 
relation to that the costs for reducing greenhouse gas emissions are 
gigantic. According to the above calculations, in 2050 they will be 1379 
bn US-dollars/per year or 5.47% of GNP in the OECD (if the OECD 
pays for all) for sustainable reduction (1127 bn US-dollars/year or 
4.47% of OECD-GNP for strong reduction, and 946 bn US-dollars/year 
or 3.75% of OECD-GNP for stabilization; cf. table 4.3). The official 
recommendation of the UN to the rich countries (which was confirmed 
in Agenda 21, ratified at the Earth Summit of Rio 1992) is to spend 
0.7% of their GNP on developmental aid. But most OECD countries are 
far from this aim; e.g. the USA only spend 0.19% of their GNP on 
developmental aid - a big part of that being military aid (Launer 1992, 
212 (according to World Bank 1990)). In view of that Schelling 
assumes that if the largest portion of the money needed for the 
abatement of greenhouse gases were spent on the development of the 
developing countries this would be much better for these countries 
(Schelling 1992, 7). Weakening this statement somewhat, in that not the 
largest, but a good part of the money should be spent on the 
development, this statement is also probably true from a welfarist point 
of view; not having calculated the value of such alternatives, however, I 
can only surmise this. My crude calculation of the efficiency of social 
assistance in NOECD countries, however, supports this view. The cost-
welfare relations for these were 3,659 dollars/qu and 2,627 dollars/ql 
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respectively (cf. table 5.11) or roughly a bit more (60% for 
utilitarianism) respectively a bit less (47% for utilex) than half of the 
cost-welfare relations of sustainable reduction (a4) -  with the 
undiscounted desirabilities. And good developmental aid, which helps 
to develop and is not only a continuous allowance, hopefully has still 
lower cost-welfare relations. - A further reason for surmising that 
developmental aid has a better cost-welfare relation than sustainable 
reduction is that a large part of the worst consequences of BAU will 
only be caused by the synergism of poverty and the greenhouse effect, 
e.g. death due to increased costs of food (which make up 39% (for 
utilitarianism) and 40% (for utilex) of all damages caused by BAU (cf. 
tables 5.1 and 5.5)). So developmental aid could even mitigate some 
negative consequences of the greenhouse effect, thus reducing its own 
cost-welfare relation. 
So what proposal for the further development of morals should be 
made by the historizing conception of our moral duties? Which new 
moral norms should be introduced? To answer this question, according 
to the criterion for applied ethics that among the presently 
implementable norms the morally best should be implemented (cf. 
above sect. 5.4), apart from moral efficiency, another condition has to 
be considered: which norms can be socially implemented at present? 
But with respect to this question it is rather clear that there is no fixed 
amount of moral contribution with free availability as to where to invest 
it - as a welfarist approach would like it. In our societies the moral 
willingness to pay depends on the object of investment. And a 
discussion as just begun, which takes further alternatives into account 
besides the greenhouse options will dissolve the unanimity of the 
different ethics as reached above in the valuation of a1 to a4: 1. 
According to deontological and liberal ethics, a switch of dedication of 
money intended for protection against the damages due to greenhouse 
effect towards other fields in which bigger increases of welfare can be 
reached, is not allowed because, according to these ethics, we have the 
(absolute) duty to prevent harming other people via greenhouse 
damages, whereas helping other people e.g. via developmental aid may 
only be a supererogatory act. A rigorous position of this kind, not 
allowing any trade-off between expensive prevention of small damages 
and cheap help with big effects even in the most extreme cases, is at 
least out of touch with reality. But milder (and not theoretically 
elaborated) versions seem to be rather influential in public morals. 2. In 
applied ethics there is always the basic conflict between global and 
sectoral justice: Is it possible to achieve justice only in certain sectors 
such as, in this case, distribution of the resource 'capacity of absorption 
for CO2' (cf. Elster 1992; Kverndokk 1995, 134)? Welfarist approaches 
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in ethics tend to take up a global perspective here, which is much more 
flexible and allows for compensation in whatever other sectors. On the 
other hand, taking up a global perspective, which leads to the inclusion 
of sectors like world poverty, distribution of other resources, the value 
of wildlife etc., subjectively increases the dimension of the problems 
and thus may discourage people from doing anything at all. So, at 
second sight, even from a welfarist point of view, largely respecting 
traditional sectors of duties and justice presently seems be the more 
successful option. This would include insisting on the principle that 
future generations may not be damaged by our greenhouse gas 
emissions or must be fairly compensated for that damage; such a 
principle would still allow for much flexibility. 
 
 
7.2. Moral Duties with Respect to the Greenhouse Effect 
 
What conclusions can be drawn from all these considerations 
regarding our duties with respect to the greenhouse effect? As 
insinuated in the last section even for welfarist ethics it would currently 
be wise to respect traditional sectors of duties and justice, i.e. in our 
case the sector of environmental damages provoked by the greenhouse 
effect. The following considerations therefore will be restricted to this 
sector. We should not forget, however, that the still unrestricted search 
for more efficient alternatives has revealed another very important field 
of urgent moral engagement: developmental aid and international help 
in the fight against absolute poverty should drastically be intensified as 
well. 
With respect to the discussed options concerning the greenhouse 
effect all ethics considered led to the order of preference: a4 > a3 > a2 > 
a1. Discussion of more differentiated options which include more 
measures of mitigation or compensation in the meantime revealed that 
there may be even better options between strong (a3) and sustainable 
reduction (a4). But actually we are still far from even realizing 
stabilization (a2). Thus, according to the historicizing conception of 
morals, present moral duties with respect to the greenhouse effect 
consist of pushing moral development in the direction of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions as far as politically feasible. If some greater 
moral progress in this direction has been achieved then which reduction 
aim is the best and which measures of mitigation and compensation 
should be taken may be decided more in detail. 
Thus, in particular at the moment we have the formal moral duty, to 
abide by currently valid national legal standards for CO2-reduction: 
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insulation regulations concerning heat or concerning cleaner or more 
efficient combustion by heating systems or motors, etc. Governments 
and the executive also have the formal moral duty to see to it that 
accepted international obligations regarding CO2-reduction are 
translated into laws and corresponding actions. Apart from that there is 
the informal moral duty, to minimize CO2-emissions as far as possible 
without larger subjective costs, by using less-polluting means of 
transportation, changing heating to non-fossil energy or similar actions. 
Finally, for any individual there is the imperfect moral duty, to help to 
bring about more rigid informal norms, e.g. by talking to others about 
their high CO2-emissions, and to engage politically for a tightening up 
of valid legal standards for CO2-reduction, e.g. for a high CO2-tax. 
Executives in particular have the imperfect moral duty to fight for much 
stronger reduction goals internationally and to introduce such stronger 
standards first on the national level. And the legislators have the 
imperfect moral duty to heighten the legal standards for greenhouse gas 
abatement as much as is politically feasible. 
 
 
Notes to Chapter 7 
 
                                                 
1 1. Many bottom-up studies state that the costs of CO2 stabilization in 
the OECD in the next decades can be neglected (Hourcade et al. 1996, 301; 
309); for the U.S.A. e.g. for 2025-2030 several studies calculate reductions of 
>61-82% (median 72%) below the level of the base year 1990 to result in zero 
net costs (ibid. 310 f.). There are several reasons why this calculation is too 
optimistic (cf. ibid. 309 f.); but top down-models on the other hand ignore many 
reduction possibilities. 2. All economic models of prognosis for greenhouse gas 
reduction, including top-down models, necessarily use rather speculative 
assumptions about technological development, especially about backstop 
technologies, e.g. that a non-carbon base liquid fuel will be developed costing 
100 US-dollars/barrel crude oil equivalent (Energy Modeling Forum cited by: 
Hourcade et al. 1996, 305). Also in this point bottom-up-studies are much more 
optimistic than top-down-studies. For example the Stockholm Environment 
Institute / Greenpeace 1993 in their "fossil-free energy future" scenario (where 
in the year 2100 79% of all energy is solar or wind energy) assumes that up to 
2030 a breakthrough in solar photovoltaic electricity production costs will take 
place along with a breakthrough in advanced storage facilities (SEI 1993). The 
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